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Abstract 
Hackers external to the organization continue to wreak havoc upon the information 
systems infrastructure of firms through breaches of security defenses, despite constant 
development of and continual investment in new IS security countermeasures by security 
professionals and vendors.  These breaches are exceedingly costly and damaging to the 
affected organizations.  The continued success of hackers in the face of massive amounts 
of security investments suggests that the defenders are losing and that the hackers can 
innovate at a much faster pace.   
     Underground hacker communities have been shown to be an environment where 
attackers can learn new techniques and share tools pertaining to the defeat of IS security 
countermeasures.  This research sought to understand the manner in which hackers 
diffuse innovations within these communities.  Employing a multi-site, positivist case 
study approach of four separate hacking communities, the study examined how hackers 
develop, communicate, and eventually adopt these new techniques and tools, so as to 
better inform future attempts at mitigating these attacks.  The research found that three 
classes of change agents are influential in the diffusion and adoption of an innovation: the 
developer/introducer of the innovation to the community, the senior member of a 
community, and the author of tutorials.  Additionally, the research found that three 
innovation factors are key to successful diffusion and adoption: the compatibility of the 
innovation to the needs of the community, the complexity of the innovation, and the 
change in image conferred upon the member from adopting the innovation.  The research 
also described the process by which innovations are adopted within the hacking 
communities and detailed phases in this process which are unique to these communities.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
     Over the past two decades, the frequency and severity of criminal attacks upon 
Information Systems (IS) resources and assets have risen dramatically (Dowland, Furnell, 
Illingworth, & Reynolds, 1999; Verizon, 2010).  As the world becomes increasingly 
reliant upon IS and the Internet for many important aspects of a functioning society – 
including entertainment, social connections, government programs, and commerce, as 
well as critical infrastructure components such as banking, power generation, and defense 
– disruptions to those aspects can have far-reaching financial and social consequences.  
Furthermore, organizations have embraced information technology as both a way to 
improve operating efficiency as well as an industry in its own right (Oliner & Sichel, 
2000), and over time firms have so tightly integrated IS within their operations that it has 
indeed become the very core of business (Dhillon, 1995).  As such, disruption of an 
organization’s IS infrastructure by malicious attackers can have significant impacts upon 
the affected organization.  
     Organizations’ IS have also increasingly been the target of attackers located outside 
the organization, which today outnumber the “insider” attacks originating from within the 
organization (Richardson, 2011).  These external hackers have undergone a steady 
evolution from individuals motivated by challenge, curiosity, or notoriety (Hoath & 
Mulhall, 1998; Jordan & Taylor, 1998; Leeson & Coyne, 2005) to dedicated and well-
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organized computer criminals with a financial motivation rooted firmly in profit (Kshetri, 
2006; Moore, Clayton, & Anderson, 2009).  Attacks from external hackers have also 
claimed a greater financial impact upon the affected organizations, and most successful 
hacks often target economic-oriented organizations operating in the financial, hospitality, 
or retail industries (Verizon, 2010).  As an example, the widely publicized attacks 
perpetrated against the retail firm TJX resulted in significant negative financial 
disruptions, including remediation costs, shareholder lawsuits, a loss of consumer 
confidence, and a reduction in market capitalization (Holt & Lampke, 2010; Xu, Grant, 
Nyugen, & Dai, 2008).  Prior research has shown that the publicity of such attacks 
against an organization’s IS can have severe financial effects upon the share price of the 
targeted firm (Cavusoglu, Mishra, & Raghunathan, 2004a) especially when the attack 
involves the breach of confidential information (Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, & Zhou, 
2003).  
     Because of the possibility of negative financial impacts following a successful attack, 
firms have heavily invested in IS security countermeasures as a defense against attackers.  
According to the 2010/2011 Computer Security Institute survey, traditional IS security 
countermeasures are widely deployed – 97% of organizations utilize antivirus programs, 
94.9% utilize firewalls, and 62.4% utilize intrusion detection systems, for example – 
although satisfaction with these countermeasures by organizational IS security officers 
hovers at around 40% (Richardson, 2011).  Despite the presence of these 
countermeasures within organizations, users still continue to be victimized by attackers 
(Holt & Lampke, 2010).  Furthermore, research into the deterrent value of these 
countermeasures has indicated that hackers are generally unfazed by the IS security 
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countermeasures deployed by organizations and can generally find other methods of 
gaining access to targeted organizations (Tejay & Zadig, 2012), calling into question their 
efficacy.   
     Furthermore, Anderson et al. (2012) describe the economic state of IS security as 
being extremely lopsided, with defenders spending disproportionate amounts of money 
on countermeasures when compared with the illicit gains made by the attackers.  
According to Anderson (2001), even moderately-resourced attackers are able to defeat 
the security defenses of large and complex organizations, due to the sheer number of 
vulnerabilities that can be found and the necessity of defenders to secure everywhere in 
their infrastructure, a situation he calls a “Tragedy of the Commons in security”.  And 
yet, spending by organizations upon IS security continues to increase (Buzzard, 1999; 
Mercuri, 2003), even as the incidences of data loss from malicious attackers rise, along 
with the financial loss per successful attack (Richardson, 2011).  Put succinctly, attackers 
and defenders are in an IS security arms race, where the brunt of the costs are born by the 
defenders, and the attackers are winning by almost every measure.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
     To be able to consistently defeat the continual development and investment in 
sophisticated IS security countermeasures by organizations, and to ensure continued 
success in their criminal activities as described above, hackers must need to constantly 
develop new methods of breaching the defenses of organizations.  Hackers are extremely 
collaborative and routinely share knowledge within specialized communities, in order to 
develop innovative approaches to circumvent security controls (Bachmann, 2010; Holt 
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2009; Holt, Strumsky, Smirnova, & Kilger, 2012; Jordan & Taylor, 1998).  In particular, 
Bratus (2007) identifies attack techniques and attack tool development as areas of active 
learning within hacker communities.   
     Holt (2007) identified web forums as a type of community where hackers can share 
knowledge and tutorials regarding various aspects of hacking, in a supportive and 
reinforcing environment.  Bratus (2007) also described hacker magazines and hacker 
conferences as other locations where “black hat” attackers can learn new hacking skills 
from other hackers.  Jordan and Taylor (1998) examined both internal and external 
factors involved in the operation of underground hacker communities, although their 
research was done during the time of hacking for challenge or notoriety and before 
financial aspects became prime motivators of computer attacks.  Despite these 
examinations, however, there remains a general lack of understanding of how new 
hacking techniques are developed within these communities, and how the communication 
of these new ideas may play a role in the eventual adoption of the innovations by hackers.   
     The research problem of this study, therefore, is to understand the nature and 
characteristics by which participants of hacking communities develop and adopt 
techniques to circumvent IS security controls.  This research focuses specifically upon 
the areas of attack techniques and tool development, as identified by Bratus (2007).  This 
research argues that the development and dispersion of innovations within hacker 
communities is a coordinated and structured process, akin to the innovation process that 
may be found within legitimate organizations.  Far from being a collection of lone 
hackers who are committing attacks upon random targets, these communities are 
populated with well-organized attackers cooperating to engage in ever-more sophisticated 
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and complex attacks upon victim organizations (Anderson et al. 2012; Moore, Clayton, & 
Anderson, 2009; Ollman, 2008; Thomas & Martin, 2006).  An understanding of the 
innovative processes of attack technique and hacking tool development within these 
communities, therefore, is a crucial requirement for future efforts to reduce the 
effectiveness of hackers, and increase the IS security of organizations.  This study is 
significant because it examines the previously-unexplored area of hacking technique 
development within hacker communities and the effect that this constant innovation has 
upon attacks directed towards organizations.  By examining these factors of hacker 
effectiveness, researchers will be able to gain a holistic understanding of hacker attacks, 
and can seek to obtain additional methods for the mitigation of such attacks.   
  
1.3 Research Questions and Propositions 
    Based upon the above research problem and argument, the following two research 
questions are appropriate:  
1. What characteristics affect the development and communication of emergent 
hacking techniques and tools within hacker communities?  
2. How do the participants in these communities decide to adopt these techniques 
and employ them in attacks against organizations?  
     The first research question deals with how hackers in these collaborative communities 
come to develop their new hacking techniques.  Prior adoption research has shown that 
innovation occurs within an organization when a new product or process invention is 
introduced in response to a need or want (Utterback, 1971), and as such an examination 
of these needs will be illuminative for the present study.  Once the innovation is 
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introduced to the hacking community, how the innovation is communicated within the 
community is also of relevance to this question.  Ebadi and Utterback (1984) had found 
that a number of factors, to include the frequency of communication, position of the 
innovation within the organization, and diversity of parties in communication positively 
affect the success of an innovation; overly formalized communication, however, was 
shown to have a negative effect.  Therefore, how hackers communicate regarding the new 
innovation will likely affect the eventual adoption of the new hacking techniques and 
tools and was an area requiring study.  
     As a result of this discussion of this first research question, two related propositions 
can be derived:  
P1: Participants of hacking communities develop new techniques when existing 
hacking techniques cease to reliably breach targeted organizations.  
P2: The methods by which the new hacking techniques are communicated amongst the 
community affect the adoption of the innovations.  
     The second research question deals with how new techniques are adopted once a new 
hacking technique is developed and communicated.  For example, an examination of the 
characteristics of individual hackers who advocate for adoption of the innovation by the 
community will be necessary; Rogers (2003) describes these individuals as “change 
agents”.  Moore and Benbasat (1991), from seminal technology acceptance literature, 
describe a number of factors that are related to the adoption of new technologies; these 
factors will be evaluated in light of hacking innovation adoption within hacker 
communities.  Also of relevance to this research is the determination of not only how an 
innovation is initially adopted, but whether or not the innovation continues to be used by 
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the attackers, which may determine how it will be employed against victim organizations 
and their IS security countermeasures.  
     Similarly, the following propositions can be derived from this discussion: 
P3: Change agents within the hacking community are instrumental in the adoption of 
the hacking innovation.  
P4:  Continued use of a hacking innovation by community members will determine the 
ultimate adoption of an innovation. 
     These research questions, and derived propositions, guided the present research study.  
 
1.4 Relevance and Significance  
     As described above, the ability of hackers to consistently overcome advances in IS 
security countermeasures has been extremely problematic for organizations who wish to 
defend against these attacks.  While prior research has shown that hackers participate in 
specialized communities where they can learn new hacking techniques (Bratus, 2007; 
Holt, 2009), in general the extant research has not examined the methods by which this 
innovation occurs.  A greater understanding of the methods by which hackers develop 
new hacking techniques and tools may result in the development of enhanced IS security 
defenses that can be deployed by organizations, or in the ability by law enforcement or IS 
security firms to disrupt hacker communities by interrupting the innovation process or 
targeting key members of the community for arrest and prosecution.  
     Previous attempts at understanding hacker communities have focused upon in-person 
hacker conferences (Bratus, 2007) or, in the case of online forums, have been limited to 
either the examination of social pressures or subcultural norms present in these 
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communities (Holt, 2007; Holt & Copes, 2010; Jordan & Taylor, 1998) or an analysis of 
the structure of the community itself (Lu, Polgar, Luo, & Cao, 2010).  These attempts, 
while useful for understanding the mindset or organization of hackers, have not attempted 
to solve the problem of the constant attacks that organizations face, and as a result the 
costly cycle of attack and defend has continued unabated.  The present study, on the other 
hand, sought to obtain an understanding of the process by which hackers develop and 
adopt new hacking techniques or hacking tools, which are subsequently used upon victim 
organizations.  A detailed study of this process may open up new research horizons into 
the areas of hacker innovation and may lead to the creation of novel defenses that reflect 
this innovation process.  
     This study also added to the body of knowledge by conducting IS innovation research 
in a criminal context; prior IS innovation research has focused upon the legitimate 
development of IS within organizations.  In the non-IS innovation realm, only a handful 
of studies have focused explicitly on criminal innovations, and these have emphasized 
white collar financial crimes – notably fraud in the subprime mortgage market (Koller, 
2010), resource investor fraud (Baker & Faulkner, 2003), stock option fraud (Snyder, 
Priem, & Levitas, 2009), and the diffusion of check forgery innovations (Lacoste & 
Tremblay, 2003).  This study, therefore, offers a new area of innovation research for IS 
scholars – that of the development of deliberately malicious IS innovations. This research 
also contributed to innovation research by adding to the relatively minor amount of 
research on criminal innovations in general.  
     Furthermore, these hacker communities are often invitation-only or require that 
participants prove their “street cred”, or ability to conduct criminal activity, before being 
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admitted (Leydon, 2011).  Hackers reside within specialized subcultures with their own 
unique speech, norms, and values (Holt, 2007; Holt, 2009) and outsiders can often have 
difficulty when they try to understand the inhabitants of those subcultures (Conti, 2000).  
Research into criminal organizations is itself a difficult issue within the criminology 
discipline (Feenan, 2002; Ferral & Hamm, 1998).  As a result, only a few security 
researchers have attempted to study malicious (or “blackhat”) attackers directly – instead, 
many have opted to investigate hackers who test IS security systems without explicitly 
breaking the law (“greyhats”), or substitute non-malicious users (“whitehats”) or even 
university students in empirical studies of misuse (Mahmood, Siponen, Straub, Rao, & 
Raghu, 2010).  This study, therefore, was a significant and novel research endeavor.  
 
1.7 Scope and Definitions 
     A proper understanding of the key concepts and terms essential to this study is 
required before proceeding further.  Leibenau and Backhouse (1990) describe 
information as a collection of data, arranged in some meaningful way and for some 
perceived purpose.  They further describe an information system (IS) as the aggregate of 
information handling activities within the technical, formal, and informal levels of an 
organization.  Given this definition, it is difficult to delineate where the organization ends 
and IS begins, and as such the organization and the information system are essentially 
indistinguishable (Dhillon, 1995).  The formal level of IS encompasses organizational 
bureaucracy that governs rules of interaction, both inter-organizational and intra-
organizational, while the informal level encompasses organizational subculture where the 
associated meanings, intentions, and beliefs are defined (Dhillon & Backhouse, 1994).  
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The technical level includes the organization’s information technology components and 
enables and automates the functioning of the formal system.  These three levels can 
therefore be viewed as a series of concentric rings, with the technical system in the 
middle, surrounded by the formal system of bureaucratic rules, which is in turn 
surrounded by the informal system that interprets and gives meaning (Dhillon & 
Backhouse, 1996).  
     Historically, classical studies of computer security have focused upon technical 
aspects and have emphasized solutions within the “CIA” sphere: confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability (Anderson, 2003).  However, this definition ignores the 
organizational aspects of security.  Expanding upon the definition of an IS described 
above, Dhillon (1995) describes information systems security as the minimization of risks 
that arise because of inconsistent and incoherent activities with respect to an 
organization’s information handling activities. Anderson (2003) provides an alternate 
definition by defining IS security as “a well-informed sense of assurance that information 
risks and controls are in balance”. This effort to minimize IS risk has been examined 
through many different lenses, including the evolution of IS security analysis and design 
(Baskerville, 1993), development of appropriate security policies (Baskerville & Siponen, 
2002), and importantly for a discussion pertaining to computer crime, deterring computer 
abuse (Straub & Welke, 1998).  
    Computer crime (or alternatively, “cybercrime”) has been defined in various ways.  
Doss (2012) states that the terms computer crime and cybercrime have different 
meanings, although they are often confused in the literature.  Doss describes 
“cybercrime” as a crime that occurs utilizing a computer or information system, but it 
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does not have the computer as the focus of the crime and are instead used as aids to the 
crime, such as in Internet-based fraud.  Computer crimes, alternately, are crimes where 
the computer or information system is the focus of the crime, such as computer hacking, 
denial of service, or software piracy (Doss, 2012).  For the purposes of this research, the 
term computer crime will be utilized in lieu of cybercrime to alleviate any confusion 
within the literature. 
     In line with this notion of computer crime, Kshertri (2005) defines a computer crime 
as “any crime that employs a computer network in any phase of the crime”, while Chung, 
Chen, Chang, and Chou (2006) define it as “illegal computer-mediated activities that 
often take place in the global electronic networks”.  Both of these definitions focus upon 
the involvement of a computer network.  Alternatively, the US Department of Justice 
(2010) provides a definition which does not include a networked component: that a 
computer crime involves either an individual who exceeds authorized access to a 
computer, which encompasses insiders, who have some form of authorized access to an 
organization’s IS (D’Arcy & Hovav, 2009); or an individual who intrudes into a 
computer without authorization, which encompasses external hackers, who have no 
authorized access to an organization’s IS.  This research is specifically concerned with 
individuals located outside of the organization that are engaged in attacks over computer 
networks.  
     Attacks from hackers external to the organization are today more prevalent and more 
costly than insider attacks, as described previously.  The external hackers that are to be 
examined in the present study are known as “blackhats”, or those who conduct attacks for 
personal gain without concern for the damage that may be caused.  Other hacker types – 
  12
including the “whitehats”, the hackers that do not conduct malicious attacks out of ethical 
considerations, or “greyhats”, the hackers that may conduct malicious attacks but who 
generally seek to improve security or warn users (Bratus, 2007; Holt, 2009) – are not the 
focus of this study.  Blackhat hackers tend to believe they have much more to gain than to 
lose from conducting attacks and generally perceive a low likelihood of being identified 
and prosecuted for their criminal acts (Young, Zhang, & Prybutok, 2007).  This 
consideration of risks versus reward implies that hackers are rational actors who make 
economic decisions, which has led to research employing game theory to model the 
interactions between external hackers and IS security defenders (Cavusoglu, Cavusoglu, 
& Raghunathan, 2004).  In general, however, the IS security literature has shown a 
distinct preference towards an understanding of whitehat defenders, to the exclusion of 
the blackhat attackers (Mahmood, Siponen, Straub, Rao, & Raghu, 2010). 
     Organizations employ IS security countermeasures, or controls, as a means of 
defending against the constant barrage of hacker attacks. Straub (1990) described two 
classes of IS security countermeasures – deterrents, which may discourage potential 
offenders, and preventives, which impede potential attackers.  Ransbotham and Mitra 
(2009) examined organizational use of IS security countermeasures in their study of paths 
to IS security compromise and found that these countermeasures can be described in five 
categories: access control, or restricting access to IS assets based upon need; vulnerability 
control, or the removing of known errors in hardware or software that can be exploited by 
attackers; feature control, or the adjustment of IS asset settings to reduce the potential for 
abuse; traffic control, or the monitoring and blocking of malicious traffic; and audit 
control, the documenting of systems that can be used for auditing.  
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     Hackers can often be found in underground hacker communities, where they can 
obtain support and engage in the sharing of knowledge related to attacks (Holt, 2013; 
Jordan & Taylor, 1998).   These communities typically take the form of web forums, 
newsgroups, and Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels, and often include the use of jargon 
and slang unique to the underground hacker scene (Holt, 2009).  Hacker communities 
often resemble marketplaces, with various hackers specializing in providing different 
types of criminal services for a fee (Holt, 2013).  While hackers can also exchange 
information in off-line environments, such as hacker conferences (Bachmann, 2010; Holt 
2009), the present study will focus upon online hacker communities.  These hacker 
communities are meritocracies, where participants are evaluated based upon their 
technical skills and abilities, and by sharing hacking knowledge and techniques a hacker 
is able to demonstrate his proficiency and highlight his value to the community (Holt et 
al., 2012).  The emphasis upon education is important, as these communities are 
primarily filled with hackers of lower technical skill and ability, who are trying to learn 
how to be more effective at conducting attacks, and with only a small number of truly 
“elite” hackers capable of providing such knowledge (Holt, 2007; Holt et al., 2012; 
Jordan & Taylor, 1998).  Hackers in these forums frequently share tools and post 
fraudulently-obtained information for others to utilize (Holt & Lampke, 2010, Peretti, 
2009).  These forums often begin as a “swarm” structure with no obvious leaders as 
hackers meet and trade information, but evolve into more formalized “hub” structure as 
the community matures, with greater levels of organization, and frequently involve 
transnational constituents (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013).  
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     It is important to note that the areas of cyberwarfare and cyberespionage, (Everett, 
2009, Goel, 2011, Kshetri, 2005, Mandiant, 2013; Richardson 2011) as well as 
cyberterrorism (Foltz, 2002; Hansen, Lowry, Meservy, & McDonald, 2007), even though 
they involve individuals that meet the definition of a “hacker”, are outside of the scope of 
this paper, which is focused upon the diffusion of information within hacker communities 
of a purely criminal nature.   
 
1.8 Summary 
     Organizations continue to suffer costly attacks from external hackers, even as 
spending on security countermeasures increases dramatically.   These attacks often have 
devastating consequences, to include reductions in share price, loss of customer 
confidence, and expensive remediation efforts.  Research has shown that hackers are 
collaborative and share knowledge in underground communities; to continually defeat 
organizational IS security countermeasures, these hackers must be constantly innovative 
in their attacks.  Today’s hackers are increasingly motivated by financial goals and 
conduct attacks for profit, instead of the notoriety or challenge that motivated previous 
generations of hackers.   
     This study focuses upon the highly organized process of development and adoption of 
new hacking methods to overcome these countermeasures.  These communities of 
hackers in fact resemble legitimate organizations with their collaborative and innovative 
behavior, and reap the rewards when their successful hacking innovations allow them to 
penetrate organizations.  
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
 
2.1 Introduction 
     This chapter describes prior literature of relevance to an inquiry related to the 
diffusion of innovations pertaining to IS security countermeasure circumvention and 
defeat by external hackers.  This literature includes an overview of research pertaining to 
hackers, computer crime, and the effects of hacker attacks upon the economics of 
information systems security, as well as research related to IS security countermeasures.   
 
2.2 Hackers and Computer Criminals 
     The word “hacker” was originally a positive term when first used to describe 
individuals who were especially skilled at developing creative computer programs and 
algorithms (Bacchman, 2010).  Individuals at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
first identified themselves as hackers in the 1960s and 1970s, when the computer use 
began to become more prevalent (Hoath & Mulhall, 1998; Turgeman-Goldschmid, 2005).  
These first hackers emphasized solving problems and building innovative software, and 
encouraged such traits as hacker cooperation, helping other hackers, and learning new 
methodologies, and such this definition of hacker can still be found in use in open-source 
development communities (Stewart & Gosain, 2006).  Later, the term evolved to 
encompass computer criminals, but these early illicit hackers possessed a strong ethical 
code, usually informal but sometimes formalized in hacker publications, such as 2600 or 
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Hacktivismo (Gordon & Ma, 2003).  Hackers initially began to cross into criminal 
behavior with the behavior known as “phreaking”, or breaking into telephone systems to 
make free long distance calls (Leeson & Coyne, 2005). Many of these earlier hackers 
fought to make protected information freely accessible in the hopes that a more 
egalitarian society would develop (Hollinger, 1991).  Over time, however, the term has 
been negatively associated with computer criminals that often operate without such an 
ethical code, and who may engage in such activities purely for profit (Galbreth & Shor, 
2010).  While some utilize the term “crackers” for such malicious hackers (Barber, 
2001a), for the most part the term “hacker” has become a negative one used to describe 
cybercriminals (Hollinger, 1991).  
     Historically, the hacker community has been male-dominated (Jordan & Taylor, 1998) 
and hackers are often college-aged (Xu, Hu, & Zhang, 2013) and come from upper-
middle class backgrounds (Hollinger, 1991).  Before the present age of financially-
motivated attackers, most individuals who identified as hackers were motivated by 
sociological forces – including desires for challenge (Hoath & Mulhall, 1998), notoriety 
(Leeson & Coyne, 2005), or excitement and curiosity (Turgeman-Goldschmid, 2005).  
Many criminal hackers often describe themselves as being troublemakers when younger, 
whose deviant behavior evolved into hacking (Turgeman-Goldschmid, 2008).  Hu, 
Zhang, and Xu (2012) explored this notion of early deviance and antisocialism and found 
that young people who possessed strong moral beliefs and exerted self-control, and who 
favored social activities such as sports over antisocial activities such as computer games, 
were much less likely to become hackers.   
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     Despite the above, IS security researchers have shown a historical preference for 
focusing upon insider crime – that is, attacks upon IS that originated from within the 
organization by rogue employees or others with insider access (Schultz, 2002).  After all, 
insiders have significant opportunities to engage in computer crimes due to their 
legitimate access to IS resources (Willison & Backhouse, 2006).  Doss (2012) also points 
out that external attackers can become insiders through the use of malware, perhaps of a 
variety that provides covert access to internal resources.  As such, a brief description of 
insider IS crime is warranted.  
     Straub and Nance (1990) examined the discovery and managerial discipline of 
computer abusers within organizations, and defined computer abuse as “unauthorized, 
deliberate, and internally recognized misuse of assets of the local organizational 
information system”.  Straub (1990) similarly focused primarily on insider attacks in a 
study involving the deterrent values of IS security countermeasures, and found that well-
communicated security policies combined with the employment of security surveillance 
tools can result in significant reductions in internal abuse.  D’Arcy and Hovav (2007) 
examined the deterrent effects of technical countermeasures (computer monitoring and 
preventive security software) and non-technical (security policies and security awareness 
programs) on internal abuse and found the non-technical countermeasures were more 
effective, and that one of the technical countermeasures – computer monitoring – did not 
have a significant countermeasure effect at all.  In a follow-up study, D’Arcy and Hovav 
(2009) found that technically-savvy users are less impacted by some countermeasures, as 
they may feel like they can more easily overcome these controls.  
  18
     Dhillon and Moores (2001) conducted two case studies of particularly egregious 
insider attacks involving the securities and banking industries, highlighting lax internal 
controls at the technical, formal, and informal levels.  Willison and Backhouse (2006) 
examined the factors involved in opportunistic attacks upon IS by internal abusers, and 
suggested that the considering the offender’s perspective may be useful in understanding 
attacks perpetrated by insiders against vulnerable IS resources.  These studies, however, 
and others that focus upon insider attacks (Lee & Lee, 2002; Theoharidou, Kokolakis, 
Karyda, & Kiountouzis, 2005; Willison, 2000) often rely upon deterrent models that 
assume that organizations have access to offenders to administer sanctions, which 
typically does not apply in the case of external hackers.  Organizations are often very 
proficient at informing internal users of the presence of security countermeasures and the 
severity of punishments for abuse (D’Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009), but extending that 
deterrence to external hackers is much more difficult.  
     Deterring internal hackers has been a significant area of research, and has focused 
upon the employment of criminological theories within the IS realm (Xu, Hu, & Zhang, 
2013).  Straub (1990) utilized General Deterrence Theory (GDT) to understand IS abuse, 
an approach that relies upon the administration of sanctions in response to criminal 
behavior as a means of deterrence.  Strong and visible policing, combined with the 
promise of swift and harsh punishment, dissuades potential criminals from committing 
crimes by emphasizing that the risks of detection are too high and that the punishment if 
detected would be too severe to make it worth committing the crime in the first place.  
GDT relies upon the thinking that attackers engage in attacks based upon the 
maximization of benefit and the minimization of costs (Theoharidou, Kokolakis, Karyda, 
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& Kiountouzis, 2005).  In an organizational context, Straub and Welke (1998), in their 
“Security Action Cycle”, state that potential IS abusers are deterred by robust security 
policies, effective detection mechanisms, and appropriate punishments.  
     Lee and Lee (2002) also examined Social Bond Theory (SBT) as a means of 
deterrence, which states that strong social bonds deter organizational insiders from 
engaging in criminal activity, as well as Social Learning Theory (SLT), which posits that 
individuals commit crime because they associate with delinquents and take on their 
values.  In an IS context, employees who are more socially attached to their coworkers 
and who do not associate with computer criminals are less likely to engage in computer 
crime.   Lee and Lee (2002) suggested a holistic model employing SBT, SLT, and GDT 
together to understand and deter insider IS abuse.  Other research has examined the 
impacts of offender rationalization, motivation, and disgruntlement upon computer crime 
and deterrence (Willison & Warkentin, 2013).  
     Theories that focus upon the computer crime itself, instead of the computer criminal, 
have also been examined.  One such theory is that of Situational Crime Prevention (SCP), 
which seeks to increase the risks of detection for criminal acts while reducing their 
rewards (Willison, 2000).  Examples of deterrence through SCP include the hardening of 
potential targets through increased countermeasures, as well as the employment of 
surveillance.  Other attempts at understanding the crime have included examinations of 
the choices that criminals make when conducting the criminal act, environmental factors 
that affect a criminal’s choice of a target or site, and the routine activities of the targets 
and how they interact with the tools employed by criminals (Willison, 2006).  While 
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these studies were intended for the insider threat, many of these theories may have 
applicability when considering attacks from outsiders as well (Zadig & Tejay, 2010).  
 
2.3 Computer Crime External to the Organization 
     Computer crime is a rather broad field – after all, criminals are very adept at 
exploiting many aspects of IS for illicit gain.  Of relevance to this study, Richardson 
(2011) identified malware – or malicious software – as a major problem for organizations 
that frequently contributes to the compromise of IS resources by external attackers.  
Computer viruses were one of the first types of malware, and initially rose to prominence 
in the 1980’s (Cohen, 1987).  These early computer viruses spread slowly at first, as 
many computers during this time period were not networked and instead relied upon 
infections that spread using floppy disks (Highland, 1997).  An early exception to this 
was the Morris Worm, which infected 5% of the networked computers on the early 
Internet in 1988 (Orman, 2003).  Later Internet-based viruses wrought increasingly 
expensive destruction, including the Melissa virus in 1999 and the ILOVEYOU virus in 
2000, each of which cost millions or billions of dollars in damages to organizations 
worldwide (Bishop, 2000; Garber, 1999).  
     The landscape malware of today, however, is significantly more advanced and 
crowded.  One of the most prevalent types of malware in existence today is known as a 
botnet, or a robot network.  Botnets consist of many infected victim computers known as 
bots that are controlled through a command and control infrastructure operated by 
computer hackers (Ianelli & Hackworth, 2006; UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013).  
Botnets are believed to infect many millions of computers worldwide (Weber, 2007), 
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resulting in significant computing and bandwidth resources in the hands of criminals.  
According to Zadig and Tejay (2011), botnets are operated by hackers for a number of 
criminal purposes, including the sending of spam, financial theft from victim computers 
or online bank accounts, denial of service attacks, fraudulent clicks upon online 
advertisements, and information stealing, among others.  The primary purpose for botnets 
is the generation of profits for the botmasters, as the hackers who control them are called, 
and it seems that profit has allowed these hackers to become more specialized and 
professional.  For example, Ollman (2008) described how some computer-based hacking 
groups emulate legitimate IS firms, and employ large malware development teams, offer 
service level agreements and product support for customers, and provide managed 
criminal services.  Moore, Clayton, and Anderson (2009) state that some of these groups 
even have dedicated budgets for research and development and testing, with the end 
result that “online crime has become organized and industrialized like no other crime, 
with the possible exception of the drug trade” (Moore et al., 2009, p. 17). 
     Indeed, economic thinking appears to be at the heart of modern hacker activities.  One 
type of malware known as “fake antivirus” programs, designed to socially-engineer users 
into paying for fraudulent security programs, is estimated to have been purchased by over 
one million victims (Provos, Rajab, & Mavrommatis, 2009).  Thomas and Martin (2006) 
examined underground computer crime marketplaces devoted to the trading of financial 
data and detailed significant amounts of specialization, where attackers can take on many 
roles involved in the compromise, sale, purchase, and liquidation of online bank 
accounts.  Other criminal groups have ventured into the profitable market of “bulletproof 
hosting”, offering hosting services where hackers can host criminal IS infrastructure 
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without fear of removal due to abuse complaints or requests from law enforcement 
(Stone-Gross, Kruegel, Almeroth, Moser, & Kirda, 2009).  And Choo (2008) states that 
many hacking groups have begun to employ various organizational structures to properly 
manage their criminal activities, while traditional organized crime groups have begun to 
expand their money-making operations online (Choo & Smith, 2008).  According to the 
United Nations, approximately 80-90% of all computer crime now originates from some 
form of organized activity, be it highly organized groups or more loosely-organized 
criminal markets (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013).  
     Hackers can also engage in significant attacks without the use of sophisticated or 
customized malware.  For example, the “Anonymous” hackers employed rudimentary 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) tools that were nevertheless able to take numerous 
targeted organizations offline (Lua & Yow, 2011).  Hackers also often employ 
commercial or open-source off-the-shelf vulnerability scanners to scan target networks 
for vulnerable applications or security holes that they can exploit to gain access (Barber, 
2001b), or utilize “sniffer” software to intercept passwords or other sensitive information 
as it is transmitted over the network (Venter & Eloff, 2003).  These tools are designed to 
overcome the IS security countermeasures deployed by organizations as defenses against 
hackers.  
 
2.4 IS Security Countermeasures 
       Using the US Department of Justice (2010) definition above, computer crime 
originating from outside the organization occurs when an individual accesses a computer 
system without authorization.  In order to access this system, the hacker must have 
bypassed or defeated the IS security countermeasures erected as a defense by the 
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organization.  Straub (1990) describes IS security countermeasures as both technical and 
non-technical methods to prevent and deter computer abuse, which fall into the classes of 
deterrents, such as security policies, and preventives, such as physical and technical 
security measures.  Cavusoglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan (2004b) took a non-deterrence 
approach and divided countermeasures into categories of preventives and detectives, the 
latter being those that can detect and inform about security events without physically 
impeding them.  As described previously, Ransbotham and Mitra (2009) detailed the 
types of technical countermeasures available to organizations in their work on 
countermeasures and the effects upon IS security compromises. These countermeasures 
can be classified into the broad categories of access control, vulnerability control, feature 
control, traffic control, and audit control.  Tejay and Zadig (2012) provided a summary of 
these countermeasures, which can be found in Table 1.  
Table 1: IS Security Countermeasures (from Tejay & Zadig, 2012) 
Countermeasure Definition Examples 
Access Control Restricting access by people and software 
based on need 
Access control lists, user 
authentication 
Vulnerability Control Removing known errors in hardware and 
software that can be exploited for 
inappropriate use 
Software patching, validation of 
user input 
Feature Control Setting parameters in devices and 
software to reduce inappropriate use 
Disabling insecure or unused 
ports or protocols 
Traffic Control Monitoring and blocking traffic based on 
identification of inappropriate activity 
Packet filtering, blocking traffic 
Audit Control Documentation of systems and activity 
that can be used for audits and actions 
Logging and management of 
activity records 
 
     Tejay and Zadig (2012) also developed a framework of IS security countermeasures 
(or “controls”) available to organizations in their work on the deterrent efficacy of these 
countermeasures.  Figure 1 describes this framework and provides examples of where 
typical countermeasures would be located within the framework, which was based on the 
countermeasure categorization provided by Ransbotham and Mitra (2009).  In this 
  24
framework, countermeasures are broken into four quadrants, representing the domain of 
the particular countermeasure, either internal or external to the organization; and the 
nature of the countermeasure, either active or passive.  As can be seen, these 
countermeasures focus primarily upon technical aspects of IS security, but also include 
the non-technical countermeasures within the legal system, which was not originally 
included by Ransbotham and Mitra.  
 
Figure 1: IS Security Countermeasure Framework          (from Tejay & Zadig, 2012) 
 
     Internal active countermeasures consist of many of the standard technical controls 
employed by IS security professionals and described extensively within the literature.  
These countermeasures are considered active because they directly inhibit an attack from 
occurring (Tejay & Zadig, 2012), such as in the case of firewalls or access control lists 
which block non-conforming network connections or unauthorized users (Bishop, 2003; 
NIST, 1995) and antivirus software which physically deletes or quarantines files 
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containing viruses (Venter & Eloff, 2003).  These countermeasures are mostly those 
referred to as preventives by Cavusoglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan (2004b).  Active 
countermeasures encompass the categories of access control, vulnerability control, 
feature control, and traffic control (with the exception of traffic monitoring) from 
Ransbotham and Mitra (2009), as each of these categories can be considered a direct 
impediment to attack.  They are considered internal because they are physically located 
within the organization itself and are deployed within the organization’s IS security 
infrastructure (Tejay & Zadig, 2012).  Countermeasures of the internal active category 
are among the ones most regularly employed by IS security units (Richardson, 2011).   
     Organizations also frequently have external active countermeasures at their disposal.  
These controls are external because they are located outside of the organization, and may 
be under the control of external entities such as Internet Service Providers or Managed 
Security Service Providers (Tejay & Zadig, 2012).  Examples of these controls include 
intrusion prevention systems (IPS) outside of the organization’s firewall (Patel, Qassim, 
& Wills, 2010) or ISP-level defenses such as router access control lists or denial of 
service prevention devices (Mirkovic & Reiher, 2004).  Richardson (2011) states that 
controls of this type, such as IPS, are used by roughly half of IS security departments.  
     Internal passive controls are also often used in organizations.  Unlike active controls, 
passive countermeasures are concerned not with directly stopping an attack, but instead 
with obtaining information about attacks so that future attacks can be stopped or the 
attackers identified.  These types of controls are those referred to as detectives by 
Cavusoglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan (2004b).  Passive countermeasures encompass the 
category of audit control and traffic monitoring from Ransbotham and Mitra (2009).  
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Examples of this type of control include intrusion detection systems (Mukherjee, 
Heberlein, & Levitt, 1994), audit logs (Schneier & Kelsey, 1999), and forensics (Corey, 
Peterman, Shearin, Greenberg, & Bokkelen, 2002).  While passive countermeasures do 
not prevent attacks, they can be used as deterrents if their presence is known, and 
information gathered after an attack can be used to prevent further attacks through active 
means (Hansen, Lowry, Meservy, & McDonald, 2007).  According to Richardson (2011), 
these countermeasures are used less often than active controls, and he hypothesizes that 
organizations are increasingly less interested in identifying the perpetrators of attacks and 
more in favor of stopping attacks outright.  
     The last category of IS security countermeasures available to organizations are 
external passive controls.  As described by Tejay and Zadig (2012), these controls consist 
of the options available to attacked organizations within the criminal justice and legal 
system, to include referrals to law enforcement, the prosecution of attackers, and the 
various domestic and international laws pertaining to computer crime (Bell, 2002; 
Hollinger & Lanza-Kaduce, 1988).  Unlike in the case of insider attacks, organizations 
rarely have access to external hackers for the purposes of administering punishment as 
they are usually out of reach (Foltz, 2004) and therefore must turn to the courts if 
sanctions are to be given.  According to Richardson (2011), organizations are reporting 
fewer and fewer intrusions to the authorities, often because they did not believe that law 
enforcement would be able to help, because the incident was too small to report, or 
because they feared that negative publicity would hurt the stock price or public image of 
their organization.  Other studies provide some support for the reduction in stock value 
following publicity of security breaches (Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, & Zhou, 2003; 
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Cavusoglu, Mishra, & Raghunathan, 2004a), as will be discussed next.  Nevertheless, 
some research has shown that hackers fear arrest and prosecution and may change their 
behavior to avoid it (Hoath & Mulhall, 1998; Tejay & Zadig, 2012).  
 
2.5 Economics of IS Security Breaches 
     As described above, organizations that have inadequate IS security countermeasures in 
place risk significant financial effects when breaches occur.  A significant body of 
research has attempted to describe these effects, while other research has attempted to 
document the costs that arise when erecting countermeasures to prevent breaches from 
occurring.  
     Costs from breaches can take many forms.  Kannan, Rees, and Sridhar (2007) describe 
two types of costs – direct costs and indirect costs.  Examples of direct costs include 
losses of productivity by employees in the aftermath of an attack, the costs of notifying 
consumers who may have been affected by a breach, and the costs of communication 
with the media.  Indirect costs, on the other hand, might consist of higher insurance 
premiums to affected firms or loss of future business due to a lack of trust in the attacked 
firm by consumers (Kannan, Rees, & Sridhar, 2007).  Some attacks may have greater 
indirect costs than direct costs – for example, a defacement of a firm’s website may have 
more indirect costs than the direct costs associated with an employee password breach of 
an internal company server due to the perception by customers of the insecurity of a more 
visible resource – the website.  Such an attack may require significant and costly 
communications with customers and the press even though from a technical perspective 
the attack was less severe as no information was breached (Hancock, 2002).  An extreme 
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example of a financial effect of a defacement was the breach of the security company 
RSA’s website in the early 2000s, which resulted in a 17% reduction in stock price, likely 
due to RSA’s prominence in the information security field (Garg, Curtis, & Halper, 
2003).    
     Hovav & D’Arcy (2004) examined computer virus attacks upon organizations and 
found that while 45% of affected companies suffered a negative impact upon share prices 
following the disclosure of the attacks, the majority of the companies did not experience 
a negative impact.  They speculated that the market may anticipate virus attacks, or that 
reported damages from virus infestations – often in the millions of dollars, or billions 
industry-wide – are overinflated and the market effects are a reflection of their true 
impact.  Garg, Curtis, and Halper (2003) offer another suggestion – that viruses, unlike 
other malware attacks, are generally untargeted and affect entire industries while not 
targeting specific firms.  Massive virus infestations, while expensive to remediate, do not 
also typically involve the theft of confidential information and as such provide little for 
the stock market to react to (Garg, Curtis, & Halper, 2003). 
     Other types of attacks, however, have greater financial impacts for affected firms.  
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, which affect the availability of IS from a “CIA” 
standpoint, have been shown to have noticeable same-day affects on share price (Garg, 
Curtis, & Halper, 2003).  These DoS attacks often have significant upfront direct costs in 
terms of lost productivity and loss of commerce opportunities, and the share price of 
attacked firms that rely upon the Internet as the core of business are also more severely 
affected (Hovav & D’Arcy, 2003).   
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     Breaches of internal company or consumer data, such as customer credit cards, have 
the most significant financial consequences (Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, & Zhou, 2003), 
with an average loss of between $17-28 million in market capitalization (Garg, Curtis, & 
Halper, 2003).  One well-known example of a costly breach is the case of TJX 
Companies, in which hackers breached the network security of the firm in 2006 and stole 
over 45 million consumer credit cards from the company’s corporate database.  Direct 
and indirect costs from the breach ultimately reached $256 million, numerous executives 
and board members resigned, and earnings estimates following the attacks were down 
57% (Xu, Grant, Nguyen, & Dai, 2008).  Cavusoglu, Misha, and Raghunathan (2004a) 
found that costs of breaches are often even higher, with an average two-day market 
capitalization loss of 2%, or $1.65 billion, a trend that is confirmed in other studies (Goel 
& Shawky, 2009).  Other research shows that the long-term effects from breaches, 
however, are not statistically significant, despite short-term impacts following the initial 
disclosure of a breach (Acquisti, Friedman, & Telang, 2006; Kannan, Rees, & Sridhar, 
2007).  Nevertheless, even short-term impacts may have significant financial implications 
for individuals and organizations that are trying to profit from the stock market in the 
short run.   
     To attempt to defray some of the costs following breaches and to change the 
perspectives of investors, Gordon, Loeb, and Sohail (2010) suggest an alternative 
approach for firms: voluntary and proactive disclosures related to IS security investments 
and events.  The researchers examined a wide range of disclosures related to IS security, 
encompassing both positive disclosures such as the deployment of new security 
technologies and negative disclosures such as breaches, and found that disclosures which 
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go beyond what is required by regulation have an overall positive effect on market value, 
of an average of 6% for the examined firms.   
     Gordon, Loeb, and Lucyshyn (2003) also suggested another method to “get ahead” of 
the costs associated with breaches – the proactive sharing of information regarding past 
breaches between firms.  Such information sharing allows firms within the sharing 
alliance to collectively spend less on security while gaining knowledge from other 
members, which leads to increased levels of security.  Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) also 
examined formalized information sharing alliances, such as industry ISACs and CERTs, 
and noted that even competing firms can achieve overall reductions in security costs, 
resulting in financial incentives to share data about attacks.  Such an approach requires 
that monitoring occur so that members of the alliance are not seen as “free riders” that 
benefit from shared information without sharing themselves (Gordon, Loeb, & Lucyshyn, 
2003).  Moore, Clayton, & Anderson (2009) argue that similar information sharing needs 
to occur amongst security vendors themselves – while it does occur in the antivirus 
sector, such cooperation does not extend to other areas of IS security, such as phishing 
sites, counterfeit pharmacy sites, and other online fraudulent websites.  
     In general, security breaches have been shown to be common events (Gordon & Loeb, 
2006) even though the rate of breaches has been difficult to forecast (Schechter, 2005); 
the question remains, how to allocate resources in defense?  Gordon & Loeb (2002) 
suggested an economic model at odds with much of the IS security industry, stating that it 
made sense only to protect the midrange of security vulnerabilities, ignoring the very low 
or very high risk areas.  They recommended that firms should only spend a fraction of the 
expected loss on security defense – never more than 37% of what the expected loss 
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would be, but usually much lower than that.  Due to the extraordinary costs of protecting 
everything at a high level of security, they suggest employing a cost-benefit approach and 
defending IS assets at a lower level of assurance.  Willemson (2006) found that 
investments of up to 50% of the expected loss could be warranted, however.  One 
problem with the Gordon and Loeb (2002) approach, however, is that many organizations 
are not quantifying their potential losses from security breaches, and Mercuri (2003) 
describes a number of quantitative approaches that organizations can utilize to estimate 
these losses.  
     In a similar vein, Cavusoglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan (2004b) developed a model to 
evaluate security investment decisions.  This model evaluated the ideal placement of 
preventive controls versus detective controls and the optimal configuration of security 
technologies, including the design and pricing of IS security systems.  They concluded 
that no single technology offers complete security and as such multiple technologies are 
needed, in a layered configuration often referred to as “defense in depth”.  Cavusoglu, 
Mishra, and Raghunathan (2004b) argued that hackers have been thinking and acting 
strategically about their attacks, and as such organizations should think and act 
strategically in the development of defensive countermeasures.  They also suggested a 
game theory approach for security investment decisions, which results in the selection of 
security technology that affects the maximum cost savings for the organization.  
     In recognition of the inevitability of IS security breaches, Gordon, Loeb, and Sohail 
(2003) suggest another approach to reduce the cost of attacks – the employment of cyber-
risk insurance.  Such an approach requires that insurance companies attempt to address 
the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in an IS security context.  These 
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policies tend to cover direct and indirect costs associated with attacks, and often include 
economic incentives for covered companies to increase their security.  Cyber-risk 
insurance has the potential to alter the economic landscape of IS security defense because 
the investment in the insurance may mean that companies are comfortable with a higher 
level of risk from breaches (Gordon, Loeb, & Sohail, 2003).  
     There are other costs to firms from the risk of security breaches.  Anderson et al. 
(2012) describe the billions of dollars of costs expended every year by organizations to 
defend against computer crime, including spending on countermeasures, direct and 
indirect losses of breaches, fines from governmental regulatory agencies following 
breach disclosures, and reduced market capitalization and loss of future business 
opportunity.  All of these costs, according to Anderson et al. (2012), fund the continued 
growth of an underground economy of hackers seeking increasing financial returns from 
computer crime.  
 
2.6 Summary    
     This review of IS security literature of relevance to attacks by external hackers has in 
essence described the attack cycle from start to finish, beginning with an examination of 
hackers and ending with the financial impacts of attacks.  The literature described a 
steady evolution of hackers away from social motivations and toward financial 
motivations for attacks (Galbreth & Shor, 2010), as well as the increasing 
professionalism of hackers and hacking groups (Moore, Clayton, and Anderson, 2009; 
Ollman, 2008).  While the dominant themes of research efforts have historically been 
focused upon deterring internal attacks (Straub, 1990; Willison & Backhouse, 2006) and 
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upon whitehat defenders (Mahmood, Siponen, Straub, Rao, & Raghu, 2010), the 
description of the increasingly destructive and powerful abilities of external hacker 
attacks and hacker tools such as malware highlights the need to shift paradigms.  A 
detailed analysis of the typology of IS security countermeasures (Ransbotham & Mitra, 
2009) also highlighted areas where attackers may seek to innovate and discover new 
ways of executing attacks.  
     An analysis of the literature related to the economics of IS security attacks and 
breaches illuminated the devastating effects of hacker attacks upon organizations.   
Kannan, Rees, and Sridhar (2007) described direct and indirect costs that could be 
incurred from attacks.  Garg, Curtis, & Halper (2003) examined the extensive financial 
effects of DDoS attacks and internal data breaches, which include damage to market 
capitalization and consumer confidence.  Firms may also have economic incentives to 
examine alternative approaches, to include proactive security disclosures (Gordon, Loeb, 
and Sohail, 2010), security information sharing between firms (Gordon, Loeb, and 
Lucyshyn, 2003), and investing in cyber-risk insurance (Gordon, Loeb, and Sohail, 
2003).  Strategic approaches of organization security investments were also examined, 
with Gordon and Loeb (2002) recommending a cost-benefit approach toward deployment 
of security defenses around assets of varying risk and Cavusoglu, Mishra, and 
Raghunathan (2004b) analyzing a “defense in depth” approach to layering security 
countermeasures.  The financial aspects of these attacks only underscore the need for an 
alternative approach to understanding how hackers develop their attacks.  
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Chapter 3 
Research Design 
3.1 Introduction 
     As described earlier, the issue of computer crime has been examined through a 
number of different lenses.  These previous efforts include deterrence-based approaches 
(D’Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009; Straub & Welke, 1998), social approaches (Lee & 
Lee, 2002; Willison & Warkentin, 2013), and technical approaches (Ransbotham & 
Mitra, 2009; Cavusoglu, Mishra, & Raghunathan, 2004b).  Many of these prior attempts 
focused upon individual computer criminals and neglected the interaction and evolution 
of the actors within a community (Lu, Polgar, Luo, & Cao, 2010).  As such, the extant 
research has been insufficient to explain the continued success of the hackers and to 
understand the role that innovation within hacker communities plays in the defeat of IS 
security countermeasures. 
     This chapter will first introduce a theoretical framework which will form the basis of 
the present inquiry into innovation within hacker communities, followed by the 
derivation of a research model.  The next section will describe the two-phased research 
method that was employed to gather empirical data, as well as the data analysis approach.  
 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
3.2.1 Diffusion of Innovations Theory 
 
     This research study adopts Diffusion of Innovations (DOI) theory as the theoretical 
basis to conduct this research.  DOI theory has been employed by IS scholars to explain a 
wide variety of individual and organizational innovation adoption decisions (Baskerville 
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& Pries-Heke, 2001; Fichman & Kemerer, 1999; Mustonen‐Ollila & Lyytinen, 2003; 
Straub, 1994), and formed the basis of this study.  As described above, the argument for 
this research stated that hackers in communities innovate and disperse those innovations 
in a process similar to one employed by legitimate firms, and as such an organizational 
theory such as DOI is appropriate.  This theory, first advanced by Rogers (2003), 
examines the process where an innovation is communicated through certain channels 
over time, among members of a social system.  Rogers states that an innovation is "an 
idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of 
adoption" (Rogers, 2003), and as such would encompass new hacking techniques that are 
being considered by a community of hackers.   
     Because of the focus upon the process by which an innovation is eventually adopted 
or rejected, innovation research can be thought of as a branch of technology acceptance 
literature (Karahanna, Straub, & Chervany, 1999).  DOI in particular, with its emphasis 
upon the communication of innovations through a social system, is well suited to the 
study of the diffusion of IS security countermeasure-defeating technologies among 
hacking communities.  In fact, Rogers (2003) has identified innovations within criminal 
circles as a potential application of his theory, and specifically mentioned computer 
viruses as an example of an innovation that has diffused very well through use of the 
Internet.  
     Rogers (2003) states that innovations perceived by members of a social system as 
having more of the following characteristics will be adopted more rapidly: the relative 
advantage of using the innovation over other technologies; the compatibility of the 
innovation with existing values, past experiences, and needs of the potential adopters; the 
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complexity of the innovation; the trialability of the innovation, or whether it can be 
experimented with before complete adoption; and the observability of the results of the 
adoption to other members of the social system.  Moore and Benbasat (1991) suggested 
the addition of two more characteristics: image, or the degree that the innovation 
enhances the user’s social status within the social system, a characteristic they argue is 
separate from relative advantage; and voluntariness, the degree that an innovation’s use is 
mandated or voluntary. Agarwal and Prasad (1997) found that of these seven 
characteristics, the complexity of the innovation is often not a significant factor, as some 
innovations are important enough that users will expend the necessary effort to overcome 
any usability issues.  
     By examining potential innovation adopters in light of the above characteristics, 
adopters can be classified on a scale of innovativeness, ordered by time to adopt the 
innovation: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards 
(Rogers, 2003).  The innovativeness of various adopter communities is an active strain of 
diffusion research within the IS realm (Cheng, Kao, & Lin, 2004; Fichman, 2001), as is 
comparing the adoption rates of the same type of innovation across different communities 
(Mustonen‐Ollila & Lyytinen, 2003).  The rate of adoption of innovations has been 
studied at length, and has generally been found to resemble an “S”, with the innovators 
and early adopters at the start of the curve, the majorities in the middle as more and more 
individuals adopt the innovation, and the laggards at the end of the curve (Rogers, 2003).  
Rogers also describes the factors that influence the rate of adoption, to include: the five 
initial characteristics of an innovation described above, the type of innovation decision, 
the nature of both the communication channels and the social system, the extent to which 
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change agents within the social system are promoting the innovation, and whether or not 
the innovation is being adopted by an individual or an organization, as organizations are 
typically slower to adopt.  
     Innovation diffusion is a process, one that ends with the decision to adopt or reject an 
innovation.  Rogers (2003) describes the “innovation-decision” process as starting with 
knowledge, where an individual learns of the innovation’s existence.  Next, in the 
persuasion phase, the potential adopter forms a favorable or unfavorable attitude towards 
the innovation, followed by the decision phase, where the individual decides to adopt or 
reject the innovation.  Next the innovation is deployed and used in the implementation 
phase, and finally the adopter enters the confirmation phase, where the individual seeks 
reinforcement of the decision to adopt the innovation, and may ultimately reverse the 
decision to adopt if negative feedback is received (Rogers, 2003).  In these last two 
phases, the DOI approach differs from other theories in the adoption literature – notably 
the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) – 
as DOI distinguishes between initial usage and sustained usage of an innovation, as 
opposed to simply determining usage intention (Agarwal & Prasad, 1997).  
     In addition to the diffusion of innovations amongst individuals, Rogers (2003) also 
relates that organizations can engage in this process.  Particularly, Rogers states that 
virtual organizations are often more flexible and adopt innovations more rapidly.  These 
virtual organizations – described as a “network of geographically-distant employees who 
are linked by electronic communication” (Rogers, 2003, pg. 405) – are analogues to the 
online hacker communities, which are made up of hackers that are often in different 
countries and who communicate using the Internet, that are the focus of the present study.  
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Organizational diffusion has been studied at great length by IS researchers (Baskerville & 
Pries-Heje, 2001; Fichman & Kemerer, 1999; Mustonen-Ollila & Lyytinen, 2003) and is 
a mature alternative to the study of diffusion between individuals.  Rogers (2003) also 
describes the concept of organizational innovativeness and describes DOI research that 
has evaluated organizations based upon their level of innovativeness.  As described in the 
review of the literature chapter, hacker groups and communities frequently operate like 
legitimate firms, including in areas of research and development and organizational 
structure, lending themselves well to a DOI-based organizational analysis.  
     The notion of hacker technique and tool innovation in particular is an appropriate area 
of focus for a study employing DOI.  According to Barber (2001b), hacker techniques 
and tools are constantly evolving and becoming ever more complex. Bratus (2007) 
describes the emergence of new hacking techniques, and the development of specialized 
tools, in one type of hacker community – magazines such as Phrack.  These techniques 
and tools allow hackers in the community to increase their flexibility and to constantly 
improve their attacks upon a victim’s IS.  The innovation of hacker techniques and tools, 
therefore, can be considered a technical process innovation, an area well studied by IS 
innovation scholars (Fichman & Kemerer, 1997; Mustonen-Ollila & Lyytinen, 2003; 
Nilakanta & Scamell, 1990).   
 
3.2.2 Research Model 
     The above discussion of the Diffusion of Innovations theory, as well as the 
examination of the two research questions guiding this study, have resulted in the 
derivation of the research model described in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: Conceptual Model of Hacking Innovation Diffusion 
 
     The components described in Figure 2 describe the process of the diffusion and 
adoption of hacking innovations.  The first stage is the identification of a need for a new 
hacking tool or technique, perhaps because existing hacking tools or techniques are no 
longer effective against attacker attempts to defeat organizations’ IS security 
countermeasures.  The second stage involves the development of an innovation by 
member(s) of a hacking community, or the introduction of such an innovation developed 
outside the community into the community by a member.  The third stage involves the 
communication of the hacking innovation by change agents within the community.  Holt 
(2013) states that online hacker communities operate in a “relational J curve” structure, 
with a small number of users responsible for a large number of posts, which may be a 
useful method of identifying change agents.  The fourth stage is the evaluation of the 
seven innovation adoption factors described above – relative advantage, compatibility, 
complexity, trialability, and observability as per Rogers (2003), as well image and 
voluntariness as per Moore and Benbasat (1991).  The fifth stage is whether or not the 
innovation is actually adopted by the community, and the sixth stage involves the actual 
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use of the new hacking innovation against victim organizations by members of the 
community.  As the innovation is used, it is constantly evaluated by users to determine if 
it should continued to be employed, represented by the “continued use” arrow following 
the final stage.  
     Mustonen-Ollila and Lyytinen (2003) described two primary areas in the innovation 
process based on their analysis of DOI.  The first area, initiation, corresponds to the first 
three stages of the conceptual model, located on the top of Figure 2.  These first three 
stages also map to the first research question of this study.  The second area described by 
Mustonen-Ollila and Lyytinen is implementation, which corresponds to the last three 
stages of the conceptual model, located on the bottom of Figure 2.  These last three stages 
relate to the second research question of this study.  Additionally, Rogers’ (2003) 
innovation-decision process can be mapped onto the model in Figure 2.  Rogers’ 
“knowledge” phase encompasses the development and communication stages, the 
“persuasion” phase consists of the stage where the innovation factors are evaluated, the 
“decision” phase consists of the actual adoption stage, the “implementation” phase 
consists of the use stage, and Rogers’ “confirmation” phase is reflected in the constant 
evaluation to continue using the innovation.  
     The use stage, as well as the process of evaluation or “confirmation” per Rogers 
(2003), is worthy of additional consideration.  This final part of the diffusion of 
innovation process is described by Parthasarathy and Bhattacherjee (1998) as “post-
adoption” behavior, and permits the identification of discontinuers and continued 
adopters, and should be considered as part of an evaluation of a successful innovation 
diffusion process.  Parthasarathy and Bhattacherjee, in their analysis of adoption activity 
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viewed through a DOI lens, determined that there may be an “expectation-reality” gap 
and found that later adopters of technology are more likely to discontinue, as early 
adopters rely more upon interpersonal influence when deciding to adopt an innovation.  A 
related area to discontinuance is the body of research that seeks to understand IS project 
abandonment (Keil, 1995).  
 
3.2.3 Philosophical Position 
     This study, while utilizing a qualitative research method, resided squarely within the 
positivist epistemological paradigm.  A qualitative research approach is appropriate for a 
positivist study, despite a common misconception that qualitative research is better suited 
for interpretive research (Klein & Myers, 1997) or, conversely, a misconception that 
positivistic research requires quantitative methods (Lee, 1989).  In short, the positivist 
position assumes that reality is objective, and that empirically testable and falsifiable 
theories can be developed to reflect observations of this reality (Chua, 1986).  Positivist 
ontology believes that there is an objective physical and social world that exists, whether 
or not individuals have any knowledge of it.  Also objective is the researcher, who 
remains detached and neutral (Darke, Shanks, & Broadbent, 1998).  Positivism is 
concerned with what individuals or organizations said or did, versus what the researcher 
thought they meant through the interpretation of symbols (Sarker & Lee, 2003).  
     Positivism is the dominant paradigm in IS research, and assumes a natural science 
ontology grounded in objective reality and frequently but not always involves the use of 
research techniques such as hypothesis and theory testing, quantitative variable 
measurement, and sampling of populations (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991).  As such, this 
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research should be evaluated by positivist criteria; evaluating one epistemological 
paradigm by the criteria of another is inappropriate, although such practice occurs 
frequently by reviewers and researchers unfamiliar with the paradigm being employed 
(Klein & Myers, 1997).   
 
3.3 Research Methodology 
     This section details the data collection and data analysis methodology of the research.  
This research will consist of two phases – an expert panel to develop an initial list of 
hacking tool and technique innovations as well as an initial sample of hacking 
community sites, and a multi-site case study of online hacking communities to examine 
the diffusion of those tools and techniques identified by the expert panel.  Such a two-
step process involving an initial expert panel is commonly employed in management 
research designs (Jennings & Lumpkin, 1992).  
 
3.3.1 Expert Panel 
     As a preliminary phase to the research, a panel of recognized IS security experts were 
formed to help guide the next phase of data collection.  The primary purpose of this panel 
was twofold: first, to develop a collection of key hacking technique and tool innovations 
of the past ten years, as well as associated keywords related to these innovations; and 
second, to identify influential hacking communities that will be appropriate sites for data 
collection in the second phase of this research.  As this research sought to understand the 
process by which communities of hackers develop and diffuse new attack innovations, an 
initial list of the most disruptive innovations was an appropriate starting point for 
  43
observing the hacking innovation diffusion process through all of the steps described in 
the research model above.  The list of innovations provided by the expert panel was 
correlated with available security research literature to obtain technical details and other 
information about each innovation as necessary.   
     The panel of experts also provided an initial list of hacking forums that were evaluated 
for suitability as case study locations.  As hacking communities are by their nature 
secretive, the research literature is not an appropriate place to derive a list of 
communities.  Likewise, attempting to find hacking communities by Internet search 
engine may only turn up those that are not skilled at hiding themselves, and may not be 
representative of the communities of skilled hackers sought for this study.  The experts 
that will comprise the panel had the expertise necessary to recommend a list of initial 
communities.  
     The expert panel consisted of eight IS security experts with specialties in computer 
crime investigation, hacker communities and culture, and IS security countermeasures.  A 
panel with eight members was chosen following a review of IS studies that found that 
many of them employed expert panels of the same size (Aubert, Rivard, & Patry, 2004; 
Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Wang, Liang, Zhong, Xue, & Xiao, 2012). Details 
regarding the background and experience of each panel member are described in a table 
in the next chapter.  The formation of this panel also allowed for the clarification of any 
issues that arose regarding the innovations and hacking communities that were examined 
in the next phase (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010).  
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3.3.2 Case Study Approach 
     The second phase of research consisted of a multi-site, qualitative case study.  
According to Yin (2008), a case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within real-life context” and “relies upon 
multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion” 
(Yin, 2009, p. 18).  Case studies take a holistic approach and are designed to examine a 
phenomenon from the viewpoint of the participants (Dubé & Paré, 2003; Tellis, 1997b).  
Unlike experimental methods, case studies do not manipulate independent variables or 
control confounding ones, but rely upon techniques such as questionnaires, coded 
interviews, or systematic observations (Boudreau, Gefan, & Straub, 2001).  Case studies 
are not meant to be representative of a larger population, but are meant to understand the 
individuals or organizations within the cases themselves (Stake, 1995).  It is important to 
note that case studies do not provide statistical significance, but instead link together 
many different types of evidence toward a relevant and strong conclusion (Runeson & 
Höst, 2009).  Case studies within the IS discipline have a rich tradition, and allow the 
study of information systems in a natural setting so that the complexity of the process 
taking place can be better understood, shedding light on emerging topics (Benbasat, 
Goldstein, & Mead, 1987). 
     The procedures for case studies include the selection of cases, development of 
collection protocol, data collection and analysis, and the development of conclusions 
from collected evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989; Tellis, 1997b; Yin, 2009).  Note that each of 
these procedural details will be discussed in subsequent sections. Additionally, case study 
methodology is an appropriate choice for research occurring within the positivistic 
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paradigm (Darke, Shanks, & Broadbent, 1998; Dubé & Paré, 2003; Gibbert, Ruigrok, & 
Wicki, 2008; Lee, 1989; Sarker & Lee, 2002).  
    A single-case study is ideal when the researcher seeks to obtain a critical, extreme, or 
representative case to illustrate theory, while a multiple-case study – or what Stake 
(1995) terms a “collective” case study – permits literal and theoretical replication and is 
often considered to be a more robust methodology (Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead, 1987; 
Yin, 2009).  The present study undertakes a multiple-case approach across multiple 
hacker communities, and per Yin (2008) each case was analyzed separately, which 
allowed findings to be confirmed by replication logic.  Following the separate analysis of 
each case, a final analysis of all the cases occurred.  Such an approach allows both 
within-case and cross-case analysis (Dubé & Paré, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989).  Case studies 
involving multiple cases have been observed in prior DOI studies (Chircu & Kauffman, 
2000; Mustonen-Ollila & Lyytinen, 2003; Reich & Benbasat, 1990).  For the present 
study, four cases were explored; while previous innovation-related case studies such as 
Chircu and Kauffman (2000) and Mustonen-Ollila and Lyytinen (2003) only utilized 
three, Eisenhardt (1989) states that four is the minimum number required to achieve 
external validity through analytic generalization, which has been employed in other IS 
studies (Chetty & Holm, 2000).  Four cases allow literal replication – that is, they permit 
the confirmation of similar results across cases.  Important findings from the examination 
of one case can inform the analysis of later cases.  Additional cases could be added 
during the study if divergent findings are observed and theoretical replication – that is, 
contrasting results but for reasons outlined within theory – is required (Yin, 2009); 
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however, this approach was not necessary for the present study. The unit of analysis for 
each case was each hacker community.  
     Data collection consisted of a triangulated approach to the study of the four initial 
hacker communities, and is described in greater detail in the proceeding section. Per Yin 
(2008), a data collection protocol was developed which will allow for a replicable and 
reliable instrument to be utilized across each case.  This protocol included an overview of 
the case study project, the field procedures to be employed, the case study questions, and 
a guide for producing the final report.  Details regarding the collection of data from 
interview subjects are provided below. The specific types of data encountered within 
each case include: postings made to the online hacker community under study; relevant 
news articles, court documents, or other secondary sources related to the hacker 
community; artifacts such as the hacker tools distributed within the community; and 
interviews of individuals who are active in the community.   Reviewing postings made by 
hackers to such online communities is an “efficient and nonintrusive way to reach 
persons who attack computer systems” (Ransbotham & Mitra, 2009, p. 125) and allows 
the researcher to observe the interactions of the participants in their natural environment.  
     The triangulated data from each case were collected at each step in the conceptual 
model described in Figure 2.  That is, data points regarding the diffusion of hacking 
innovations were reviewed from each data source – such as observations from web forum 
posts, interviews with hackers, analysis of court documents, and so forth – with an eye 
toward uncovering details of the innovation diffusion process.  This process included the 
detailing of a need for a new hacking innovation, the development of the innovation, the 
communication of the innovation within the community, the factors influencing adoption 
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of the innovation; the eventual adoption or lack thereof of the innovation, and the 
continued use of the innovation, as described in Figure 2.  
     The subsequent chart (see Figure 3), adapted from Yin (2009, p.59), will serve as a 
guide to the following detailed sections of the case study methodology, given that we 
have selected DOI as our starting point:  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Case Study Methodology (adapted from Yin, 2009) 
 
3.3.3 Selection of Cases 
     As described above, the present study employed a multi-site holistic research design, 
with the sites consisting of four individual hacking communities, in the form of 
underground hacking web forums.  The list of communities provided by the panel of 
experts was employed as a starting point; however, a preliminary examination was 
conducted of each community to determine if discussions of hacker tools and techniques 
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are actually occurring, and one additional community was indeed sought.  Yin (2009) 
recommends screening candidate case sites before engaging in data collection to ensure 
that they represent the desired behavior under study.  This screening, according to Yin, 
involves querying knowledgeable people about the site – such as those in the expert panel 
– and perhaps obtaining quantitative data about the site to be sure it is suitable.  For the 
present study, such quantitative data included the number of forum members, the number 
of total posts and threads, and the length of time the forum has been active.  Forums with 
more activity, for a longer period of time, were more suitable than ones with less activity.  
     It should be noted that only hacker communities that are “blackhat” were examined, as 
the focus of this research is upon malicious hackers who are attempting to overcome the 
IS security countermeasures of victim organizations, which permitted the observation of 
participants in real-time.  Data collection occurred within active, online hacker 
communities.  These communities archived much of the older discussions that had 
occurred in prior years and allowed for the review of the early stages of an innovation’s 
development.  Such an approach also allows a longitudinal approach to the data 
collection, as samples can be taken from different points of time in the history of the 
hacking community.  Due to researcher language restrictions, only English-language 
forums were reviewed. 
     Yin (2009) emphasizes that a multiple-case study should be analogous to an 
experiment repeated multiple times, where replication logic is emphasized.  A multiple-
case study should not be thought of as an analogy to multiple respondents in a survey or 
multiple subjects in an experiment, where sampling logic would dominate (Yin, 2009).  
Instead of employing a statistical approach to selecting respondents, this study sought to 
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select a handful of illustrative cases to demonstrate literal replication of the theory, 
although attention will be paid for any instances of theoretical replication during cross-
case analysis.  Eisenhardt (1989) also states that cases should be chosen if they are 
theoretically useful, in that they replicate or extend theory by filling theoretical 
categories.  
 
3.3.4 Case Study Protocol Design 
     Now that the criterion for selecting the multiple sites has been described, the next step 
of the case study research design is to develop the case study protocol.   The protocol 
“contains the instrument but also contains the procedures and general rules to be followed 
in using the protocol,” and is “essential if you are doing a multiple-site case study” (Yin, 
2009, p.79).  The protocol provides a guide to the researcher for collecting data from each 
individual case.  Having a prewritten protocol offers a number of benefits, including 
allowing the researcher to plan ahead for specific questions to be asked or observations to 
be made, providing a template for other researchers to review to ensure the study will 
collect the proper data, and it serves as a log where data collection and analysis can be 
recorded (Runeson & Höst, 2009).  
     According to Yin (2009), the following elements are included in the design of a case 
study protocol: an overview of the case study project, including the case study setting, the 
rationale for selecting the case, and the theoretical relevance; the field procedures to be 
used to collect data, including observations, interviews, and triangulation using historical 
or other sources, and a description of the tasks to include gaining access to the site, a 
schedule of collection activities, and providing for unanticipated events; the case study 
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questions, which are the primary “instrument” used to collect data; and finally, a guide 
for the case study report, which provides an overview of how the data obtained from each 
case will be reported (Tellis, 1997b; Yin, 2009).  The case study protocol employed for 
each case is produced in Figure 4, and will be explained below.  It should also be noted 
that Stake (1995) recommends considering additional factors before gathering data, 
including the number of helpers, allocation of time, and possible expenses.  
      The case study overview is the first part of the protocol and contains introductory 
information regarding each case.  This information includes details about each site setting 
– in the case of an online hacking forum, this would include the particular Internet 
address used to access the site and other details, such as the number of users, number of 
threads, and length of existence of each forum, as described in the previous section.  
Next, the rationale for selecting the case was provided, and answered the following 
question: what features make this site a good candidate for the case study?  The 
theoretical implications of each site were also briefly described, and answered the 
following question: what will this site contribute to the case study?   
     The next part of the protocol describes the field procedures used in the study.  First, 
access to the site must be obtained.  In the case of an online hacking forum, the 
researcher may need to sign up for an account on the site if it is not publicly searchable.  
If the forum is located on a hidden network service such as Tor, as was the underground 
marketplace Silk Road, then logical access to the network will need to be gained as well 
(Biryukov, Pustogarov, & Weinmann, 2013).   Once access is obtained, data collection 
can begin.  Yin (2009) describes a number of sources from which case study evidence 
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can be obtained, which are detailed in Table 2.  This table also includes analogues to 
these sources applicable in an underground web forum environment.   
A. Overview of the Case 
a. Case study site setting 
i. Forum Internet address 
ii. Statistical details of forum 
b. Rationale for selecting case 
c. Theoretical implications of the case 
B. Field Procedures 
a. Access to particular site 
b. Observation of forum participants (online / offline) in development of new hacking 
techniques and tools 
i. Selection of innovations to be observed 
c. Interviews of forum participants involved in the innovations 
i. Description of interviewed individuals 
ii. How individual was selected for interview – role in innovations, if any 
d. Acquisition of data from other sources 
i. News articles about use of hacking innovation, hacking websites, court 
documents, etc.  
C. Case Study Questions 
a. Determination of hacking need 
i. How is the problem defined? 
ii. Does the need come first, or awareness of the innovation?  
b. Development of innovation 
i. Who engages in the process of developing the innovation? 
ii. To what extent is this development collaborative or performed singularly?  
iii. What are the roles of the various participants in the development of the 
innovation?  
c. Communication of innovation 
i. What are the communication sources for the innovation? 
ii. By which channels do the communications occur?   
d. Innovation characteristics 
i. What is the relative advantage granted by the hacking innovation? 
ii. How compatible is the innovation with the values, experiences, and needs of the 
community members?  
iii. How complex is the innovation, and does increasing complexity dissuade 
potential adopters? 
iv. How trialable is the innovation?   
v. If the innovation is adopted, is it observable to other members? 
vi. Does the innovation enhance the image of the user?   
vii. To what degree is the use of the innovation voluntary? 
e. Innovation Adoption 
i. Is the innovation adopted or rejected by the community?   
ii. What behavior and factors determine if an innovation will be adopted or 
rejected?   
f. Implementation of Innovation 
i. To what extent does reinvention of the hacking innovation occur, and for what 
reason? 
ii. If the innovation is discontinued, why do the adopters discard it?   
D. Guide for Case Study Report 
Figure 4: Case Study Protocol 
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Table 2: Sources of Case Study Evidence 
Source of Evidence Examples from Yin (2009) Web Forum Analogues 
Documentation  Letters, email correspondence, 
announcements, news articles 
Forum rules, policies, or terms of 
service; administrator 
announcements; news articles 
about forum or members 
Archival records Public statistical data, 
organizational records, 
maps/charts, survey data 
Forum member lists, user profiles 
Interviews In-depth interviews, focused 
interviews, structured interviews 
Interviews of participants, key 
informants 
Direct observations Real-time observation of events Review of forum conversations 
(asynchronous) 
Participant-
observation 
Assume roles within case study 
situation 
[Not applicable for current study] 
Physical artifacts Tool, instrument, technology Hacking tools derived from 
innovation 
 
     Yin (2009) states that documentation is relevant to most case studies, mostly for the 
corroboration of evidence from other sources.  In the present study, examples of 
documentation in a web forum environment consisted of forum rules or policies posted 
by administrators, as well as posted website terms of service.  Forum administrators may 
also post administrative announcements in various forum sections.  Furthermore, news 
articles or other Internet writings such as blogs may describe the activities of the forum or 
its members, and may be useful to corroborate other evidence found during the case 
study.  Archival records, according to Yin, are another important source of evidence.  In 
the present study, instead of statistical data such as census figures, an example of archival 
data was a roster of forum members or individual member profiles.   
     Yin (2009) also describes interviews as an essential source of case study data.  In the 
present study, interviewees were selected from forum participants.  The case study 
literature is generally silent on how many interviews to conduct in a study, and the 
number of interview participants in case study research can vary wildly (Mason, 2010); 
however, the goal is to obtain theoretical saturation (Runeson & Höst, 2009).  For the 
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present study, a total of two interview participants per community were sought.  
Interview participants were selected in a purposive manner and were contacted directly 
by the researcher based on forum posts regarding the innovations under study.  The 
researcher approached community members who were senior members, who had been 
active within the community for a significant period of time, and who had experience 
with the innovations under study.  Initial contact of interviewers identified through forum 
postings were made through the private messaging systems built into the community.  In 
the initial contact, the researcher identified himself as an IS security researcher and 
requested an interview about hacking tools and techniques, and explained that the identity 
of the interviewee would be kept confidential.  If the interview subject expressed interest, 
the researcher then provided the subject with a document describing the confidentiality 
process and rights of the interviewee, as shown in Appendix B.  Note that the document 
described in Appendix B provides a brief overview of the purpose of the study, although 
care was taken with this overview to avoid introducing bias into the participant’s 
responses.  If after reviewing the document the interviewee decided to participate, the 
interview commenced, either over the private messaging system of the community, via an 
external chat service, or over email.  
     Yin (2009) states that there are a number of different types of interviews that can 
occur: the in-depth interview, where the interviewee provides opinions and insights, may 
act as a key informant who can provide access to other sources of evidence, and who 
agrees to spend time engaging in an interview for an extended period of time or for 
multiple interviews; the focused interview, where a person is interviewed for a short 
period of time, such as an hour, and where the questions are typically derived from the 
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case study protocol; and a more structured interview, such as a survey, where quantitative 
data is produced.  For the present study, a mix of in-depth and focused interviews was 
sought.  An example of this interview technique can be found in Keil (1995), which 
employed a semi-structured interview where a detailed protocol was developed as part of 
the case study data collection.  Runeson and Höst (2009) describe three strategies 
employed in case study interviews: the “funnel” model, which starts with open questions 
and moves to specific ones; the “pyramid” model, which begins with specific questions 
and ends with general ones; and the “time-glass” model, which begins with open-ended 
questions, moves to specific questions, and concludes with open-ended questions.  One 
major barrier to interviews was subject reluctance; given that the participants of these 
communities are hackers and are possible criminals, some were hesitant to describe their 
activities to an outside researcher.  This reluctance may be overcome in part by 
introductions from case study participants or members of the expert panel, as well as a 
description of the confidentiality process of the study (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009).  
     The next type of case study evidence is direct observation.  Yin (2009) describes this 
type as a contemporaneous observation of relevant behaviors or environmental 
conditions.  Given that the cases for the present study were primarily historical in nature, 
as forum postings and activities are by their nature asynchronous and many of the 
innovations identified for study had taken place in the past, contemporaneous observation 
may not be feasible.  However, for the purposes of this study, observation of innovation 
events within the hacker communities occurred as if they were transpiring in near real-
time, so that the development of an innovation can be treated as a single event.  Particular 
attention should be paid to the details, actions, and subtleties of the environment 
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(Benbasat et al., 1987). Yin also describes the participant-observation as another source 
of case data.  In this type of collection, the researcher participates in the events under 
study.  Such an ethnographic approach in a study of criminal hacker communities would 
be problematic from a legal and ethical standpoint and as such was not considered for the 
present study.  
     The final type of data source is the physical artifact.  Yin (2009) states that in some 
case studies, an artifact – such as a tool, instrument, technology, or work of art – may be 
collected or observed.  Yin relates that artifacts typically have less potential relevance in 
usual case studies.  For the present study, however, the potential for the creation of an 
artifact is real, as a possible output of the hacker community innovation process is a new 
tool or exploit that can be used against victim organizations.  As such, the collection of 
such an artifact – such as a hacker tool or source code – occurred if it was observed.  
     Yin (2009) describes a number of principles that should guide data collection in case 
studies.  Multiple data sources should be utilized to allow for data triangulation.  
Triangulation occurs when different sources of evidence – such as interviews, archival 
data, and observations, for instance – converge upon the same facts.  This permits the 
conclusions of the case study to be supported by multiple types of evidence, and 
addresses construct validity by demonstrating “multiple measures of the same 
phenomenon” (Yin, 2009, p.117).   Triangulation is especially useful when collecting 
qualitative data, which can be broader or richer but not as precise as quantitative data 
(Runeson & Höst, 2009).  Yin states that the concept of data triangulation can be 
troublesome for the researcher as techniques for collecting each type of data must be 
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mastered, as opposed to other types of studies which may employ a single data collection 
method.  
     Yin (2009) also states that another principle of data collection is the use of a case 
study database.  Unlike the report generated by the investigator at the conclusion of the 
case, the database records data collected during the study and can be the subject of 
secondary analysis, independent of the availability of the initial data.  The database, 
according to Yin, should contain four primary components: the notes of the investigator, 
stored and organized in an efficient manner that can be understood by an outside party; 
the case study documents that may have been obtained during the data collection; tabular 
materials such as quantitative data that may have been collected; and finally, any 
narratives produced by the investigator, which Yin recommends be written as open-
ended answers to the case study questions – which are described in the subsequent 
paragraphs – but not included in the final report.  These narratives help the researcher 
make connections between and triangulate the different data sources for each case.  The 
database also increases the repeatability and transparency of the research (Rowley, 2002).  
     The final principle of data collection, according to Yin (2009), is the development and 
maintenance of a chain of evidence.  This process is similar to that employed by law 
enforcement and forensic specialists when collecting evidence for court cases and 
increases the reliability of the study.  Through careful documentation, developing a chain 
of evidence would permit an outside observer to, using the same evidence, come to the 
same conclusions as described in the final case study report.  This chain starts with the 
case study questions, then to the case study protocol, next to citations of specific evidence 
in the case study database, and finally to the case study report itself (Yin, 2009).  A 
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reader should be able to start at either end – the initial questions or the final report – and 
following the chain of evidence in either direction, reach the other end (Dubé & Paré, 
2003).   
     The next part of the protocol describes the actual questions of the case study. Yin 
(2009) states that this is what is commonly referred to as the “instrument”.  However, 
these questions are not asked to interviewees or other case study participants; instead, 
they are directed toward the investigator, and serve as a structure of inquiry to remind the 
researcher of the specific data that is to be gathered during each case.  Each question 
should also detail the sources of evidence where data is likely to be obtained.  The 
questions should also be directed to the unit of analysis of the case study – that is, the 
hacking community – and not the unit of data collection – that is, the individual hacker 
participants (Yin, 2009).  As described in Figure 4, the following case study questions 
were considered as part of the protocol.  A detailed description of each question, and the 
linkage back to the propositions and research model are described below.  The case study 
questions are organized into sections, each section corresponding to a concept expressed 
in the research model in Figure 3.   
     The sequence of questions below were applied for each innovation studied within each 
case.  The initial round of innovations that will be analyzed using these questions will be 
obtained through the expert panel, although additional innovations were added if needed 
as they were encountered during data collection within each case.   Refer to the questions 
in Figure 4, the rationale of which is described in detail below. 
     The first set of questions deal with the determination of a hacking need by members of 
the community, for new hacking tools or techniques.  Rogers (2003) defines a need as a 
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“state of dissatisfaction or frustration that occurs when an individual’s desires outweigh 
the individuals actualities” (Rogers, 2003, p.172), and identifies that need recognition 
may occur when future problems are anticipated, or if a social system prioritizes a 
problem high on an agenda.  This is part of the first stage of Rogers’ innovation-decision 
process, the “knowledge” state, as described earlier.  Of particular interest is how the 
systems under study – the hacking communities – define the need for an innovation.  
Much of the extant DOI research does not describe this aspect of innovation, and instead 
selects a particular innovation to be studied – such as ERP system development (Bradford 
& Florin, 2003), travel reservation system adoption (Chircu & Kauffman, 2000), or 
Microsoft Windows deployment (Karahanna, Straub, & Chervany, 1999) – and does not 
describe how and why the organization decided that an improvement was needed.  The 
notion detailed in proposition P1, that an innovation is developed when existing hacking 
methods no longer succeed in breaching targeted organizations, will serve as the 
underlying assumption for this part of the innovation process.  Interestingly, Rogers 
(2003) states that a need can prompt the development of an innovation, or vice versa, an 
innovation may prompt a need in an individual.  For each innovation reviewed in each 
case, identifying the origin of the need determination will prove illuminative – was the 
innovation developed as a result of a hacking need within the community, or did the 
community members learn of an innovation and subsequently develop a need for it?  
     The second set of questions relate to the actual development of the innovation under 
study.  Rogers (2003) defines development as “the process of putting a new idea in a 
form that is expected to meet the needs of an audience of potential adopters” (Rogers, 
2003, p.146).  If the innovation is developed within the organization, who participated in 
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the development?  Was the innovation developed externally to the community and 
discussed or debated within the community, or was it developed wholly within the 
hacking community?  Previous DOI research has studied both in-house development 
efforts (Mustonen-Ollila & Lyytinen, 2003) and innovations that were developed 
externally to the organization (Karahanna, Straub, & Chervany, 1999).  If the 
development is conducted within the hacking community, is it a collaborative effort or 
does a single individual develop the innovation?  If collaboratively, what are the various 
roles that the participants play in the development?  Understanding how the innovation 
was developed is a necessary component of the overall understanding of the eventual 
diffusion and adoption of the innovation.  
    The third set of questions deal with the communication of the innovation within the 
hacking community.  Communication is also part of the “knowledge” stage of Rogers’ 
(2003) innovation-decision process.  Rogers states that participants acquire knowledge of 
an innovation through a “communication channel” consisting of a source, such as an 
individual or organization who originates the communication, and a channel, consisting 
of a means from which the message travels from the source to the recipient.  
Communications channels can be interpersonal, that is directly from one source 
individual to one recipient, versus mass media, where a source or small number of 
sources can broadcast to a large audience or recipients.  Rogers generalizes that mass 
media channels are more important at the knowledge stage of the innovation-decision 
process, whereas interpersonal channels are more important at the persuasion stage. 
Similarly, these channels can also be cosmopolite, where communication sources 
originate outside of the social system, versus localite, where the sources originate within 
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the social system.  Again, Rogers generalizes that cosmopolite channels are more 
important at the knowledge state, while localite channels are more important during the 
persuasion stage.   
     These concepts of the communication channels used for the innovation lead to the 
following questions: what are the communication sources for the innovation, and by 
which channels do the communications occur?  Within the DOI literature, Zmud (1983) 
examined cosmopolite channels and their impacts upon software development teams, and 
found that these external sources were effective if the internal environment of the group 
is supportive of innovation.  Rogers (2003) also found that the effectiveness of these 
channels varies depending upon the categorization of the adopter by time to adopt, from 
early adopters to laggards as described previously.  Rogers states that in general, early 
adopters are more affected by mass media and cosmopolite channels, while adopters 
toward the laggard end of the scale are more influenced by interpersonal and localite 
channels.  
     The above questions relating to the establishment of a need and the development and 
communication of the innovation were all part of Rogers’ (2003) knowledge phase of the 
innovation-decision process.  The next set of questions relates to the persuasion phase of 
the process and deal with the characteristics of the innovation.  The first question asks, 
what is the relative advantage granted by the hacking innovation?  If the innovation 
outperforms its precursor, then users may be more likely to adopt it.  The second question 
asks, how compatible is the innovation with the values, experiences, and needs of the 
community members?  A more compatible innovation is less uncertain to the adopter and 
may fit their needs better (Rogers, 2003).  The third question asks, how complex is the 
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innovation, and does increasing complexity dissuade potential adopters?  Recall that 
Agarwal and Prasad (1997) in their research found that complexity was not a significant 
factor; however, Thong (1999) found that relative advantage, compatibility, and 
complexity are all significant factors, indicating that it is worthy of further investigation.  
The next question asks: how trialable is the innovation?  Whether or not the hacking 
innovation can be tested before it is adopted may have impact upon the eventual adoption 
of the innovation. Furthermore, if the innovation is adopted, is it observable to other 
members?  Observability allows other members of the community to view the innovation 
at work and may further encourage wider adoption (Rogers, 2003).  Moore and 
Benbasat’s (1991) last two characteristics round out the questions for this section: Does 
the innovation enhance the image of the user?  Finally, to what degree is the use of the 
innovation voluntary?  This last question may have limited relevance in hacker 
communities, which may be considered to be looser social structures than an employee 
working in a firm; although to the extent that these communities do imitate legitimate 
firms, there may be some rules of behavior governing the use of the innovation.  
     The next set of questions relate to the decision phase of the innovation-decision 
process.  At this stage, the innovation can either be adopted or rejected.  According to 
Rogers (2003), rejection can itself take two forms: active rejection, where an innovation 
is first considered or perhaps tested before it is rejected; and passive rejection, where an 
innovation is rejected outright without being considered.  This leads to a case study 
question:  Is the innovation adopted or rejected by the community?  This question leads 
to another case study question: What behavior and factors lead determine if an innovation 
will be adopted or rejected?  
  62
     The final set of case study questions pertain to the actual use of the hacking 
innovation, and involves both the implementation and confirmation phases of Rogers’ 
(2003) innovation-decision process.  During the implementation phase, the innovation is 
actually employed by the adopter, and various issues may be overcome, such as how to 
obtain the innovation and how to use it properly.  Eventually, the innovation becomes 
institutionalized and is no longer considered a “new” idea.  The concept of reinvention, or 
the modification of an innovation by an adopter during its use, is introduced during this 
phase.  Instead of passively using an innovation as-is, some adopters may change it to 
suit their needs better.  Rogers states that innovations that are reinvented by users are 
more likely to be adopted at a faster rate and experience continued and sustained use.  
This leads to another case study question: To what extent does reinvention of the hacking 
innovation occur, and for what reason?  During the final stage, confirmation, the adopter 
seeks reinforcement of their decision to adopt the innovation, and may decide to 
discontinue use of it if this reinforcement is not obtained (Rogers, 2003).   
Discontinuance may occur because an adopter becomes disenchanted with the 
innovation, and Rogers suggests that later adopters discontinue use at a higher rate than 
earlier adopters.  This tendency of later adopters to discontinue was confirmed by 
Parthasarathy and Bhattacherjee (1998) during their examination of online service 
adoption and discontinuance.  This leads to an additional case study question: If the 
innovation is discontinued, why do the adopters discard it?  
     Now that the case study questions have been defined for each case, Yin (2009) states 
that the final part of the case study protocol is the development of a guide for the case 
study report.  Tellis (1997b) states that some researchers prefer to keep their report in a 
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journal format, while others prefer a more structured system. Each individual case should 
have its own report.  The present study will record the report in outline form with 
headings for each case study question.  Runeson & Höst (2009) refer to this section of the 
protocol as the “data analysis guidelines” section.  The analysis of the data will be 
discussed in the next section.  
 
3.3.5 Data Analysis 
     With the development of the case study protocol, including data collection and 
instrument, data analysis can now be discussed.  Data analysis is intended to focus upon 
patterns within the collected case study data, so that conclusions can be drawn.  However, 
data collection and analysis are not intended to be completely separate phases – analysis 
and data collection should overlap so the analysis can guide future data collection, and 
allow the researcher to remain open to new ideas or patterns that may be encountered in 
the data (Darke, Shanks, & Broadbent, 1998).  Within the case study methodology, data 
analysis design consists of two major steps – selecting an appropriate analytic strategy, 
and then choosing an appropriate analytic technique.  Whichever strategy and technique 
is selected, the overall goal is to become intimately familiar with each case, so that 
unique patterns of each can emerge and be examined (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
     There are four analytic strategies for case studies, according to Yin (2009), which can 
be used singularly or combined.  These include: relying upon theoretical propositions, 
which are derived from research questions and a thorough study of the literature; 
developing a descriptive framework, which is primarily used if data is collected before 
propositions are developed; employing both qualitative and quantitative data, and 
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subjecting the quantitative data to a robust statistical analysis; and examining rival 
explanations to determine if they can explain the observed behavior, which requires that 
the rival explanations be identified ahead of time so data supporting them can be 
collected during the data collection phase.  The present study will employ a theoretical 
propositions approach (Tellis, 1997a) combined with a thorough examination of rival 
explanations.  A detailed statistical analysis is not applicable given the types of evidence 
that will be collected, as described in the previous section; additionally, a descriptive 
framework is not appropriate given that propositions have been considered prior to the 
initiation of data collection.  
     The concept of rival explanations deserves further explanation.  Yin (2009) provides a 
number of reasons for why a rival explanation may provide the explanatory basis for 
observed behavior, and breaks these reasons into two types –“craft” rivals, and “real-life” 
rivals.  A craft rival is an explanation caused by errors in research design, and Yin 
includes the following three: the null hypothesis, where the behavior is explained by 
chance circumstance only; threats to validity, which are detailed in the next section of 
this chapter; and investigator bias.  Yin also describes six real-life rivals: a direct rival, 
where an intervention other than the expected intervention explains the results, which is 
described in the next paragraph; a commingled rival, where a combination of the 
expected intervention and other interventions together explain the results; an 
implementation rival, where the process of implementing the intervention explains the 
results, instead of the intervention itself; a rival theory, where a completely different 
theory better explains the results; a super rival, where some activity larger than but 
including the examined intervention explains the results; and finally, a societal rival, 
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where social changes and trends explain the results, and not an intervention.  The present 
study must be sure to collect enough data that these types of rival explanations can either 
be supported or refuted as necessary.  
     Each of the propositions described previously can be explained with direct rival 
propositions.   The original propositions of this study are included below (P1-P4), along 
with sample direct rival propositions (R1-R4) that may also offer explanation.  Note that 
other rival propositions are also possible.  Again, data collected must be broad enough to 
support or discount these rival propositions.  
P1: Participants of hacking communities develop new techniques when existing 
hacking techniques cease to reliably breach targeted organizations.  
R1: Participants of hacking communities develop new techniques as a means of 
demonstrating skill and earning status in the communities.  
P2: The methods by which the new hacking techniques are communicated amongst the 
community affect the adoption of the innovations.  
R2: A hacking innovation, if useful enough, will be adopted by the community 
regardless of the manner in which it is communicated through the social system.   
P3: Change agents within the hacking community are instrumental in the adoption of 
the hacking innovation.  
R3: The role of change agents within a community advocating for particular 
innovations is minimal; instead, the merit of the innovation dictates its adoption.   
P4: Continued use of a hacking innovation by community members will determine the 
ultimate adoption of an innovation. 
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R4: Ultimate adoption of an innovation is unaffected by continued use of the hacking 
innovation.   
    Analytic techniques are the next phase to consider when selecting a data analysis 
method.  Yin (2009) describes a total of five techniques – pattern matching, explanation-
building, time-series, logic models, and cross-case synthesis.  The present study will 
employ a combination of pattern matching, explanation-building, and cross-case 
synthesis, and not logic models or time-series, as are described below.    
     One of the main analytic techniques for case studies is the concept of pattern 
matching.  This technique compares a pattern of empirically-observed outcomes against a 
pattern that has been derived theoretically (Yin, 2009).  This pattern may consist of “a 
situation where several pieces of information from the same case may be related to some 
theoretical proposition” (Tellis, 1997b).  Such an approach requires that the pattern that is 
expected be defined before data is collected.  Yin states that pattern matching is the most 
desirable of the case study analytic techniques, and as such it was employed in this study.  
     For a pattern matching approach, there are some considerations that must be 
understood before it is employed.  Borrowing from natural science terminology, Yin 
(2009) states that one technique is using non-equivalent dependent variables as a pattern.  
For each outcome studied, if the values predicted in the proposition were found while 
alternative patterns of values – including those from validity threats – are not, this is a 
pattern that allows strong causal inferences to be made.  This requires that threats to 
validity be identified ahead of time and that numerous patterns be analyzed to ensure that 
the validity threats so not account for the observed pattern.  To better discern patterns, 
Stuart et al. (2002) suggest varying the order in which data from the cases is arrayed, 
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grouping like and unlike events together, so commonalities and differences may become 
evident.  
     A related approach is to conduct tests on the rival propositions described above to 
determine if observed patterns are a result of those propositions, instead of the 
theoretically-derived ones.  Yin (2009) also notes that because pattern matching is not 
subjected to statistical analysis, precision may be low.  Yin suggests postulating less-
subtle patterns to avoid interpretation errors on the part of the researcher in either 
confirming or rejecting a pattern match. Within the IS discipline, Sarker & Lee (2003) 
utilized a pattern matching approach in their case study analysis of ERP implementations.  
Keil (1995) also employed pattern matching to identify factors in his study of software 
project management. 
     Another analytic technique is the concept of explanation-building.  This approach 
attempts to explain how or why a certain observed behavior occurred (Yin, 2009).  Tellis 
(1997b) describes explanation-building as another form of pattern matching, where the 
analysis of the study is conducted by constructing an explanation of the case.  This 
approach is more suited for explanatory case studies than exploratory ones, and allows 
the explanation to be built over the analysis of multiple cases, so that the final 
explanation derived at the conclusion of the study may not have been stipulated at the 
outset, unlike the pattern matching technique described previously.  These explanations 
typically take narrative form and reflect propositions (Yin, 2009).  This technique was 
also employed in this study.  
     Developing explanations is an iterative process: an initial statement or proposition is 
defined, then an initial case is examined, and based upon the results of comparing the 
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initial case against the proposition, the proposition is revised.  The proposition is then 
compared against a second, third, or more cases, and is revised after each; and is repeated 
until no additional insights are gained (Tellis, 1997b; Yin, 2009).  Yin cautions that the 
explanation-building approach is more difficult and the repeated iterations may cause the 
researcher to drift away from the original topic of interest, although a safeguard against 
this tendency is to constantly refer to the original research goal.  Other safeguards include 
reliance upon the previously-discussed tenets of a successful case study – the use of a 
case study protocol, a case study database, and maintaining a chain of evidence. Within 
the business research arena, Chetty and Holm (2000) employed both a traditional pattern 
matching and explanation-building approach in a multiple-case study of international 
network behavior among firms; explanations for observed behavior from each case were 
built iteratively, and resulted in a final explanation regarding internationalization.  
     The third type of analytic techniques is the time-series analysis.  This approach 
directly mirrors the technique by the same name in experimental and quasi-experimental 
analysis (Tellis, 1997b), and involves tracing changes in variables over time.  Time-series 
analyses can consist of simple series, where only one dependent or independent variable 
is observed and an observed trend is compared to a theoretically-anticipated trend, or to a 
rival trend.  A complex series analysis may involve not just the rise or fall of a particular 
variable, but possibly the rise and then fall of a variable within a single case, or other 
mixed pattern, and may involve multiple variables (Yin, 2009).  Chronologies can also be 
a form of time-series analysis, where the placement of specific events in a case in 
chronological order may lead to causal conclusions, if the sequence of events follows a 
predicted sequence instead of a rival sequence.  Time-series analyses may be used in 
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either single- or multiple-case studies.   Tellis (1997b) points out that time-series analyses 
can be problematic as variables may change multiple times or for multiple reasons, which 
may make the starting or ending points of an event difficult to identify.  Such a technique 
is not suited to the present study as the diffusion of innovations to be examined does not 
have an explicit time component, and a time-series approach often involves the 
introduction of an improvement or intervention (Runeson & Höst, 2009).  An example of 
a time-series analysis within the IS discipline can be found in Keil’s (1995) longitudinal 
study of IS project failure.  
     Another type of analysis is the employment of logic models.  This approach describes 
a complex series of events over a period of time – but unlike the time-series analysis, 
logic models are described as a chain of cause-effect-cause-effect patterns (Yin, 2009).  
In a logic model approach, a dependent variable event in one stage becomes an 
independent variable causal event at the next.  In essence, a logic model approach is 
another form of pattern matching, as the observed events are compared against a 
theoretically predicted sequence of events.  Depending upon the unit of analysis, logic 
models can be applied at the individual, organizational, or program levels (Yin, 2009).  A 
logic model approach is not ideal for the present study, however, because they are most 
appropriate for studies that involve the introduction of an intervention or significant 
change to the subject of the case study.  
     The final type of analysis is the cross-case synthesis, which is designed specifically 
for a multiple-case study.  With this technique, each individual case is first treated as a 
separate study.  If a large number of individual case studies are present, the findings from 
each can be analyzed using statistical analysis techniques, and conclusions drawn; if data 
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from a smaller number of cases is collected, as anticipated in the present study, other 
techniques including the employment of word tables may be used (Yin, 2009).  Word 
tables involve the placement of data from the individual cases into an array to look for 
patterns.  Multiple word tables are created for the areas of interest to the study, and data 
from across the multiple cases can be compared.  Yin states that this approach requires 
argumentative interpretation of results instead of simple numeric tallies, and describes 
cross-case synthesis to be analogous to cross-experiment interpretation, which – even in a 
natural science, experimental, and statistical setting – requires interpretation when only a 
small number of experiments have been conducted.  This analytic technique was also 
employed in the present study.  
     Eisenhardt (1989) suggests developing the categories or dimensions to be compared 
both from literature as well as patterns observed in the case study data.  These dimensions 
can be placed in tables – such as a 2x2 grid – to compare several categories at once, or 
pairs of cases can be compared against each other to identify similarities or differences of 
each case.  Such forced comparisons could result in the development of new data 
categories or new concepts worthy of study (Eisenhardt, 1989). An example of cross-case 
analysis in IS can be found in Gable (1994), a study of enterprise IS adoption where five 
main variables were identified in each case, which corresponded with patterns predicted 
in literature.  The values of these five variables were extracted from each case and 
compared against each other, and against patterns suggested in the literature, to obtain a 
deeper understanding of the issue as a whole.  
     To ensure that analysis is performed in a high-quality fashion, Yin (2009) provides 
four principles that should be followed.  First, the investigator must show that the 
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analysis relied upon all of the relevant evidence obtained during the study.  Second, rival 
interpretations of the evidence should be included and addressed to demonstrate that they 
do not account for the observed behavior.  Third, the analysis should be sure to address 
the most significant aspect of the case study – the underlying goal of the original 
research.  And finally, the researcher’s own prior expert knowledge of the subject should 
be utilized to enhance the analysis (Tellis, 1997b; Yin, 2009).  
     The actual procedure to analyze the collected data should also be discussed.  There are 
multiple ways that case study data can be analyzed, including the employment of 
transcripts, tabular displays or graphs, or sequence analysis for time-series approaches 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  Darke, Shanks, and Broadbent (1998) suggest three areas: data 
reduction, where data is selected and simplified; data display, or organizing the data into 
narratives, tables, charts, or graphs; and conclusion drawing and verification, where 
meaning is drawn from the data, and a logical chain of evidence is constructed.  To 
facilitate this analysis, this study will employ the coding of raw data for data reduction.  
Various types of data displays will also be employed to both demonstrate the chain of 
evidence and to assist in the uncovering of connections in the data, as will the usage of 
quotes from the participants of the communities under study, so that the voice of the 
participants can be heard (Dubé & Paré, 2003). 
     Runeson and Höst (2009) recommend analyzing raw qualitative data by developing a 
series of codes, where parts of the collected texts are assigned a code that represents a 
theme, area, or construct of relevance to the study.  It is possible to have a hierarchy of 
codes and sub-codes to assist the analysis.  Codes are an efficient way to conduct data 
reduction and to validate interpretations of data (Dubé & Paré, 2003).  Codes can be 
  72
applied to different units of data, including whole episodes, interviews, or documents 
(Stake, 1995).  Following the assigning of codes to the collected data, the coded data is 
tabulated by organizing the codes into individual tables, much as the concept of word 
tables described by Yin (2009).  Runeson and Höst (2009) describe four approaches to 
coding: immersion approaches, which are the least structured and rely upon the intuition 
and interpretive abilities of the researcher; editing approaches, where a priori codes are 
developed during analysis; template approaches, where codes are developed ahead of 
time based upon research questions; and quasi-statistical approaches, which eschew 
interpretation and rely upon the calculation of frequencies of particular words or phrases 
within texts.  Runeson and Höst states that immersion and quasi-statistical approaches are 
quite difficult, and therefore most researchers employ editing and template approaches.  
Yin (2009) takes a template approach, stating that codes that are developed should have a 
logical progression from the study’s research questions.  
     Bandara, Gable, and Rosemann (2005) used a combination of an editing and template 
approach in their case study of business process modeling.  They first coded behavior that 
was related to theoretical constructs (template approach) and identified new constructs 
within the data (editing approach).  Bandara et al. then refined the codes to determine if 
the text referred to the mere existence of a construct or was evidence of the criticality of a 
construct.  Using qualitative analysis software, they identified keywords of relevance and 
built sub-constructs, and grouped codes into summary matrices for pattern matching and 
comparison.  
     Keil (1995) also employed coding of case study data as an analysis approach.  First, a 
narrative of each case study was developed, as described previously.  Then a table of key 
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information was developed from the narrative and the relative information – in Keil’s 
case, project management information available to decision-makers – was coded in terms 
of the availability of the information for each project.  As another example of coding, 
Boudreau, Gefan, & Straub (2001) conducted coding of concepts in their meta-analysis of 
IS research articles, where the description of particular research methods or tools were 
noted and tabulated.  
 
3.3.5 Threats to Validity 
     The next section of the research methodology chapter is a discussion regarding 
various validity threats to the present study.  In general, there are four threats to validity 
that must be considered and defended against: construct validity, internal validity, 
external validity, and reliability (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008; Runeson & Höst, 
2009, Tellis 1997a).  Each of these aspects will be considered below.  
     The first area of concern is construct validity, or how the data being studied reflects 
both the aims of the researcher and what is examined through the research questions 
(Runeson & Höst, 2009).   This threat is prevalent during the data collection phase of the 
research (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008) and seeks to ensure that the 
operationalization of a concept actually measures what it is supposed to (Boudreau, 
Gefan, & Straub, 2001).  To overcome construct validity issues, three main approaches 
can be employed: triangulation of multiple data sources, having key informants review 
the case study report, and maintaining a clear chain of evidence (Sarker & Lee, 2002; 
Yin, 2009).  As described above, data triangulation was achieved by collecting data from 
multiple sources within the community, such as interviews, observations, documents, and 
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so forth. A chain of evidence was constructed as described previously so that readers of 
the research will be able to follow the path of the study, starting with the collected data 
and finishing with the conclusions.  
     The next threat to validity is that of internal validity, which is a concern during the 
data analysis phase of research (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008) within explanatory 
studies (Tellis, 1997a).  This threat arises when a causal relationship between two 
variables is claimed to be sure it is not caused by a third variable, or if the absence of 
such a relationship means that the event does not occur (Runeson & Höst, 2009; Sarker & 
Lee, 2002).  Essentially, we need to show that variable X leads to variable Y, and that Y 
was not caused by variable Z (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008).  To counter this threat, 
Yin (2009) recommends employing pattern matching logic as previously described – if 
empirically observed patterns match theoretically predicted ones, but not patterns from 
rival theories, then internal validity is high (Sarker & Lee, 2002).  This study did indeed 
employ pattern matching logic to counter the threat of internal validity.  Pattern matching 
should occur both for literal and theoretical replications (Stuart et al., 2002).  A clear 
research framework can also help counter this threat (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008). 
      Another threat to be considered is that of external validity, or the extent to which the 
case study findings can be generalized beyond the immediate case (Stuart et al., 2002; 
Tellis 1997a).  Sarker and Lee (2002) note that generalizability applies to the theory 
being tested and not to the individual case studies themselves.  Furthermore, statistical 
generalization is not possible with case studies, but analytic generalization is achievable 
(Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008; Stuart et al., 2002).  To achieve analytic 
generalizability, Eisenhardt (1989) recommends a minimum of four cases so that robust 
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cross-case analysis can be performed, which the present study employed.  To further 
enhance generalizability, sufficient details should be provided for the case study selection 
and context so that the reader will comprehend the sampling choices employed (Gibbert, 
Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008).  This approach was employed in the present study.  
     The final threat to validity comes from reliability, or the extent to which the case 
study’s procedures can be repeated for the same result (Stuart et al., 2002).  There are two 
main aspects to this threat – transparency and replication.  Transparency is assured 
through the development and description of a case study protocol, as described above.  
Replication is assured by maintaining a case study database for collected evidence, 
consisting of case study notes, documents, tabular material, and study narrative, all of 
which is available should additional researchers attempt to replicate the results (Gibbert, 
Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008; Sarker & Lee, 2002; Stuart et al., 2002).  Additional methods to 
improve reliability come from clear coding of collected data and clear interview 
questions (Runeson & Höst, 2009).  
 
3.4 Summary 
     This chapter detailed the overall research design of the study.  The DOI theory and 
applicability to IS security was described, and a research model of DOI applied to 
hacking communities was derived.  The philosophical positions of the research were 
provided, and then an appropriate research methodology that reflected those positions and 
incorporated previous DOI and IS literature was selected.  This methodology included an 
expert panel and a case study approach of four hacking communities.  The case study 
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protocol was described in detail, and finally, data analytic strategies appropriate for the 
study were described.  
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Chapter 4 
Results  
4.1 Introduction 
     This chapter describes the execution of the expert panel and the four-site case study 
undertaken for this research, as well as the results from each.  Following the description 
of individual results of each case, a section describing cross-case analysis will be 
presented.  
 
4.2 Data Analysis 
4.2.1 Results of Expert Panel 
     As described in the Methodology section, a panel of information security experts, with 
specific experience in computer crime, was convened prior to the initiation of data 
collection.  The table below describes these panelists:  
Table 3: Expert Panel Participants 
Panelist Description Panelist Location 
Law enforcement agent specializing in computer crime Southwestern US 
Information security consultant Northwestern US 
Researcher specializing in computer crime  Southeastern US 
CEO of information security company Northwestern US 
Threat intelligence expert in financial services industry Mid-Atlantic US 
Threat intelligence consultant Northeastern US 
Antivirus industry expert Canada 
Antivirus industry expert Ireland 
 
     The panel engaged in a discussion regarding recent hacking tool and technique 
innovations that would be likely to be discussed in underground hacker communities and 
be suitable for detailed study in this research.  The panel derived the following list of 
innovations: 
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Table 4: Expert Panel Innovations 
Innovation Additional Details from Panel 
Havij SQL injection technique 
“As a service” model of cybercrime Examples: DDoS as a service, spam as a service. “The 
big advantage of that is that you do not need to 
understand how the service works - as long as you pay 
the money, and the guy has a good reputation - it just 
plugs effortlessly into your setup.” 
Bulletproof hosting Webhosting specifically for cybercrime  
Cryptocurrency Stealing bitcoins, mining bitcoins, or steganography in 
bitcoin wallets 
Spyware Evolution: Spyware (circa 2006/2007) -> Fake 
antivirus -> ScareWare -> Ransomware 
Point-of-sale malware For stealing credit card data from retailers 
Cybercrime-enabling services Counter anti-virus services, crypting as a service – 
“fully undetectable” 
Memory resident tools An anti-forensics technique 
Shodan search engine Embedded systems / SCADA hacking 
Cross-platform or mobile malware Consequence of shift away from Windows operating 
systems to Mac / mobile 
DNS Reflection attacks Type of DDoS attack  
Booter services DDoS method popular with gamers 
Amplification attacks DNS, SSDP, NTP, other types of amplification attacks 
for DDoS 
Malware services Customer-focused - support agreements, FAQs, 
customer forums 
Affiliate programs Methods for malware distribution 
 
     The innovations described in Table 4 were employed in the case study portion of the 
data collection.  Not every innovation was observed or popular within every hacking 
community studied; some communities had specific focuses, or others had members who 
were familiar with certain techniques but not others.  However, the above list was used as 
a lens with which to observe the innovation diffusion process within the studied 
communities, as will be further described in subsequent sections.    
     In addition to the hacking innovations above, the expert panel also recommended a 
total of eight potential case study locations.  These locations, based on the experiences of 
the panel, were online hacking communities where numerous hackers participated in 
discussions of attacks and where a number of the hacking innovations above had 
emerged.  From the initial eight locations, a total of four were selected for further study 
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based on factors including the number of active participants, the length of time the 
community had been in existence, whether or not the community was open to registration 
from the public, and a cursory preview of the community to determine if innovation 
discussion was occurring.  The next four sections of this research describe each of the 
four locations selected for study.  
 
4.2.2 – Case Study Analysis - Community A 
4.2.2.1 Community A – Overview 
     The first community examined, Community A, is one of the better-known 
underground hacking forums.  This community was created in 2007 and has a total of 
approximately 2,680,000 member accounts that have been registered since the 
community was founded.  It should be noted that many of these member accounts have 
been closed for abuse by the community staff, for reasons including spamming or 
breaking the forum rules. One abusive member may have registered numerous accounts 
that were subsequently banned by the forum staff.  Nevertheless, thousands of members 
appear to be active at any given time – at the time of the data collection of this study, 
hundreds of users were routinely online at once, and the site boasts that the most users 
ever logged in at once was over 2,800.  Furthermore, approximately 470,000 of these 
accounts have ever made one or more posts, which for the purposes of this study will be 
thought of as the active size of this community.  Anybody can register for an account on 
the forum, which is required to access many parts of the site, conduct searches across the 
forum posts, or send messages to members.  Once a user has registered for an account, 
they appear have access to the entire community. 
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     After a user account was created to facilitate data collection, a comprehensive review 
of the community was undertaken to understand the community norms and social 
dynamics.  This review revealed that there were numerous types of user accounts 
arranged in a hierarchy.  The more expansive accounts, with greater abilities, required a 
small payment using an online payment system such as PayPal or Bitcoin.  This appeared 
to have been done not as a moneymaking endeavor but as a way to weed out individuals 
who wished to conduct abuse on the site.  Individual members can also be assigned 
reputation scores by other members, to help determine which members are trustworthy 
and which are “scammers” or “rippers”.  Members post messages in threads, which other 
members can reply to in order to have a conversation.  Many of these threads have 
hundreds or even thousands of replies and these conversations can last weeks, months, or 
even years in some cases.  The forum itself is divided into numerous sections, where 
members can discuss different types of attacks, can post tutorials (or “tuts”, using the 
forum slang) about certain techniques, or can participate in a marketplace where hacking 
tools and services are bought and sold.  This marketplace confirms what Holt (2013) had 
described in his own review of hacker communities.  
     Using the built-in search function for Community A, searches for each of the 
innovations described by the expert panel were conducted.  Coding was conducted on the 
search results to identify the specific tool or technique being discussed, as well as coding 
for keywords associated with innovation activity.  Examples of coding employed in the 
data collection and analysis of this case include the grouping of common terms, such as 
“SQL injection”, “Havij”, “SQLi”, under a single SQL injection category, or “DDoS”, 
“booter”, “stresser”, “amplification”, “reflection” under a single DDoS category.  
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Additionally, coding was employed to group postings into various adoption factor or 
phase categories, by analyzing word choice and meaning to gauge adoption intention.  
Relevant excerpts from these conversations were placed into word tables, as can be 
observed in Tables 5 and 6, and for similar tables for each innovation, to assist in 
comparison and analysis.  These word tables allowed for cross-case synthesis to occur 
following the completion of each case.  
     The four propositions described earlier in this paper (P1, P2, P3, and P4) were 
examined and theoretically-derived patterns related to each were obtained from them for 
pattern matching during the analysis of data from this case.  Using these patterns, 
explanation-building was conducted on the results from each innovation.  These 
explanations were refined for each innovation, and subsequent explanations from later 
communities reflect and expand upon those explanations derived from earlier 
communities.  
     This initial review found that many of the innovations were too commonly-referenced 
by members and the number of posts requiring review would have been unmanageable 
(such as “SQL injection” as an overall technique, “booters”, or “crypters”) and as such 
were unsuitable for the scope of this case; other innovations were barely discussed at all 
(such as “cross-platform malware” or related innovations).  Based on this review, the 
following four tool and technique innovations were selected for further study:  
- Havij 
- Amplification attacks 
- Bulletproof hosting 
- Shodan 
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     For each innovation studied, a detailed review of all postings regarding the innovation 
was conducted.  Certain details were recorded, such as the date it was initially posted and 
any relevant quotes regarding the development, diffusion, or adoption of the innovation.  
The number of postings about the innovation were plotted over time as a visual aid to 
help determine the level of adoption within the community.  Note that adoption or 
rejection of technique innovations may differ from adoption or rejection of specific tool 
innovations.  A technique innovation, such as amplification attacks in Community A, 
may be implemented in different ways by members and may be incorporated into a 
number of individual tools.  These individual tools that implement the amplification 
attack technique may be adopted or rejected by community members, and will be 
considered, but will not entirely determine, when establishing the community’s adoption 
or rejection of the larger technique.  Individual members’ adoption or rejection of tool 
innovations, such as Havij or Shodan in Community A, has a more direct impact upon the 
community’s overall adoption or rejection of the tool.  This approach will be applied to 
all innovations studied in this and the other three communities.  
     In-depth interviews were conducted with two senior forum members.  Note that for 
this community, the first two members contacted by the researcher elected to participate.  
These members were selected because they were long-term members, higher in the social 
hierarchy of the community, who were observed to be posting in one or more 
conversations related to the four innovations selected above.  This study will refer to 
them as Members A1 and A2.  Member A1 has been a member of Community A since 
2012 and has posted over 3,000 individual postings, and has a moderate number of 
reputation points.  Member A2 has been a member of Community A since 2010, has 
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posted over 24,000 individual posts, and has a very high number of reputation points.  In 
addition to these interviews, reviews of the artifacts produced by the community, such as 
the tools offered for download or the websites were the services were available, were also 
conducted as part of the case study of Community A.  
    
4.2.2.2 Community A – Havij 
     The first innovation to be analyzed was Havij, a popular SQL injection tool.  
Structured Query Language (SQL) injection is a common attack technique which 
involves the sending of SQL commands, often through unsanitized web forms, which 
allows attackers to enumerate portions of a SQL database (Halfond, Viegas, & Orso, 
2006).  Postings about SQL injection in general were too numerous within Community A 
to be feasible for collection for this study; however, postings about Havij were of a 
quantity that was more manageable.  Havij automates much of the manual work of SQL 
injection and allows attackers to quickly locate desired information, such as the username 
and password to administrative portions of the targeted website, and is an important 
initial step in a larger-scale compromise (Parekh, Dave, & Sridaran, 2014).  Havij was 
initially released to the public in July of 2009.   
     The initial need for the Havij innovation within Community A was observed to be a 
lack of knowledge about, and difficulty executing, SQL injection (sometimes referred to 
as “SQLi”) attacks.  It was observed that discussions about Havij were broken down into 
two primary areas: general discussions about the usage, availability, or other questions 
about the tool; and tutorials authored by members to educate others on how to use the 
tool.  A quantitative analysis of the number of general postings about Havij over time is 
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described in Figure 5, and a similar analysis of the number of tutorials about Havij over 
time is described in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 5: Havij Non-Tutorial Postings in Community A 
 
 
Figure 6: Havij Tutorials in Community A 
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      Both curves above resemble an “S” shaped curve, similar to what is predicted by 
Rogers (2003) for innovation adoption.  DOI predicts that the innovators and early 
adopters are present at the start of the curve, with the majorities in the middle and the 
laggards near the end.  This may not be entirely analogous, as the same population may 
not be present for the entire adoption cycle as some members may join or leave the 
community while it occurs; however, the presence of the curve does suggest that an 
acceleration and then leveling-off of the adoption of the innovation is occurring as it 
diffuses through the community.  Subsequent paragraphs in this section will explore other 
aspects of DOI to determine if the theory is useful in the understanding of hacking 
innovation adoption. 
     Further analysis of specific conversation threads regarding Havij revealed that many 
adoption factors were present in the conversations.  Table 5 describes many of the 
conversations observed that had aspects of DOI adoption factors.  
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Table 5: Havij Innovation Factors in Community A 
Date Factor Sample Quote 
December 2007 Compatibility  Im skeptical as to how well its mssql injector would work. It could 
be set back by all sorts of errors, like unclosed braces. 
Complexity If you are going to use a program at least use a nice one like sqlmap 
http://sqlmap.sourceforge.net/ though I doubt many people here will 
get to grips with a cli lmao. 
September 2009 Observability wowowowowow this just rocks i got the usernames and passwords 
for the provided sites now i m gotta search using dorks 
Image This is the problem with you people ..  Tool make works easy but it 
wont give you knowledge .. A Hacker need the knowledge more than 
Automated tools ..  Your not in a competition No Need to Hack Soon 
.. Even your work is slow if you have knowledge . anyplace in the 
world you can do SQL Injection without any problem or tools   I've 
been doing SQL Injection for 3 years down ..I never use tools   learn 
the theory of SQL Injection .. how to fix the bug ..Those are what u 
need 
May 2010 Relative 
Advantage 
I'm using this tool now it's very good, I recommend you use it too, 
automatically SQL Injection always needed and better than manual 
in some case,  Thanks for the tool 
Complexity Look like an automated SQL injector, everything is 'auto' here. 
Trialability Much appreciated mate! I've been reading the tuts and threads posted 
here.. all of them are awesome. I'm sure I'll be defacing a website 
quite soon :D. Cheers ;) 
Observability Wow This is great I already got into 2 websites! :) Thanks a lot! 
Image No one who really wants to be a hacker would use this.. the one who 
uses this willl just get addicted to using fast methods and will alwyas 
think that hacking is a very fast procedure .. in everything he will 
loose his patience resulting in him remaining a script kiddie forever.. 
so if anyone is really interested in being a HACKER (not script 
kiddie..as the poster himself is) then you should not go for any tools 
until its just really impossible .. 
 
     Interestingly, the image factor played a significant negative role in the adoption of this 
tool – using Havij appeared to reduce the user’s social status within the community, not 
enhance it.  As described in the quotes in Table 5, and through a review of the tool itself, 
Havij is a “shortcut” tool that allows attackers to quickly identify SQL injection flaws in 
vulnerable websites; however, the same attacks could be done manually if the user 
possessed the requisite skills.  Users of the Havij tool were often derided as “script 
kiddies”, or “skids” in the slang of Community A, who did not have the knowledge or 
ability necessary to perform a SQL injection attack by hand.  This reduction in image did 
not appear to slow the overall adoption of the tool, as was observed in the quantitative 
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analysis described above, and many postings were noted where users would state that 
they use the tool for convenience but that they could have done it manually if they had 
wanted.  
     In line with this reduction in image, the two senior members of the community that 
were interviewed were also similarly derisive of the tool.  One of the interviewees, 
Member A1, stated that Havij is “meant to make even the worst hacker into a ‘Sup3r l33t 
heker’” but is actually less effective because it “won't deliver the results someone who 
actually spends time doing manually, as the program cannot change specifics that a 
human would”.  Similarly, the other interviewee, Member A2, stated that within 
Community A, “it's mostly just people asking how to use it because they think they'll be 
able to become SQL injection pros very quickly”. 
     The specific hacking need that this innovation fulfilled was mentioned in many of the 
above threads.  For example, the September 2009 thread – only the second time that 
Havij was mentioned in Community A – the original poster described the need as “Havij 
is an advanced MSSQL Injection tool that can check websites for MSSQL vulnerabilities 
and many other useful tools… Now you have to find a vulnerable website. For example 
now i'm going to hack this website.”  The need that this innovation fulfilled was the 
hacking of a website through SQL injection.  Note that hacking of this type bypasses 
many traditional IS security countermeasures, including firewalls, antivirus, and IDS.  
This need existed prior to the introduction of this innovation, but Havij brought SQL 
injection down to the level where any member could attempt it, and allowed for lesser-
skilled members to hack websites that were previously out of their reach.   
  88
     Many of the postings also appeared to transit the DOI adoption phases of knowledge, 
persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation as members weighed in and 
contributed to discussions about Havij.  Two example discussions that highlight the 
phases of adoption of Havij within Community A are described in Table 6 below.  Note 
that for the most part, individual comments below are posted by different members. 
Table 6: Havij Adoption Phases in Community A 
Date Phase Sample Quote 
January 2011 Knowledge [Initial post] 
Persuasion Should add a DL link to the tut ;) So is this better than SQLi Helper 
Please, please make sure you can manually inject before using Havij. If 
you don't know and you only use Havij, all I can say is wow. 
Oh dear fuck, the skids get it on a plate now.... 
Not a bad tut, but i personally HATE Havij. 
Decision Manually go through a site and find all of this: 2-3 hours minimum (for 
me, atleast) Donwload this and run it on the same site: 10-15 minutes 
Good detailed instructions, but I'm not a big fan of Havij... never used 
it, but I don't plan on using it either! 
I can see now why I read people's posts saying 'I prefer to do it 
manually.' This takes all the work out of it. Anyone can do this. Well 
It's a good place for me to start. Great tutorial, easy to follow. I will 
make use of it. 
Implementation this tool is pretty awesome but i think you should know how you can 
do this stuff without tools ;) 
I got some website shopadmin tables, and in order column I can't get 
the number of credit cards. It only shows me **4251 . I mean only the 
lasts 4 digits. What can be done? Is this because of havij free and dont 
let me see the all cc number? Or because some websites encripts credit 
cards detail? If so, what can be done to unencrypt them. Thanks. 
Confirmation thanks a lot, i hacked my first website with this, altho now i prefer 
manually 
Nice Im using it Thansk for this stuff. It really awesume. 
Prefer to do it manually, but this will do the job faster :) 
March 2012 Knowledge [Initial post] 
Persuasion Nice tutorial, have used them before but.. Better learn Manual SQLi .. 
Havij is a pretty straight forward program very nice n i cant wait to try 
it 
This is a nice entry into the realm of sql injection. 
YA GOOD TUTORIAL BUT ITS THE LAZY WAY OF 
INJECTION.. 
Decision nice tutorial brother..!! willl try this out :D 
good tutorial going to give this a try i have havij havent used it yet 
Implementation How many tries does it take to hack 1 website? Because I have tried 
about 30 sites now and all of them I couldn't find the admin page or 
admin credentials or i did find them but they just didn't work. 
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     Knowledge of Havij was provided through the initial posting by the community 
member who was sharing the post – in both cases above, these postings were tutorials 
intended to promote the user of the tool.  The next phase, persuasion, occurred as other 
members weighed in on the tool and expressed their opinions, and attempted to influence 
the favorable or unfavorable attitude of potential adopters.  In many cases, the image 
factor played heavily into this phase, as detractors of Havij claimed that the use of the 
tool would reduce the user’s social standing in the community, through such comments as 
“it’s the lazy way of injection” or “the skids get it on a plate now”.  In the decision phase, 
members would state if they decided to adopt or reject the innovation, as can be seen 
through quotes such as “going to give this a try” or “I don’t plan on using it either”.  In 
the implementation phase, members talked about their experience using the tool, both 
positive and negative (“I have tried about 30 sites now and all of them I couldn't find the 
admin page”).  Finally, in the confirmation page, the members declared their intention to 
continue to use the tool (“Nice Im using it Thansk for this stuff. It really awesome”), or 
discontinue use (“thanks a lot, i hacked my first website with this, altho now i prefer 
manually”).   
     Because of the reduction in image brought about by using the tool, it is also possible 
that some of the members may be moderating their publicized adoption of the tool.  That 
is, these members may be claiming to not need the tool while in reality adopting it for 
use, perhaps covertly.  Many of the conversations observed within Community A 
regarding Havij, such as the quotes referenced above (“i personally HATE Havij”, “this 
tool is pretty awesome but i think you should know how you can do this stuff without 
tools”, and “thanks a lot, i hacked my first website with this, altho now i prefer 
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manually”) lend credence to this notion that this innovation may be adopted in secret to 
avoid being labeled as a “script kiddie”.  A review of DOI literature has indicated that 
this may be a unique phenomenon within innovation studies.  Certainly, some 
innovations may be adopted in non-public ways, such as criminal innovations both cyber 
and real-world (Rogers, 2003); however, moderating visible adoption of an otherwise 
useful innovation to preserve image within the social structure appears to be a new 
finding.    
     While only two sample threads were described in Table 6, numerous other threads 
were observed where the phases of adoption were traversed by the members of 
Community A in regards to Havij, indicating that the pattern observed above is 
representative of overall adoption characteristics within this community.  As a whole, it 
appears that Havij was adopted by Community A.  
    
4.2.2.3 Community A – Amplification Attacks 
     The second innovation studied within Community A was the amplification attack, also 
known as the reflection attack.  Amplification attacks are a type of denial of service 
(DoS) attack where spoofed network packets are sent to vulnerable servers, which 
respond to the intended target with a much larger packet in response.  A common type of 
amplification attack is DNS Amplification, which has a typical amplification factor of 14, 
meaning that the target receives a DNS packet 14 times larger than the spoofed packet 
sent by the attacker (Anagnostopoulos, et al., 2013).  Other types of amplification attacks 
include NTP, SNMP, CharGen, gaming protocols, and peer-to-peer filesharing protocols 
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(Rossow, 2014).  Amplification attacks are widely used in booters or other DoS-as-a-
service offerings (Karami & McCoy, 2013), as described by the expert panel above.  
     Unlike the discussions about Havij, discussions about amplification attacks in 
Community A were much less oriented towards instruction and education.  Indeed, only a 
total of four tutorials were observed regarding these attacks.  Instead, many of the 
postings were threads related to the sale or discussion of DoS code or services that utilize 
the amplification method.  A quantitative analysis of the total number of amplification 
postings was also conducted, as described in Figure 7: 
 
Figure 7: Amplification Postings in Community A 
      
     The curve in this example is less clearly of an “S” shape than the Havij curves – 
Community A had a single post about amplification attacks in 2009, and then nothing 
until March of 2012, when the technique began to pick up steam.  Instead of leveling off 
as the technique became widely adopted, it continues to rise, even at the time that data 
collection within Community A had ended, which may indicate that it has not yet been 
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fully adopted.  The “S” curve model may also require modification in an environment 
where many of the posts are about sales about tools or services.  It was noted that many 
of the tools and services offering amplification attacks – such as booters – would be 
initially offered, garner a significant amount of attention in the community, and then 
eventually go offline as either the operators moved on or the services were shut down, 
perhaps by network operators who observed the abusive traffic or even by law 
enforcement.  New services would be offered by different sellers to take the place of the 
earlier services, a cycle the appeared to continue indefinitely, meaning that estimating 
who the late majority or laggards were in this situation could be difficult.  From the initial 
posting in 2009 – one of the first innovators of this technology – and then to the early 
adopters observed in 2012, this innovation appears to have been successfully adopted by 
Community A.   
     Similar to the Havij innovation, many of the threads regarding the amplification attack 
technique could be broken down into individual DOI factors.  Table 7, below, describes a 
few example threads where this can be observed.  
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Table 7: Amplification Innovation Factors in Community A 
Date Factor Sample Quote 
April 2012 Relative 
Advantage 
Hey guys, Over the past few days, I have figured out a few new unseen 
amplification methods and would like to get your opinions on it. Some 
of you may think that it it is only possible to amplify off of game servers 
although there are many other possibilities. Here is an example of one of 
the couple methods that recently found and created. I would just like to 
get some of your opinions on it. Thanks. 
This is not a using the old quake method, The quake method only has 4x 
amplification at max, This method as you can see has about 24x 
Trialability Yea, if someone would like to donate a 10gbps server then we could 
fully test the power of this method but as it stands we are downing a 
1gbps server with 4MB 
Compatibility  Man that will make one hell of booter. Would make it cheap as shit to 
maintain one now instead of having multiple you would only need like 2 
Complexity It's not just game servers that are being utilized, that's simply the most 
common here. They're very easy to manipulate. You literally just send 
chr255chr255chr255chr255getstatus\n in a UDP packet to the 
gameserver, and it replies back with the map being played, the players 
that are currently on, and some other shit. Easy as hell. 
Observability OP, if your method is truly 24x amplification or whatever you claim, 
why is WickD's booter not outputting 6x what it used to? 
I tested this with LiteSpeed a few minutes ago and it peaked at 6gbps. 
That sir, is fucking amazing. 
May 2015 Relative 
Advantage 
I have access to a very fast server and I've been scanning for 
amplification lists. So I figured I would release them right now for 
everyone, along with their scripts. Enjoy Black Hat I am able to scan 
1.1.1.1 to 255.255.255.255 and it will only take 2 hours. 
Completely maxed 1gbit port after filtering the list. It killed the box 
after the 104M incoming so i had to stop it. 
Compatibility thanks again man so the netbios method will work for protected hosts, 
home connections, w/e? layer 4? 
Complexity ya, most home connections can be downed with just 300mpbs from 
anything, its nothing really, just another amplification method that can 
be used. not exactly specific to anything since it will still push data at 
anything, only a matter of time before ovh, nfo, bl filters this out too, if 
they dont already. 
Trialability I used the NTP monlist script that comes with Nmap (nmap -sU -pU:123 
-Pn -n --script=ntp-monlist <target>) but I changed the command to 
"nmap -iL ntpserverslistfromroot.txt -sU -pU:123 -Pn -n --script=ntp-
monlist". For any other skids the -iL arg is inputList and the list in 
question is the one that Root gave us in the last page (big props to Root 
for that :D Thanks!).  Here is the list in Pastebin (I am a new user so I 
can't post links yet :/ Replace the [DOT] with a "." (no shit) and the 
[FWSLASH] with a "/". 
Observability did you not see my dstat? snmp pushed 10gbps from one box, that 
hardly sux0rz. Anyway, it's just another amp method so ofcourse it's 
gonna be blocked/firewalled. 
 
     In the postings above, the various innovation factors can be observed as the 
community learns about the new amplification techniques.  Most reactions to the 
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innovation were positive and indicated that members were likely to adopt.  Conversations 
regarding this innovation did not have explicit mention of the image factor – however, in 
the above threads as well as numerous other threads related to amplification, appreciative 
members would either “vouch” for the services of the poster who was offering the 
amplification service or tool for sale, or would give “rep” or reputation points as a way of 
enhancing the poster’s status in the community.  
     The hacking need was described in many threads related to this innovation.  Members 
of Community A desired to use DDoS attacks against websites to take them down, but 
waging these attacks was difficult due to the large number of bots required to send the 
traffic.  Websites had been increasingly adding bandwidth and security countermeasures 
to defend against traditional bot-based DDoS attacks.  Amplification attacks allowed 
members to use far fewer attacking machines, with greater overall bandwidth, to take 
down a victim site.  The need for this innovation was pre-existing – the desire to conduct 
denial-of-service attacks – but when amplification was introduced, they became much 
easier.  
     It was also observed that many of the threads related to amplification attacks transited 
the innovation phases.  Table 8 describes one such thread, involving a new DoS service 
available for rental utilizing amplification attacks, where the innovation phases were 
clearly observed.  Note that names of users or websites, when observed within relevant 
quotes, were removed by replacing the name with the text “[redacted]”.  This will be 
employed for any similar occurrences that are observed elsewhere in this study. 
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Table 8: Amplification Adoption Phases in Community A 
Date Phase Sample Quote 
July 2012 Knowledge [Initial post] 
Persuasion [redacted] has my vouch. Haven't talked to him much, but I can 
definitely say that whatever he produces is legit. 
I am currently in the Process of buying this its So fuckin badass with 
all the features and what it can do and its cheaper :) and more power 
Vouch 
Vouch for this, great booter with loads of power. GLWS. 
[redacted], is there a reason everytime someone says an amp even close 
to what you claim [redacted]'s is, you have to whine about it for the 
first 3 pages of their thread? I know we had some details wrong on 
stresser++, but you do realize that this is the exact same thing as what 
I'm using, and you stopped posting about it...  Also, I'd like to point out 
with [redacted]s "500mbit" plan, it hits 34mb, about 272mbit (I have a 
copy, I've tried it.), so I don't see how you can keep complaining about 
what we're saying when your effectively cheating all of your users. 
Decision Probally gonna try this once my [redacted] licence end. Less expensive 
and more powerfull. :P 
please add me on aim…[redacted]  really interested in purchasing… 
So the main question is..how much are you writing without usleep? 
Implementation we just bought This Sick AF API its exactly as powerful as they say it 
is :) 
Confirmation Yes, first it was totally offline and after a while it did hit with 33M 
again and now idk since i havent tested again but hes not even replying 
to anyone though seems he just ignores customers when things go 
wrong. 
API is still not working. Fix your shit all I am making a dispute. Hasn't 
worked for 1 day yet. 
Gamma API is currently offline. We are working on the issue and it 
should be resolved today. 
 
     In the above example, a phenomenon was observed that regularly occurred in 
Community A.  The tool was initially announced to the community by the sellers, which 
consisted of junior-level members who acted as the sales staff or technical support for the 
tool, and a senior-level member who was the ultimate author of the tool.  These 
individuals are the innovators and the champions of this tool, and this announcement 
served as the knowledge phase for this innovation.  Initial reaction to the service was 
skeptical, but then more experienced members chimed into the thread with vouches for 
the service or for the author in the persuasion phase.  These senior members acted as 
change agents from a DOI perspective, and their vouches provided community members 
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with assurances that the offering was legitimate, and led to requests from members to the 
sellers to purchase access to the service.  Then, also in the persuasion phase, a champion 
of a rival service added disparaging remarks to the thread, doubting the technical abilities 
of the tool.  Later, additional senior members provide additional assurances, and in the 
decision phase members appear to be interested in learning more about the service or 
stating intent to purchase.  In the implementation phase, members stated that they were 
using the tool.  However, in the confirmation phase, those members began complaining 
that the tool went offline and that the sellers were unreachable.  In the end, this 
implementation of amplification attacks by the service sellers was not adopted by the 
community, even though amplification attacks as a technique were enthusiastically 
adopted.   
     A similar theme of senior members acting as change agents and lending support to 
tool innovations was observed in another amplification thread.  In this thread – which 
also occurred in early 2012, shortly after the amplification technique began picking up 
steam – a service was offered by a seller and disparaging remarks were made by other 
members: “You mean only enough power to take down wendys? Lol. Wendys is the 
weakest of them all. And how do you not have enough time to do something that would 
take a total of about 2 minutes?”, and “You continue to browse and make post and shit 
but can't do a simple request that takes 10 seconds? Exactly. Proves you can't down any 
of them other than Wendys. I take my vouch back.”  However, a senior member with 
significant reputation points and a higher-status account defended the seller, in a fashion: 
“Omfg guys i don't like [redacted] but stop bitching on his thread you've never fucking 
tried to booter so fuck off and go fuck around another place its pissing me off i see you 
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[reacted] on any booter threads and bitching about them when your booter aint even half 
as strong as this.”  After this defense by this respected member, other members began 
purchasing the tool and remarking about its abilities: “Thanks, this booter does hit hard..  
It has 31 fucking vps's that can each hit home connections & websites down, so 1x31, do 
the math people!” and “Looks like a great booter. GLWS broskie :P”, for example.  
These examples indicate that in Community A, the ability of senior members to act as 
change agents is an important part of the decision to adopt the innovation.  
     The two senior community members, Members A1 and A2, were also interviewed 
about amplification attacks.  Member A1 stated that amplification attacks were extremely 
popular within Community A and were adopted quickly because the technique was a 
“much better method of taking down web servers and/or home connections”.  Member 
A1 also stated that he had “utter disdain for DDoSing” and as a result had an incomplete 
understanding of the technical implementation of the attack, but had observed its 
enthusiastic adoption within the community.  Member A1 related that the amplification 
technique was originally championed within Community A by Member A2, and as a 
result made a significant amount of money by selling tools and services.   
     Member A2, the original change agent for the technique within Community A, was 
interviewed and described the process of adopting amplification attacks, stating that they 
were adopted so quickly because they were far superior to the previous popular DDoS 
method for booter services, which required hundreds or thousands of “shells” be installed 
on compromised systems to generate UDP floods for the attack.  Regarding trialibility 
and observability, Member A2 stated the following: 
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Back then a lot of new customers would just request "demo hits". Sellers would 
provide them free of charge for a few minutes so the buyer could see what he was 
getting. Sellers of these services also posted a lot of 
http://downforeveryoneorjustme.com links showing that they took down large or 
popular websites. That was enough demonstration to convince everyone. After 
that, word of mouth spread it quick.   
     Member A2 explained that implementing the amplification attack technique within 
booters allowed Community A members to rapidly experiment with the technique.  After 
the first booter implemented amplification attacks, Member A2 stated that other booter 
operators reacted quickly: “After people saw the results of the first booter running it, 
every seller raced to get the scripts needed and implement it into their booters.”  As a 
result of the integration within the booters, Member A2 recalled that “it caught on quick” 
and “it very quickly became the norm”.  This is an example of reinvention of the 
amplification technique into the booter operators’ own services.  
 
4.2.2.4 Community A – Bulletproof Hosting 
     The third innovation studied within Community A was the technique of “bulletproof 
hosting”.  Bulletproof hosting refers to the hosting of websites or domain names upon 
hosting providers that will not take down illegal or malicious content, even if a complaint 
is made, due to either geographic location in a country where computer crime laws are 
weak (Wei, Sprague, Warner, & Skjellum, 2010) or because the operators simply offer 
such services because they are profitable (Kamluk, 2009).   Member A1 defined it as 
“hosting that will not go down, and typically allows for malicious websites, exploit kits, 
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etc. This hosting should have the capibility to withstand large amounts of traffic, and 
DDoS protection as well.”  Bulletproof hosting remains popular, even though a number 
of early high-profile services were shut down following media attention and government 
investigation (Bleaken, 2010; Clayton, 2009). 
     Within Community A, a number of discussions regarding bulletproof hosting services 
were observed.  These postings consisted of a range of topics including questions about 
the technique itself, where to procure the services, and members offering bulletproof 
hosting services.  There were no tutorials offered by members, likely because operating a 
bulletproof hosting service requires a significant amount of resources and community 
members appeared more likely to purchase services from one of the other members who 
were serving as vendors.  The quantitative analysis for bulletproof hosting in Community 
A is represented in Figure 8: 
 
Figure 8: Bulletproof Hosting Postings in Community A 
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     Unlike the previous two innovations examined for Community A, this curve is much 
more linear.  This may be because, similar to what was observed for amplification 
attacks, many of the postings in Community A related to bulletproof hosting were 
centered around the sale of services.  This technique is one that is required for many 
modern computer crime operations, including botnets, spam, banking Trojans, and the 
like (Bleaken, 2010; Wei, Sprague, Warner, & Skjellum, 2010); given this constant need, 
it is reasonable to assume that vendors will continue to post advertisements for services.  
Indeed, if we remove postings related to the sale of such services from the analysis in 
Figure 8, we obtain the results in Figure 9, which is still somewhat linear but does 
resemble an “S” curve more than the chart with commercial postings.    
 
Figure 9: Bulletproof Non-Commercial Hosting Postings in Community A 
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     A review of the postings related to bulletproof hosting revealed discussions centered 
around a number of DOI factors.  Table 9, below, describes a few example threads where 
these factors can be observed. 
Table 9: Bulletproof Hosting Innovation Factors in Community A 
Date Factor Sample Quote 
June 2010 Relative 
Advantage 
I will be setting up bulletproof dns's that will work as a no-ip, but 
won't get canceled. … Bulletproof is great for anyone running a 
botnet/trojan. No-Ip.com cancels domains if any abuse report is 
received, with these sub-domains/Dns redirects you will be 
guaranteed to have them working all the time! 
Instead of having a dns like happy.no-ip.com for your bots to connect 
through, I offer Bulletproof dns's happy.mysite.com and they won't 
get canceled due to abuse. 
Complexity In order for you to setup a service like this you need multiple 
dedicated servers...which I doubt you will be able to invest in. 
Anyway good luck. 
Trialability Can you pm me an ip of your dns so I can check location etc? I might 
be interested 
May 2011 Relative 
Advantage 
I am selling 100% bulletproof shared, vps, and dedicated hosting in 
Zimbabwe. EVERY content is allowed, with the following 
restrictions: No email spam or resource eating script on shared/vps, 
you must get a dedicated server for this. Hate speech against the 
government of zimbabwe is not allowed on ANY service. 
Nigeria is not fully bulletproof. Due to the state of the government in 
zimbabwe you can host absolutely anything on this and you will 
never, ever be shut down. 
Compatability So which hosting should I take so that I may host web booter and 
private shells there with mass mailing feature...? 
when you mean anything you really mean anything ? if you allow 
anything prices are big but should worth it. 
Observability Guys, I have the dedicated server from this guy. Its quite expensive, 
takes up a lot of my pay-check but its still worth it. The speeds are 
fabulous, customer support is beyond amazing, and you can do w/e 
you want with it. I highly vouch for this member. 
 
     Unlike the previous two innovations in Community A, it appeared that most members 
intrinsically understood the necessity for the bulletproof hosting innovation.  When 
members sought knowledge, instead of asking questions about the technique itself, 
members asked for places where they could purchase the service.  Most threads were not 
about raising awareness or convincing members to adopt the innovation; instead, most 
threads appeared to be about selling services.  This demonstrates that the hacking need 
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was fully in place prior to the introduction of this innovation – members needed places to 
host their criminal infrastructure without fear that they would be shut down before, 
during, or after their attacks.  
     The very first posting related to bulletproof hosting within Community A, observed in 
June of 2009, was a request for help finding a reputable service: “But the thing is when 
your bot is reasonable big it gets reported and shut down. You'll end up losing all your 
bots at once.  So is there any service out there that offers bulletproof dns hosting? so even 
if they get reported they dont shut it down. A service that is known to host botnets?”.  
Another early posting, from October 2009, also was a request for finding a hosting 
provider: “Hi, can anyone advise on a good remote service to host my own irc server. I 
want to experiment with bots a bit more. I've looked into vpn's rdp etc I'm willing to pay 
something for it and was looking at possibly something off-shore I know many countries 
have very limited enforcement against botnets. Basically does anyone host their IRC like 
this and where is a good place to arrange it?”.   The analysis of this innovation within 
Community A revealed that the primary decision was not to adopt or reject the 
innovation; if members knew enough to ask about bulletproof hosting, they already were 
prepared to adopt it.  Instead, the primary decision was with which provider of this 
service to adopt.   
     In that light, there were a number of sales-oriented threads where the innovation-
decision process about bulletproof hosting providers manifested clearly.  The below table 
describes a few example threads that detail this process.  
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Table 10: Bulletproof Hosting Adoption Phases in Community A 
Date Phase Sample Quote 
September 2015 Knowledge [initial post] 
Persuasion  Big vouch, op hosting gr8 seller 
Vouch for [redacted] both legit members, AnonTech is amazing 
bulletproof hosting, Don't hesitate to buy. 
Decision Any vouch copies? Would be interested in writing a review. 
mass mailing? phishers? botnets? Just need clarification 
The bandwidth is a joke to be honest. 
Say, would I be able to host a botnet that will include DDoS? Or is 
this against T.O.S.? Thanks :) 
What is your definition of bulletproof? I know for a fact if you get a 
spamhaus complaint it will be shutdown fast. 
Implementation Huge vouch! Everything worked perfectly. :) 
got my first purchase few min ago. swiftly all works well 
Confirmation Well, just bought anon.tech hosting with domain, fast, kind and 
helpful support, fast hosting with good price, had no problems, I 
reccommend this to buy 
June 2015 Knowledge [initial post] 
Persuasion  high price man ... it,s about 7 or 8$ enough   anyway best of luck 
for you sell 
Amazing bulletproof hosting, vouch for [redacted].. always comes 
with HQ products. A+ to support 
Decision Can i use it to send out like 10,000 emails per day? "marketing"... 
DMCA ignored!! Really nice... will like to test it out soon! 
we, usually won't get any spam report. If we got any we change the 
ip. let me know if you do have any other query, thanks 
There is no atomatic layer 7 protection, we do offer basic ddos 
protection upto 120gbps as per packet flow size. 
Implementation Ordered this hosting, works how it belongs to 10/10 + great support 
^^. 
Had a little problem, but it was fixed fast. <3 VOUCH! 
I believe this works well for me am giving it a try right now. 
Confirmation VOuch .. Still happy with the host i am loving it :) 
i have told you many time bro but you keep deaf hear of that, pls fix 
the two website Asap is upto 2weeks now or is it when it will expire 
that you will start fixing ? 
Op calls bulletproof hosting because he will allow you to host 
whatever you want. I used before his host, even got a dedicated IP 
and at first report, i was suspended lol 
 
     As can be seen above, individual members made decisions to adopt or reject this 
seller’s innovation, with a majority of those who contributed appearing to adopt.  Some 
members in the confirmation phase appeared to reject the service after purchasing – such 
as the member who complained about being suspended at the first complaint, and the 
member who complained about a problem that persisted for two weeks – but the 
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complaints of these members did not appear to detract from the enthusiasm of the other 
members participating in the thread.  Like the previous amplification innovation, it was 
observed that in the persuasion phase members would supported adoption would provide 
vouches for the seller, while members who did not encourage adoption would contribute 
disparaging remarks.  In the decision phase, technical questions were posed by members 
and were answered by the seller.  In the implementation phase, members would describe 
their experience with the service, often adding additional vouches to encourage further 
adoption, and in the confirmation phase, members would highlight their intention to 
continue to utilize the service.  It appears that the bulletproof hosting technique was 
indeed adopted within Community A.  
     Members A1 and A2 did not have much experience with bulletproof hosting services, 
and stated that Community A is not the type of community where true bulletproof hosting 
can be bought or sold due to relatively low sophistication of average members.  Member 
A2 stated that many sellers of such services “claim their shit is bulletproof but it isn't. Not 
here at least”, and added that “not many people here actually know how to obtain 
bulletproof hosting nor do they want to pay the costs required. Those that do are usually 
more active on other sites.”  Even if the quality of bulletproof services offered by sellers 
within Community A was poor, there was still a level of interest in members seeking to 
adopt services, and many of the services offered by sellers were experimented with by 
community members before ultimate adoption.  
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4.2.2.5 Community A – Shodan 
     The final innovation recommended by the expert panel and observed within 
Community A was Shodan.  Shodan is a search engine that scans the internet and indexes 
administrative pages of internet-connected hardware devices, including so-called 
“Internet of Things” devices like surveillance cameras (Genge & Enachescu, 2015) or 
industrial control systems such as manufacturing or power generation devices 
(Bodenheim, Butts, Dunlap, & Mullins, 2014).  Hackers have utilized Shodan to 
maliciously attack baby monitors, webcams, heating and cooling systems, and other 
connected devices (Hill, 2013).  
     A significant amount of mischief can be conducted using these connected devices.  As 
a result, there was interest in this innovation from the members of Community A, 
although not to the levels that were observed for the previous innovations.  The chart of 
postings over time is displayed in Figure 10: 
 
Figure 10: Shodan Postings in Community A 
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     For this innovation, there were only 28 observed postings referencing Shodan, 
indicating a relatively low level of adoption within Community A.  Neither Member A1 
nor Member A2 had any experience with this tool.  Of the 28 observed postings, three 
were tutorials, and the rest consisted of questions regarding the service.  Due to the 
smaller number of postings, there were fewer samples of DOI innovation factors 
observable in the postings regarding this innovation; however, a few examples are 
described in Table 11. 
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Table 11: Shodan Innovation Factors in Community A 
Date Factor Sample Quote 
December 
2010 
Relative 
Advantage 
So, I'm going to provide you chaps with a short guide to a very useful 
resource indeed. It's called Shodan and it functions, essentially, as a port 
scanner/banner grabber database and search engine…. Well, take a look 
http://www.shodanhq.com/browse/ there. These are the most popularly 
rated searches, and include webcams, routers, embedded devices, and 
more. You can use this to find specific combinations of servers and 
operating systems in specific countries using search filters, and of course, 
like all search engines, basic operators will work, too, so you can engineer 
some fairly damn specific searches. 
Compatibility Shodan contains an exploit search engine which allows you to get results 
from those sites, yes, but its primary purpose is as a database of port-scans 
with banners, a search engine of vulnerable servers, which is completely 
different to a collection of exploits. Did you even read my post or visit the 
site? 
Trialability Unfortunately, some of the service filters are pay-only (telnet and https), 
and without paying, you can only see the first 50 results in a search, which 
is annoying, but you can survive. 
Observability It's a very interesting tool to check, for example, for anonymous ftp. 
http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=port%3A21+%22...n%22++-530 Or perhaps 
you'd like to see Windows 2000 boxes running Apache? 
http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=os%3Awindows2000+apache Uses are 
pretty much endless; there's plenty more you can do, and plenty more 
useful machines, so I'll leave you guys to find them out. 
December 
2012 
Relative 
Advantage 
A webcam exploit tutorial that I have used for the popular leak of the strip 
club cam I found about a month back. I still use this method today and have 
great success with it and now it is time I share a good HQ tutorial with my 
fellow HF members.My old thread where I released the popular strip club 
cam can be seen and located here. 
Compatibility Just as a little side-note. If you find something interesting, but without the 
default password for that piece of software - most of these are implemented 
without any kind of brute-force counter-measures.  Oh. And I find most 
user/pass comboes to be admin/admin <-- Depends on what software you 
target of course. 
“The only thing I knew about the website is that people used it for 
WebDAV shells. .xmls.” “Yes allot of people use it to find shells.I did 
myself for a bit but exporting xml files can get expensive and most of them 
are overused.” 
Complexity nice tutorial but somehow I cant log into any Cams I think I tryed 30 
different cams already but it always says "http://118.80.12.16 verlangt 
einen Benutzernamen und ein Passwort. Ausgabe der Website: "VIPCAM" 
maybe they just changed the default settings and its a lot of work 2 finally 
find one with default settings ^^ 
Trialability “really can u give me a IP that works? iam trying 10 min and got nothing 
yet :(“ “No prob man I have sent you a list of them to play with.” 
Lol I must be retarded it's not letting me login it comes with login and 
password what do I put in.. 
Observability works, funny stuff. thanks for that. I have a lot of successful logins where 
the cam does not load. Any suggestions? 
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     Both of the threads referenced above were tutorials, posted by two Community A 
members to attempt to persuade other members to utilize the tool.  These two members 
can be viewed as change agents who are enlisting other members in the use of this 
service.  The relative advantage of Shodan is immediately apparent to potential adopters, 
and the trialability and observability of the tool makes for easy testing.  The tool was 
somewhat complex, resulting in numerous members posting questions on how to utilize it 
properly; however, most members appeared eager to adopt once they had tried the tool. 
     From a hacking need perspective, this innovation differs from the previous three 
innovations studied within Community A.  Members who participated in discussions 
about this tool were surprised at the level of information they could obtain from it, and 
few prior discussions related to a desire to hack webcams or other devices were observed 
prior to its introduction.  The results appear to have been treated as a novelty but did not 
appear to be a core part of the attacks perpetrated by the members of Community A.  This 
indicates that the tool was introduced to Community A before a legitimate hacking need 
existed for it, contrary to the need that had been observed for the prior three innovations.           
     The last conversation in Table 11 was also reviewed for indications regarding the 
steps of the innovation-decision phases, and the results are described in Table 12:  
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Table 12: Shodan Adoption Phases in Community A 
Date Phase Sample Quote 
December 2012 Knowledge [initial post – tutorial] 
Persuasion  Very nice tutorial. Very HQ for beginners such as myself. Thanks! 
Decision im gonna check this out it seems cool, thanks for the tut 
looks legit man, i'll have to try this out (for education purposes of 
course ;) 
Implementation Vouch, i am in a cam of a bank :D  Nice tut !!! 
Looks nice but, I'm having issues getting the login to work. I've tried 
quiet a few webcams but, none seem to work. 
Just tried the method out, its real cool. Thanks. :) 
Good post man! Hacked into my local banks camera! 
Confirmation I have bought the extended/full search. Thanks for a great guide! 
Okay, I got it working. Just make sure to try a few, It took like 10-5 
for me to get a working one. Awesome method, Vouch. 
 
     Unlike many of the previous innovations discussed, there appeared to be little to no 
opposition to Shodan.  This may have been because there were no competing services 
being offered by other members, and use of the tool did not reduce the social standing of 
the user, such as with Havij.  There were some members who experienced problems, but 
the change agent who posted the tutorial provided guidance to these members and 
appeared to resolve their problems in a way that convinced them to adopt.  Despite the 
low number of postings regarding Shodan, it does appear that this innovation was 
adopted by members of Community A. 
 
4.2.2.6 Community A – Summary 
     Community A was an extremely active hacking community where numerous 
innovations were proposed, experimented with, and ultimately adopted or rejected by 
members.  The focus of the community appeared to primarily cater to members who were 
engaged in the operations of attacks and members who were operating as vendors selling 
hacking services, although some education of members who wished to learn techniques 
occurred as well.  Many more innovations were observed being discussed and evaluated 
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than the four examined here.  None of the innovations examined as part of this case study 
were actually developed within Community A, with the exception of amplification 
attacks which were introduced by Member A2; instead, the techniques or tools were 
introduced to the community by change agents who championed their use or who 
authored tutorials instructing other members on their use, and many of the techniques 
(such as bulletproof hosting or amplification attacks) were incorporated, or reinvented, 
within service offerings by vendor members.  Also important to the adoption of these 
innovations were the senior members who lent their support to the change agents and 
who influenced the more junior members to experiment with, and eventually adopt, the 
innovations.   
     This forum appeared to contain a mix of skill levels, including some lower skilled 
individuals and some more highly skilled individuals, but the overall skill level of this 
community appeared to be medium.  Of the four innovations examined, only one  - 
Shodan – appeared to have been introduced without a hacking need firmly in place.  The 
other three innovations appear to have been introduced as a response to a need by 
members to engage in easier and more effective attacks.  
     The communication of the individual innovations primarily occurred over the 
channels offered within the community itself – namely, public forum postings and private 
messages.  Some additional communication occurred outside of the community, such as 
when vendors posted links to their websites where hacking services were offered.  Some 
other communication may have occurred over instant messaging services, such as Skype 
or MSN Messenger, as many members posted their contact information in their post 
signatures and invited individuals to contact them there.  It was not possible to observe 
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communications that occurred in non-public spaces, but it also appears based upon the 
flow of conversations within message postings that the majority of communications 
occurred within individual message threads.  
     The four innovations that were examined were instructive for an understanding of the 
innovation process within Community A.  These innovations demonstrated the rate of 
adoption within the community, highlighted the differences in measuring adoption of 
tools and techniques without a commercial aspect versus ones that involve the sale of 
services, and illustrated the phases of innovation factors and innovation-decision process 
experienced by members who were deciding whether or not to adopt as the innovation 
diffused throughout Community A.  Interestingly, the importance of the image factor in 
the adoption process was also demonstrated, as was the lack of importance of 
voluntariness.  These findings will be compared against the findings from the second case 
study location, Community B.  
 
4.2.3 Case Study Analysis – Community B 
4.2.3.1 Community B – Overview 
     The second hacking community studied, Community B, was a smaller and seemingly 
more professional community than what was observed in Community A.  The community 
appeared to be more focused upon education around hacking techniques, versus the focus 
on the sale of services seen in Community A, with members appearing to have more 
experience and with fewer “script kiddies”.   The community was started in 2010 and 
boasts a total of approximately 38,400 individual member accounts.  Like what was 
observed in Community A, many of these accounts were never used or appear to have 
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been blocked by forum staff for abusive behavior.  Many other accounts appear to have 
been used by members to “lurk” but never contribute to public conversations.  A total of 
approximately 3,700 of the total user accounts engaged in conversations and can be 
thought of the number of active users of the community.  Once a user has registered for 
an account, they appear have access to the entire community. 
     Similar to Community A, Community B also had a hierarchy of members, with the 
forum owner and administrators at the top, followed by moderators, and then various 
types of “VIP” members, with the general members at the bottom.  VIP status is given to 
members based on merit and participation and is not available for purchase as in 
Community A.  More senior members who have been active for a longer period of time 
appear to have been awarded VIP or higher status.  This community also employs a 
system of reputation points.  These points appeared to be less important for Community 
B, however, as there were no commercial postings within the community and using 
reputation to determine scammers and rippers was less important.   
     Based upon the input from the expert panel described previously in this chapter, a 
review of innovation activity within Community B was conducted.  Using the search 
tools built into the community’s forum-based communication system, Community B was 
searched for postings that related to the innovations suggested by the panelists.  This 
review resulted in the selection of four innovations to be analyzed within Community B, 
as they were found to have a total volume of postings sufficient for study.  These 
innovations are broader subjects then those explored within Community A, due to the 
smaller size of the community and lack of commercial postings, and can be found below: 
- SQL injection attacks 
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- DDoS attacks 
- Crypting services 
- Bitcoin (criminal aspects) 
     Data collection and analysis for these innovations and this community was identical to 
the method employed for Community A.  In addition to data obtained from observing 
postings about the innovations, interviews with two senior members of Community B, 
Member B1 and Member B2, were conducted.  These members had expressed interest in 
participation after they the researcher posted a request for participants in a chat room 
created for the sole use of Community B members.  Member B1 is an administrator of 
Community B and has been active since 2010, having posted approximately 6,500 
individual postings, and has a high number of reputation points.  Member B2 is a 
moderator of the Community and has been active since 2011, with approximately 1,100 
postings and a similar number of reputation points to Member B1.  Both members are 
longtime senior members with enough visibility to have input regarding the innovations 
under study.  
 
4.2.3.2 Community B – SQL Injection Attacks 
     The first innovation studied within Community B was the technique of SQL injection.  
SQL injection is the hacking technique behind the more user-friendly tool Havij 
described in the previous community.  A quantitative analysis of the number of postings 
relating to SQL injection attacks can be found in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: SQL Injection Postings in Community B 
 
    Of the 202 total postings related to SQL injection observed in Community B, five were 
found to be tutorials.   These tutorials were posted by change agents seeking adoption of 
the technique within Community B.  Two of these tutorials demonstrated a number of the 
innovation factors as members experimented with the technique, and are described in 
Table 13: 
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Table 13: SQL Injection Innovation Factors in Community B 
Date Factor Sample Quote 
March 
2011 
Relative 
Advantage 
I personally use MySQL because its free and works well with Apache and 
whatnot. It also got a good syntax. It is also the most used engine so its what 
you will most likely encounter when doing injections. All SQL in this 
tutorial will be MySQL. 
Compatibility Awesome tutorial, thanks!!!!  I have to mess with this more, I was already 
doing all the preventive measures recommended in this tutorial but even 
when I take prevntive measures away I still can't break my code, I'm gonna 
have to do a lot more studying!!!  example of some code I was trying to 
break (my dad owns a limousine company, I wrote this for him to keep track 
of maintenance on the vehicles) 
Complexity well written [redacted] but the securing part take time to see it and if you are 
a newbie like me its hard to see all those codes 
I must say that this is a HQ tutorial. I will expect nothing less from an admin. 
You made it very clear what you are saying and i understood it all. But i do 
have a lot of experience in SQLi so i dont know how it looks from a newbie. 
Trialability I try this tutorial.. and have problem. First: when you try write 
http://[redacted]/index.php?id=17+ORDER+BY+5 or 
http://[redacted]/index.php?id=17+UNION+ALL+SELECT+1,2,3 you get 
nothing.. I solved this problem with ...?id=17' UNION ALL SELECT 1,2,3# 
but if you write in url in my case # dont works so I change it to %23. like 
?id=17' UNION ALL SELECT 1,2,3%23. 
Ok Thanks =] As we talked pm you said there is no CMS panels in that 
website i pmed you and said to check for XSS vuln. Well i didn't founded 
XSS vuln too :\ 
Observability You mean the query union select and the sql server return all 3 columns. I 
may ask that why it output "2", "3" on the webpage rather than anything else, 
for example columns name. In some other tut, this query is said to find 
vunerable column, and u make difference. Sorry for my bad english 
It outputs 1, 2 and/or 3 because that is the values you selected (SELECT 
1,2,3). When you select a number instead of the column name, it takes the 
values as is, and prints them directly. You could also do SELECT 'a', 'b', 'c' 
and it would print 'a', 'b' and/or 'c'. You do this to see the changes in output, 
so that you know where to look and what is being printed in the next step: 
Actually retrieving data. 
Image Videos are shit. You do not learn SQL injection without knowing SQL... this 
way you can learn few commands and that's it! Only if you know SQL you 
can make queries and inject them... ugh. 
November 
2012 
Relative 
Advantage 
Advantage of using this script : I've given a textbox to enter the URLs. You 
can enter more than one URL to be checked. Very often you come across 
huge lists of URLs and people say that they are all Vulnerable to SQLi. 
Well, this is what you'll need then... 
Compatibility The error message checking you are doing is a bit.. Broad. Many sites do 
contain the word "sql", "error" and "()" without actually having a 
bug/vulnerability. 
Complexity RFI/LFI would be easy to do with your script, just replace the entire 
argument(s) with various LFI and RFI attack strings and look for the things 
mentioned above. For RFI you could try http://google.com and look for 
something google.com always has on their home page or something..  XSS 
would be as simple as replacing the ' with '"/><img src="herp.png" /> and 
look for "<img src="herp.png" />" in plain-text in the source.  CSRF is a bit 
harder. And probably will not be very useful/practical/easy to make in this 
case. 
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Observability Scanning only the last parameters for sqli is not a best way. May be the other 
parameters in the link is injectable too. Do you plan to fix it  :)? 
 
     Interestingly, the first tutorial in the above table was written by one of the 
administrators of the site.  It was observed that a significant amount of praise was 
provided by more junior members as a response (such as stating that the tutorial was 
“HQ”, or high quality) and that the high status of the poster in the social system of the 
community appeared to encourage other members to experiment with the technique.  As 
can be seen in the reference to “pm” (or private message) during the trialability phase, 
communication about this innovation occurred both over mass media public postings 
seen by all as well as interpersonal, private messages between the original poster (the 
change agent) and the potential adopter. As a comparison, the second tutorial was posted 
by a more junior member and the responses were more critical.  The second tutorial 
involved this junior member who reinvented the innovation by incorporating SQL 
injection into his own custom script and is an example of enthusiastic adoption of the 
technique, even though others were critical of his implementation.   
     The introduction of the SQL injection technique to Community B appeared to have 
been in response to a pre-existing hacking need, as described in the tutorial posted by 
Community B’s administrator: “So, if you are able to set your own requirements in the 
query, we can also do an information retrieval injection, which in the end is what SQL 
injection is all about. Getting information you are not supposed to… This is because we 
asked for the ID which is 23, then the subject which is ‘admin passwords’ and then the 
text which is ‘abcabcabc’.”  The goal of this tutorial was to teach members how to hack 
into vulnerable sites to obtain information to which they were not entitled – and this 
information was often the administrator password to the target website.  This type of 
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information is a frequent target of hackers and was a legitimate need before SQL 
injection was introduced into this community, as evidenced by the number of hacking-
related postings observed prior to this date.  
     It was also noted in numerous other postings about SQL injection within Community 
B that the ability to engage in manual SQL injection versus using automated tools (such 
as Havij from Community A) affected the overall image of the member.  Members who 
had the skills to conduct manual SQL injection attacks were seen as superior to members 
who utilized automated tools or who did not have complete knowledge of the principles 
behind the technique, as noted in the quotes below, obtained from a number of individual 
postings about SQL injection:  
- “Please, do me a favor, before you go ahead and follow tutorials on this tool. 
Read atleast [redacted] tutorial on sql injection.  Do you want to be a TOTAL 
skid???, no!. So get some knowledge before accessing the tools of the trade.  This 
is one of the most advanced opensource sqlinjection tools available. Tough you 
need to know some basics about sql injection and sql, sql servers, and server side 
coding to load this weapon.” 
- “I always tell them to learn to create before learning to destroy - because if you 
know how to create, you can think of more productive/effective ways destroy stuff 
and I like creating more, because then you have something to show. Like those 
skiddies doing SQL injection without having a clear picture of wtf SQL is - this 
just makes me sad, really.” 
- “Also in their arsenal, Anonymous uses extremely prevalent website 
vulnerabilities (from highest to lowest success: SQL injection, cross-site scripting, 
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file inclusion, directory traversal, general server misconfiguration, 
password/POST form cracking). Nothing of real interest or innovation. Most 
Anons only have an exceedingly basic, fallacious and surface knowledge of their 
actions and use readily configured popular security suites (Havij, sqlmap, Cain & 
Abel, Metasploit, Nessus, nmap, etc.)” 
- “Oh, those are awesome! You only have to insert the link and hit a button, 
meaning that you don't even need to know any actual SQL Injection. I love those 
"H4x0rZ 1t n0wz" kinda programs. Why learn? That's wasting time, right?” 
- “You can still find hundreds of easy SQL injections you just have to be crafty in 
how you.... craft your google queries.  Also don't use NMap or Metasploit! Make 
your own versions so you truly understand what you are doing when you use 
those tools, once you've done that, then you'll no longer be considered a script 
kiddie.” 
     As in Community A, a number of postings about SQL injection appeared to transit the 
innovation-decision process as knowledge of the innovation spread and individual 
members evaluated the technique.  An example of this process is described in Table 14, 
using the same initial tutorial from March 2011 as described in the previous table. 
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Table 14: SQL Injection Adoption Phases in Community B 
Date Phase Sample Quote 
March 2011 Knowledge [initial post – tutorial] 
 Persuasion when I took away mysqli_real_escape_string, is_numeric, and the '' for 
the var, I still couldn't inject :( 
I appreciate the update, the information is understandable and simply 
well written. I have read and learnt some through this tutorial. 
Decision Interesting article , Best way to master SQL injection is learning sql 
first and study whats happen behind the scene when we injecting . 
Implementation euhh i'm a very bigenner in hacking lol, but i'm good at coding, so my 
problem is that i can't find tergets (i mean website where i can apply 
what you just teach as here) any ideas !!?? 
I also hack with sql injection and somtime it show no column with 
union all select. I wonder it has not any text type column (a table 
always has text column, is that right?).Thank for answer 
Confirmation Thanks for answer. Well it was the only user table on the database 
server (i pmed you link of that site) And password is not hashed. I 
Don't know where is problem... and that happens always when i get 
admin logins... i go to control panel and it says login invalid :\ i don't 
know what im doing wrong 
Ive got an algorithm for this in C++ (console app) ask input->getstring 
= x -> search url : x + "sql injection stuff" -> if error output 
"vulnerable" -> then search for tables names and that stuff I think that I 
could make it :P 
 
     In the innovation-decision process described above, the innovation is first introduced 
in the knowledge phase.  In the persuasion phase, members form favorable or 
unfavorable decisions about the innovation – in this case, both types of opinions were 
formed as members attempted to use the technique.  In the decision phase, the members 
decide to adopt or reject the innovation, and in the above example the member is shown 
endorsing the original poster’s methodology, which involves learning a significant 
amount about SQL before attempting to use it in attacks.  In the implementation phase, 
members express their experiences when they use the innovation.  Finally, in the 
confirmation phase, members declare their intention to continue to use the technique – in 
the first comment the member succeeds at obtaining the administrative username and 
password to the website being attacked, but is unsure of what to do next (thereby 
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demonstrating the success of the technique), while in the second comment the user 
describes his intention to reinvent the technique by incorporating it into a C++ program 
he intends to write.  
     This initial tutorial by the community administrator was seen as a great success – 
indeed, for years afterward, when junior members would ask about the SQL injection 
technique, more senior members would direct them back to that same tutorial.  As a 
result, it appears that Community B adopted the SQL injection technique.  
 
4.2.3.3 Community B – DDoS Attacks 
     The next innovation studied within Community B was the technique of distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attacks.  DDoS is a popular method of attack, where the 
attacker harnesses the power of multiple computers to send a flood of traffic to the 
intended victim (Li, 2004).  These attacks frequently overcome organizations’ IS security 
countermeasures by sending massive amounts of legitimate-seeming traffic, bypassing 
firewalls and other devices.  The technique described in Community A of amplification 
attacks is a class of DDoS attack, and the booter tools described in that community utilize 
numerous types of DDoS methods to take down their targets.  For Community B, the 
innovation of DDoS generally was examined, including related methods such as 
amplification attacks, reflection attacks, booters, and the popular tools “LOIC” and 
“HOIC” (Shiaeles & Papadaki, 2014).  
     As before, an analysis of the number of postings over time was conducted.  The results 
of this comparison can be observed in Figure 12.  
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Figure 12: DDoS Postings in Community B 
 
     The diffusion of this innovation is close to linear, which is surprising given the low 
opinion of the technique expressed by members of Community B.  The following quotes, 
taken from a single month of postings on the topic (July 2012), are representative of the 
general opinions expressed by members on the topic of DDoS: 
- “I can tell you right now you will not get any positive reactions from any 
respected member on this site when you spend your time ruining peoples work for 
no gain, just because they run software on their server that is vulnerable. I have a 
feeling you think DDoSing a site is pretty awesome too. I feel sorry for ya bro :-\” 
- “You can't expect to be welcomed to a community where you think hacking 
includes defacements (and possibly DDoS however you never responded to that) 
Defacements take no real skill at all which is why a bunch of 12 yr olds are doing 
it (along with DDoS')” 
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- “Writing about DDoS is not very interesting unless it is something new, and even 
then it is not really all that interesting.” 
     There was a significant theme of public shaming for those members who professed to 
conduct DDoS attacks, and the image of those members was significantly reduced.  
Because of this, there were not any conversations regarding the diffusion of DDoS 
innovations where members experimented with and adopted or rejected tools or 
techniques.  Likewise, a pre-existing hacking need related to DDoS appeared to be non-
existent. Instead, when members attempted to seek help with DDoS attacks or solicit 
other members to engage in them, the postings were moved to a section of Community B 
called the “Board of Shame” for public ridicule.  Member B2 stated about this section of 
the community, “Public shaming is one of the most used tools on [redacted] in dealing 
with members who ask ‘stupid questions’. If the thread or the responses are funny 
enough, the thread may even be moved into the Board of Shame, which is a public 
shaming tool.”  
     There were some discussions about innovative techniques, such as reflection or 
amplification attacks, but these discussions centered on detection and defense, or learning 
about the technical principles behind such attacks, and not about the adoption of the 
technique itself.  Member B1 stated that these discussions were allowed because while 
Community B members “hate ddos as a service, it's not frowned upon talking about 
techniques, tools and use-cases of ddos if it's related to learning and sharing some 
knowledge”. 
     Generally, those members who claimed to engage in DDoS attacks were labeled as 
“script kiddies” and shunned, and there existed a strong social pressure to not speak about 
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such attacks, with common quotations such as “I would never DDoS or anything like 
that, that's for skids” and “Just looks like a shitty DoS tool (I believe people call this 
particular type a ‘shell booter’). Not even written well at that”.   Member B1 echoed this 
sentiment, stating that “even though hacking discussions are what should be around here, 
we don't condone illegal activities and most of us hate DDoS as it's just stupid.”  Member 
B2 added that DDoS is “seen as something that skids do/buy. Requires no skill and is 
lame.” 
     Because of this behavior, it appears that Community B as a whole has rejected DDoS 
innovations.  This type of rejection is a passive rejection, where the community has 
rejected the innovation outright, without considering it for adoption (Rogers, 2003).  It is 
possible that individual members may adopt the technique in secret, but Community B 
was observed as a place where innovation into DDoS attacks did not occur.  This in itself 
is a novel finding as the community rejected an entire class of hacking techniques based 
upon primarily the image factor, although complexity also played a role as DDoS attacks 
were seen as too simplistic to be interesting.  
 
4.2.3.4 Community B – Crypting  
     The third innovation studied within Community B was the technique of crypting (or in 
tool form, crypters).  Crypting is the process of encrypting malware executable files so 
they are not detected by IS security countermeasures such as antivirus programs and is a 
parallel process to packing, or compressing, malware, which is also frequently done for 
obfuscation (Yan, Zhang, & Ansari, 2008).  Between 80 to 90 percent of malware 
samples are obfuscated in such ways in an attempt to deliver malicious payloads to 
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targets before they are detected (Lyda & Hamrock, 2007).  Using the slang of these 
hacker communities, the goal of the malware is to make it “full undetectable” (or 
“FUD”).  Because crypting and packing techniques are often closely linked, searches for 
threads describing both will be conducted.  The processes of crypting and packing, and of 
creating crypter and packer tools, are quite popular within hacking communities and were 
observed extensively within Community A, although less so within Community B.  
Figure 13, below, describes the prevalence of discussions regarding crypting and packing 
techniques within this community. 
 
 
Figure 13: Crypter Postings in Community B  
 
     A review of innovation diffusion activity surrounding crypter-related threads was 
illustrative.  Of the 40 total conversations related to malware crypters, four were 
identified to be tutorials.  Two of these threads were selected below in Table 15 as 
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examples where innovation factors were clearly discussed.  Both of these threads 
involved members who were releasing crypter tools that they had developed to the larger 
community.  It was interesting to note that posts about crypters or packers that appeared 
to have been authored by “script kiddies” that were seeking help with obfuscating clearly 
malicious software, such as Trojans, were moved to the “Board of Shame” similar to 
what had been observed in the DDoS section above.  Posts about these innovations that 
were technically novel or were geared toward the sharing of knowledge were commented 
upon, and perhaps even experimented with or improvements suggested, even if the 
ultimate goal was likely for malicious purposes.  This may indicate that image plays a 
role in the adoption of various techniques or tools; however, the image in the case of 
Community B, that of technical superiority or mastery, is different from the image 
observed in Community A, that of “street cred” within the community.  
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Table 15: Crypter Innovation Factors in Community B 
Date Factor Sample Quote 
 May 2015 Relative 
Advantage 
Being a noob looking for stub crypter sources that I would finally be 
able to understand, I stumbled over this (rather imperfect, but tiny & 
lucid) piece of code… I rewrote most of the mess and thereby 
improved it quite a bit, I guess. Now I'm happily adding this project to 
public domain… Nevertheless, with some initiative of your own (i.e. 
adding/changing  about 20-30 lines of code), you might be able to use 
this code as a straight basis for your very own crypter, which then 
actually IS fud! 
Compatibility Nothing is obfuscated or protected at runtime. The code is plain visible 
in memory while being executed. It must be, otherwise it could not be 
executed. The only thing that comes close is a protection mechanism 
that only deobfuscates small parts of the code at a time during 
execution. But even then the small part is still plain.  These "scantime 
protected" files are actually nothing more than file droppers created by 
a builder. Or if you want terms that are not associated with malware, 
then they are wrapped files. In your case the program that wraps the 
files is a bundler, because it will turn two executables into one 
executable.  These terms scantime and runtime crypter are misnomers 
and I still wonder why everyone just swallows them without 
complaining. 
Complexity Just to clarify for everyone: You wrote/modified a crypter/binder that 
appends two executables in an encrypted form to the overlay of the 
stub. The stub decrypts the overlay, writes both executables as 
temporary files to disk and executes them. Correct so far? The PE 
format is one of the most complex formats that I know off. So I am not 
sure what you mean if you say it is easy to f*ck up and therefore not 
complex. I think it is the opposite. You can f*ck it up so easily because 
it is complex and you will make mistakes easily while trying to modify 
a PE. 
November 2010 Relative 
Advantage 
I made this when I was bored this summer. It cyphers files by adding or 
xoring one byte (user-selected). It includes a stub for working with 
exe's. 
Compatibility And that's why it perfectly fitted my needs :D i.e. abilities. Many other 
stub sources I've found were either .net crap or just way above my 
comprehension skill. (But since you helped me understanding general 
stub concepts, they're not so hard to analyze anymore. Thus I've 
already got sum new projects in the pipeline ;) ) 
Note: Its a scantime crypter, not runtime. But still a good example :) A 
scantime crypter will only "protect/crypt" your file when the file is not 
running. Once you run it, most AV's will detect the temporarily created 
file. A runtime crypter will make the file undetectable at all times. 
Complexity It's not that hard to modify to make it a runtime crypter. 
Trialability Here's [name] crypt v2.0, written by me: [link]   I hope you don't feel 
copy&pasted or anything :P and that it was okay to re-use your name 
Observability However, after a few minor improvements, this script can do 
surprisingly well! Just got a 1/33 on nodistribute with some generic 
keylogger, hihi 
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     In the first example from Table 15, originally posted by the member in May 2015, 
only the factors of relative advantage, compatibility, and complexity were observed in the 
discussions.  This may be because the innovation was initially posted by a junior 
member, and because the responses of more senior members were not encouraging and 
appeared critical and dismissive of the innovation.  As a result, other members were 
uninterested in pursuing adoption of the tool.  The hacking need that this innovation 
fulfills is clearly described, though – a desire to protect malware at scantime and at 
runtime from antivirus software, to allow the delivery of the malware to the target.  Such 
a hacking need predated the introduction of this technique into this community.  
     In the second example, from November 2010, a senior member of the “VIP” level 
posted the initial innovation, and other senior members were more enthusiastic about the 
innovation and it was eventually adopted.  This may highlight the importance of senior 
members, both as change agents when championing innovations and as gatekeepers 
through which other innovations must pass, and where a negative review or comment 
could result in an innovation not being adopted.  This example is expanded upon in Table 
16, as Community B brought this tool through the innovation-decision process before 
adoption.  
Table 16: Crypter Adoption Phases in Community B 
Date Phase Sample Quote 
November 2010 Knowledge [initial post] 
Persuasion Great for people looking for open source crypter.   Thanks for 
sharing. 
Decision This is awesome bro. I will for sure use this as an example 
Implementation What are you working on. I was planning to create something like 
this for my encoder/decoder. 
Confirmation Here's [name] crypt v2.0, written by me: [link]   I hope you don't 
feel copy&pasted or anything :P and that it was okay to re-use your 
name 
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     The innovation described in Tables 15 and 16 was a “Simple Crypter + Stub” written 
in the C programming language, according to the innovator who posted the code.  
Complimentary postings were made by other members in the persuasion phase, and 
intention to use was stated by a member in the decision phase.  In the implementation 
phase, another senior member stated that he planned to develop a similar implementation 
in his own tool, and in the confirmation phase, another member reinvented the code by 
adding new features and releasing the improved version to the community.  This is an 
example of a crypter innovation that has been adopted by Community B. 
     Member B1 confirmed these observations about the influence of senior members, 
stating that “but with power comes responsibility, so maybe that's why we are respected a 
bit more”, and “if more of respected members support the idea it might get developed 
more”.  Member B2 did, however, argue that ideas with merit would be respected in any 
event, and related “if you're a newfag or an oldfag, if you're idea is brilliant then it's 
supported, if it's stupid then you are told that it's stupid”, but that the status of the poster 
may influence how other members react, stating that the “reply wording may vary on the 
OP status, i.e. I wouldn't get told to fuck off if I posted some stupid suggestion in a 
serious context”.  
     Member B2 provided additional details about crypters, stating that he had authored 
one of Community B’s most respected papers on crypters.  In this paper, Member B2 
claimed that good malware writers should not need to use crypters, as if the author is 
skilled enough the malware will be undetectable without the need for an outside crypting 
program.  Member B2 stated, “Since that paper I saw others posting that opinion 
whenever the topic came up. It was not like that before. I believe before that you could 
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publicly show off your own crypter, but you could not ask that other people create you a 
crypter for free without getting shamed.”  This points to the influence of senior members 
upon the adoption process – Member B2’s statements on the image of crypters led to a 
rejection of the technology as a whole.  Member B2 also stated that the terminology used 
by members made a difference regarding the diffusion and adoption of a particular 
innovation, stating “if a new member asks something about a packer it is probably not as 
bad as asking for a crypter, although crypters are a subset of packers. 
Everything that is associated with being typical for [Community A] is despised. That is a 
certain language (FUD, Scantime Crypter, etc) as well as certain types of tools and 
questions.”  Therefore, it seems that how an innovation is communicated within 
Community B appears to be important, not just the type of innovation itself.  It appears 
that in general crypters as a technique have been rejected by Community B, although 
some individual crypting tools are eventually adopted.  This was an active rejection as 
per Rogers (2003), as the community did experiment with the innovation before rejection.  
 
4.2.3.5 Community B – Bitcoin  
     The final innovation studied within Community B was Bitcoin.  Bitcoin is a virtual 
currency that is decentralized and anonymous, and utilizes cryptography to both secure 
transactions and to generate new Bitcoins through a process referred to as “mining”, and 
as such is referred to as a “cryptocurrency” (Huang, 2013).  This is a fairly broad 
innovation with many applications, and to focus more upon areas of relevancy to this 
research only malicious uses of Bitcoin – such as malware that steals Bitcoins, or botnets 
that use compromised computers to mine Bitcoins – will be examined within Community 
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B.  Note that to the end goal of these techniques is to obtain Bitcoin, a valuable resource, 
and the systems which contain Bitcoin are often protected by IS security countermeasures 
themselves.  Bitcoin mining through malware is extremely popular and Huang et al. 
(2014) estimated that 4,500 Bitcoins, with a street value of nearly $4.5 million 
(depending upon when the mining occurred) had been mined using botnets.  Bitcoin is 
also subject to other types of criminal activity, including money laundering, intentional 
market disruptions, double-spending of the same Bitcoin, and other attacks (Huang, 
2013).  
     A quantitative review of the number of postings within Community B related to 
malicious use of Bitcoin was conducted, and the results can be found in Figure 14, below. 
 
Figure 14: Bitcoin Postings in Community B 
 
     Many of the postings observed in Community B related to Bitcoin mining using 
botnets or purchasing hacking-related services, such as VPN connections or proxy 
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servers, with Bitcoin.  One thread was observed from 2012 pertained to Bitcoin mining – 
this was a thread that emerged relatively early in Community B’s discussions about this 
innovation and many members were still experimenting with the technology.   This 
thread was a demonstration of both many of the innovation diffusion factors as well as 
the innovation-decision process as these members decided whether or not to adopt the 
innovation, and can be observed in Tables 17 and 18, below.  
Table 17: Bitcoin Innovation Factors in Community B 
Date Factor Sample Quote 
August 2012 
  
Relative 
Advantage 
Bitcoins are a digital currency that you can buy stuff online with. They 
are going for about 1 bitcoin for 9 USD at the moment, and still rising. 
It is a cool concept, no governments fucking shit up and so on. However, 
the big players are winning on this currency as well. 
Compatibility So doing bitcoin mining on your own comp.just ain't worth the time tbh, 
however joining a bitcoin mining pool could be worth it. you'll have to 
check that out yourself. If I did a poor job explaining thia, ask for 
clarification and ill do what I can. Cahse I do think the hows and whys of 
bitcoins are quite confusing lol 
Complexity Bitcoins are a currency that is transferred virtually anonymously through 
complex mathematical algorithms called blocks. These blocks are super 
complex, and must be solved in order to allow future transactions. 
Bitcoin mining is the act of using your GPU to solve these equations, for 
which you are rewarded 50 bitcoins. This is also how bitcoins are added 
to make the available currency pool larger. These bitcoin.generations are 
severly reatricted however due to a number of factors. 
Given the current rate of ASICs coming up on the network, GPU mining 
of BitCoins has become retardedly hard. I barely get shit done with my 
7970, and a friend of mine running CF'd 7970's is also saying it's starting 
to become too slow. 
Trialability ok how does a mining pool work , can i make my own with a bot-net ? 
Observability and what's the point in investing in bitcoin when there is stock and real 
estate? 10 % a month is not difficult in stocks. 
Very true. But bitcoins can also be invested in without any cash. Just start 
mining, and either try to do it yourself or join a mining pool. Personally I 
don't think it's worth it atm, but other people seem to think it is. 
 
     Interestingly, there was little discussion about the image factor in any of the Bitcoin 
discussions, even though image played a significant role in the other innovations studied 
for Community B.  Adoption, or lack thereof, did not appear to affect the social standing 
of a member.  The decision process for this same thread is described in Table 18: 
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Table 18: Bitcoin Adoption Phases in Community B 
Date Phase Sample Quote 
August 2012 Knowledge [initial post] 
Persuasion While investing now won't be quite as good as it was when bitcoins 
first started, it could still be worth the cash as bitcoins rise in value. 
Pay $6 each now and sell for $20 each in 5 years, something along 
those lines 
bitcoins... when paypal ain't enough. really tho, the idea is bullshit. I 
don't understand why people are so freaky about it. 
Decision If someone is still intrested in mining, look for mining hardware like 
the ones from butterflylabs.com  I have started to think about buying 
these some weeks ago and there are really good feedbacks. 
My idea was to start with a 270$ miner and after 1 month or 2 buy one 
again, and some months later guy the bigger one and so on. 
Implementation My brother got into bitcoins while the where like $0.10 and he, 
thinking it wasnt going anywhere, got like 50 bitcoins. Then they shot 
up to like 20-30 a piece. He was really pissed because he could have 
made a fortune. 
Confirmation I had bad experiences with BitCoins. That stuff is unstable man, 
wouldn't waste my time on it. Not yet anyway. I used to do bt mining 
with some of the most powerful GPU in the world and still it was a 
waste of time. 
Actually out of the mass of altcoins that have cropped up, by process of 
elimination, me and my friends ended up only with LTC as the most 
viable replacement for the shitty system that BTC turned out to be. 
 
     Even though the feedback in the confirmation phase was not positive, the innovation 
appears to have been adopted by Community B eventually, as numerous discussions 
about the use of the topic were observed in the years following the above posting.  Some 
of the same members who made the contributions to the original thread ended up being 
enthusiastic proponents of the innovation.  The need for this innovation – at least, for the 
cybercrime-related aspects of Bitcoin – is less clear.  It seems that because 
cryptocurrency was a new invention, there was not a pre-existing need for malicious 
activities around it, or mining Bitcoins; however, there certainly was a pre-existing need 
to make money from online activities.  The ability to make money from resources such as 
botnets was certainly a need that existed among members of Community C, and therefore 
this innovation appears to have been introduced as a response to that need.  
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4.2.3.6 Community B – Summary  
     Community B was a significantly different hacking community from Community A, 
both in terms of overall attitudes of participants as well as innovative behavior.  Image as 
a critical innovation factor was found to be important within Community B, as was 
observed within Community A; however, the type of image was different.  Within 
Community A, adopters did not want to be perceived as “skids”, but discussion of 
adoptions that fell within the domain of script kiddies (such as Havij) was still robust.  
Within Community B, on the other hand, script kiddies were also panned but the 
community as a whole tended to shut down posts that outwardly malicious with no 
technological merit.  Community B appeared to be much more focused upon learning and 
upon discussing novel technical hacking innovations, whereas Community A appeared to 
be focused upon the executing the operations of attacks and upon vendors selling services 
– some learning did occur in Community A, but there was a significant amount of 
attention paid to pure operations.  
     Unlike Community A, Community B did not have a financial aspect, and no vendors 
were observed selling tools or services to other members.  This meant that an entire class 
of innovators – that is, vendors who sought adoption of their services – was absent.  
According to Member B2, this was by design – “it is on purpose that we don't have a 
market place here as it attracts the wrong kind of people. Those, who need to buy 
‘hacking services’ are no hackers.”  To discourage these types of members, Member B2 
stated that threads about selling tools and services, or about “RAT/crypter/bot-
builder/other skid shit tutorial here” were routinely deleted by moderators, or moved to 
the “Board of Shame”.  Exceptions to this rule are made when the tools being described 
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are actually written by the member, and if the discussion is very high quality.  It was also 
observed that members of Community B had an extreme dislike for the members of 
Community A, deriding them as “skids” and hackers with little skill.  In general it 
appeared that Community B was a medium-high skill level community, as its focus upon 
education seemed to result in a lack of active, highly-skilled attackers that will be 
discussed in Community C, while still being above the attackers observed in Community 
A.  
     In general, innovations were introduced in response to pre-existing hacking needs.  An 
exception to this rule was DDoS attacks; this innovation was strongly discouraged and as 
such the members of Community B had no existing need for it.  Communications 
channels utilized within Community B appeared to be those developed by the community 
itself.  Unlike Community A, Community B only utilized forum postings, private 
messages, and a community-run Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channel to engage in 
discussions.  Outside services, such as vendor sites or third-party chat networks, did not 
appear to be utilized to a great extent.  In addition to the channels of communication, the 
language used in the communications was also important – for example, posts on crypters 
that utilized slang commonly found in Community A were blocked, but posts that did not 
use this slang were allowed to continue.  
     None of the innovations examined were developed (from a software engineering 
standpoint) within Community B – like Community A, the innovations were introduced 
and discussed within the community by members who may have sought wider adoption, 
but in the case of Community B had no vested interest, aside from perhaps seeking 
elevation of image by discussing and championing a popular innovation.  Senior 
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members also played a significant positive role as change agents in the adoption of the 
studied innovations – both if senior members originally proposed the innovations, and if 
senior members later provided endorsements for the innovations.  A senior member 
contributing to a specific thread often made the difference between a positive reception 
culminating in adoption or a negative one culminating in rejection.   As before, 
voluntariness did not play a role in Community B’s adoption of thee innovations.   
 
4.2.4 Case Study Analysis – Community C 
4.2.4.1 Community C – Overview 
     The third hacking community studied, Community C, was created in 2005 and boasts 
over 35,000 user accounts.   Of these only approximately 6,800 were used to post 
messages to the community – while similar in overall user accounts to Community B, 
Community C appears to have twice as many active members.  The stated purpose of 
Community C was overwhelmingly on malware, and specifically upon programming and 
developing malware, with focus upon code-level technical details.  Community C also 
had a hierarchy of members, with “Junior Members” at the bottom, and “Senior 
Members”, “Moderators”, and “Admins” at the top.  Once a user has registered for an 
account, they have access to the entire community.  
     Based upon the results of the expert panel and the findings from the previous two 
communities, the following innovations were studied in Community C: 
- SQL injection 
- Bulletproof hosting 
- DDoS attacks 
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- Crypters 
     Data collection and analysis for Community C was similar to the methodology 
employed in Communities A and B.  As before, interviews were conducted with two 
senior community members.  These members were identified following a review of 
forum postings related to the innovations under study.  Note that unlike in Communities 
A and B, approximately ten members were contacted over private message by the 
researcher before two agreed to participate – some contacted members refused to 
participate, while others simply did not respond to requests.  Member C1 is a moderator 
who joined in 2006 and has over 1,600 postings to the community.  Member C2 is 
another senior member who joined in 2007 and has over 2,000 postings.  Both of these 
members remain active within the community and have experience with the innovations 
being examined.  
 
4.2.4.2 Community C – SQL Injection 
     The technique of SQL injection, described in detail above in relation to Communities 
A and B, was the first class of innovation reviewed for Community C.  As a hacking 
community, Community C did contain postings about specific tools and techniques 
related to SQL injection, although fewer than in the previous communities due to 
Community C’s general focus upon malware.  Figure 15 shows the analysis of these 
postings, of which 28 were observed. 
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Figure 15: SQL Injection Postings in Community C 
 
     Similar to the previous communities, members were derisive of others who utilized 
automated tools such as Havij, but to a much lower level than what had been previously 
observed.  Numerous members stated that using “your brain” is the best approach, but 
even then would allow for tools: “Find the SQLi with your brain and then feed it to 
sqlmap for faster exploitation.”  As was observed in Community B, a significant amount 
of vitriol for Community A was noted, with members of Community C expressing 
disdain for unoriginal or unsophisticated postings and telling the posters to “go back to 
[Community A]”.  
     While Community C had fewer discussions regarding SQL injection innovations than 
was observed in the prior communities, there were still a few threads where innovation 
diffusion factors were observable.  As an example, Table 19 contains a description of the 
innovation factors observed in a discussion regarding a SQL injection vulnerability that 
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one member had found in a popular banking Trojan botnet known as SpyEye, which 
allowed him to take control of the botnet from the original owner:  
Table 19: SQL Injection Innovation Factors in Community C 
Date Factor Sample Quote 
April 2011 
  
 
  
Relative 
Advantage 
Exploit ./sqlmap.py -u"http://x.x.x.x/formgrab/frm_findrep_sub2.php?id=1" 
--file-read=/var/www/formgrab/config.php define('DB_USER', 'root'); 
define('DB_PASSWORD', '1234TTab123xsdesd568');  # Admin 
define('ADMIN_PASSWORD', 'hdjsd898oiSDKfsdf32423ncc'); 
frm_findrep_sub2.php?id=1 this file is sql injectable. 
Compatibility Ok guys, does the latest panel with build 1.2.99 from RED work? I guess ill 
have to try..I wont forget to check that SQLi function and patch it =P 
Complexity I didn't found any other remote-exploitable SQLi and btw if gribodemon it's 
an idiot why you publish this?by doing this you help gribodemon improving 
spyeye security.... 
Gribo very noob coder. Found this months ago. 
Observability why are you an fucking idiot an publish this?i found this two months ago and 
kept it for me,few friends for not getting patched,now you did it....btw in the 
main/form panels are also some persistent/non-persistent XSS but you can't 
exploit them remotly…  
thanks for this share. Thx to this i catch one of the big gribo friend botnet 15-
33k online. 
Image thanks for sharing. About [redacted], he just wanted to show us that he knew 
about this exploit and this post is not a surprise for him. 
Wanabefamouskiddo 
 
     The original poster describes the SQL injection vulnerability and shows that the 
database and admin passwords for the botnet are obtainable, demonstrating the relative 
advantage of the technique.  This advantage also demonstrates a similar hacking need – 
obtaining the administrator password – that had been observed in Communities A and B 
in relation to similar techniques.  Such a need was pre-existing in this community as 
members had desired to commit intrusions via administrator accounts prior to the 
introduction of SQL injections.  A member asks about the compatibility of the technique 
with another version of the botnet that he is attempting to target, and other members 
discuss the relative lack of complexity in the vulnerability, while also adding that no other 
similar vulnerabilities were found.  For observability, one member describes the results of 
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his using the technique to find and take over a large SpyEye botnet, while another 
member complains that posting this method in such a public fashion will allow the botnet 
creator to fix the vulnerability.  Finally, a participant states that the member who 
complained was worried about his image because he did not want his credibility 
undermined by appearing to be surprised about the vulnerability.  Note that trialability 
was not expressly observed but components of the experimentation of this technique were 
seen in the above postings, implying the members did experiment with the innovation 
prior to total adoption.  
     Other threads demonstrated the diffusion of SQL injections through the innovation-
decision process, as described in Table 20:  
Table 20: SQL Injection Adoption Phases in Community C 
Date Phase Sample Quote 
January 2011 Knowledge [initial post] 
Persuasion ps :in mysql user acc lvl right is important to run this comand 
sometime you can just read  and in mssql there is no limit ! 
you wount hack any site with this program 
Decision So basically you're telling me I can't do anything with it (apart from 
reading database entries) after I found an injection? -.- 
Or get the administrator password, log in to panel, upload shell and 
root it. Also You can try mysql load_file to get config.php , get mysql 
password, connect to it and own. 
Implementation Today, I wanted to modify a row and I got the following problem: 
According to the documentation of mysql_query, PHP only executes 
the first command in the query string, so I can't just append my second 
query to the first (with a semicolon in between ) 
Confirmation @[redacted]: That's great, thanks! I'll take a deeper look into it later. 
@[redacted]: It seems I can't read any files at all (well, with the 
particular server I'm working on at the moment ). I don't know the 
DocumentRoot, though, so it could be that I just used the wrong paths 
every time... 
 
     In the above conversation, a member is considering adopting the SQL injection 
technique but is seeking help from other members.  In the initial posting, the member 
enters the knowledge phase by making others aware of his desire to learn about the 
technique.  In the persuasion phase, other users attempt to persuade the member to adopt 
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or reject the innovation – one member highlights the effectiveness of the technique within 
MYSQL and MSSQL, but another member dismisses the approach entirely.  In the 
decision phase, the potential adopter was observed weighing the decision to adopt, but 
appeared discouraged because he can only use it to read information.  Another member 
chimed in with additional approaches to take.  In the implementation phase, the potential 
adopter describes that he is still having problems implementing SQL injection attacks, 
and in the confirmation phase, the adopter states that he will continue to try to improve 
his SQL injection technique.  It is ultimately unclear if the adopter was able to resolve his 
issues with the technique and fully adopt, although this example conversation details the 
assistance that other members of Community C can provide when a member is deciding 
whether or not to adopt.   
     SQL injections as a whole within Community C appeared to have a lackluster 
reception, and it appears to be rejected as a whole by the community, outside of certain 
niche areas such as employing SQL injections to hijack botnets.  This appears to have 
been an active rejection, as per Rogers (2003), as some members did experiment 
somewhat with this method before rejection.  This determination was made based on the 
small number of postings regarding the topic and the relative lack of innovation-related 
activity related to SQL injection attacks.  Member C1 agreed, stating that “SQL 
injections aren't really that popular (here)”.  This rejection of this technique appears to be 
because SQL injection is not compatible with the malware-writing needs of this 
community.  
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4.2.4.3 Community C – Bulletproof Hosting 
     The second innovation studied within Community C was bulletproof hosting, as was 
previously described in Community A.  Bulletproof hosting is a necessary part of the 
distribution and operation of botnets, Trojans, and other types of malware (Kamluk, 
2009) and would seem to be a popular innovation within Community C, given the 
community’s primary focus upon malware.  A review of conversations within the 
community resulted in a surprisingly low number of postings, however, which are 
reflected in Figure 16.  This may be because the focus of Community C is upon the 
authoring of malware and not upon the operation of malware, and bulletproof hosting is 
certainly a component of the operation of malware infrastructure.  Member C1 stated that 
many bulletproof hosting providers ended up being scams or simply were not truly 
bulletproof and the supposedly untouchable servers would go offline.  
 
Figure 16: Bulletproof Hosting Postings in Community C 
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     A total of 31 postings were observed, starting in October 2009 and ending in July 
2014.  No postings have been seen regarding bulletproof hosting since, which may mean 
that the members of Community C have either fully adopted the technique or abandoned 
it – or that it is less relevant to the community than had been thought.  Member C1 stated 
that he believes this is because Community C no longer offers a dedicated marketplace 
for vendors, and as a result those offering bulletproof hosting services have migrated to 
other forums.  Most of the 31 postings observed dealt with botnet hosting, and 
specifically the Zeus botnet, a banking Trojan similar to SpyEye.  The hacking need for 
this innovation was firmly in place prior to the introduction of this technique – as the 
entire point of the community is around malware, one of the main problems as observed 
during the review of Community C was finding a suitable place to host it so victims can 
be infected.  Member C1 stated that the innovation “was a necessity when web-based 
bots came out, when 'building' a bot you have to include a domain for the bot to connect 
to, if said domain ever goes down all the bots that were connected to it are effectively 
lost”.  Unlike Community B, the selling of services are allowed in Community C, and 
some of the historical postings related to bulletproof hosting were from vendors selling 
their services.  
     Within the bulletproof hosting arena, there were a few legitimate innovations observed 
within Community C.  The first innovation involves a proposed method to make a normal 
webhost bulletproof, while the second innovation involves a proposed technique to host 
botnet command and control servers within the Tor network.  Both are improvements 
upon the original bulletproof hosting idea, mostly because finding true bulletproof 
  143
hosting is difficult, as explained by Member C1, and expensive, and the individual 
innovation factors are detailed in Table 21: 
Table 21: Bulletproof Hosting Innovation Factors in Community C 
Date Factor Sample Quote 
February 
2011 
  
 
  
Relative 
Advantage 
Well, I regularly set up HTTP controlled botnets on free webhosts, and 
after a few of my C&C panels got shut down and accounts suspended... 
I began to have a think… I would install my webpanel in a sub-dir made 
accessable, and then proceed to create a shitty website 
(generic_lolcat_website OR generic_bullshit_blog OR 
generic_vanity_site) of some form to 'cover up' or 'mask' the presence of 
my C&C… Just an idea for those on free hosting... Next I plan to do the 
same with Java Drive By/exploit kits... and host server.exe on the site... 
Compatibility not everyone has a gazilion dollars to spend off on bulletproof hosting in 
foreign countries. 
Like I said, not for serious botnets. useful for experimenting with new 
leaks on maybe 50-100 bots. In total I now have close to 1k live bots 
across almost 20 different 'panels', been thinking to get a stable bot + 
offshore BP and migrate sometime soon 
Complexity or hacked one. it will last for a month before the owner or the sysad to 
find out.. 
Trialability get cheap offshore plus BP domain which is pretty cheap also, if your 
host gets shut, just change nameservers on domain for new host so you 
don't have to spread again 
im like the OP and not bothered to pay for hosting, the simple way is to 
have your bot connect to many free hosting sites to distribute the 
bandwidth, its no harm at all if you keep it legit looking. the best way is 
to just have LOTS of free hosting accounts and a checker to be able to 
tell when they get banned. 
Observability I only use freehosts because I am not making money or anything from 
my botnets, they are moreso just for loading twitter-controlled-DDoS 
tools.  When I get more serious and practiced I will be paying for 
offshore bulletproof hosts, but for now I am stuck with damn free ones... 
Image Bullshit!!!!! You can't get reliable bp hosting for €5, you are obviously 
from [Community A] and believe the advertisements. Do you believe 
FUD for life too because its java? 
August 2011 
  
 
  
Relative 
Advantage 
Did you ever built a botnet with thousands of bots and was it taken 
down in minutes by the feds revoking your domain or nullrouting your 
servers? Do you wish this would never happen again? 
Compatibility TORifier works with any bot, HTTP aswell as IRC. And RAT trojans 
too! You only need to be able to set the hostname and port on your own. 
TORifier was successfully tested with ZeuS, SpyEye, rxbot and poison-
ivy. Except a higher latency (~1000ms) there were no downturns. 
Complexity With TORifier you can easily upgrade your existing bot executable with 
a TOR tunnel, tunneling all the traffic trough multiple TOR-relays to 
your server, which is behind a hidden service. Only the onion-domain (a 
pseudodomain used for communication with hidden services) is known 
and noone can assign a real IP to this domain! 
Trialability Price will be negotiated over ICQ, but expect to pay as much as you pay 
for SpyEye+Plugins. Remember, that this investion will lower your risk 
running a botnet dramaticly! 
Observability you seem not to understand what a hidden service is, I added .pdf with 
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setup instruction. Collector daemon works over hidden service, I tested 
it myself. Reverse connection features like ftp and socks5 will of course 
work outside hidden service, because they require speed. You should 
really watch the videos as you talk crap. 
Image Lol TORifier is a windows tool. Windows's security is crap making it 
easy for anyone pwn your botnet. 
 
     The first innovation received a lukewarm reaction within Community C, possibly 
because the technique was designed to be “not for serious botnets” – instead, the 
technique was designed for botmasters just starting out who don’t have the money to pay 
for true bulletproof hosting.  Some members defended the technique while others pointed 
to the availability of cheap offshore hosting that, while not bulletproof, might suffice.  
The image factor was not a huge concern, except when one member stated that 
bulletproof hosting can be found cheaply, and another member retorted that perhaps be 
belonged in Community A.  As seen in Community B, the name of Community A is used 
almost as an epithet and is associated with a severe reduction in image.  The second 
innovation was received more enthusiastically, due to the compatibility with the existing 
needs of Community C – developing malware for Windows-based victims – and because 
the complexity of the technique allows for better obfuscation of the botnet traffic, which 
means that it may stay undetected for longer.  In this case, increased complexity of the 
innovation is a positive benefit.  
     A review of innovations that transited the phases of the innovation-decision process 
was also useful.  Two innovations are described in Table 22 – first is another Tor-based 
malware communications service, and second is a traditional bulletproof hosting vendor 
who is advertising his services.  
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Table 22: Bulletproof Hosting Adoption Phases in Community C 
Date Phase Sample Quote 
March 2011 Knowledge [initial post] 
Persuasion excellent tutorial bro i must to install it soon 
tor is not good to hide you work , they keep logs and FBI can demand 
the TOR owners to release any information needed to trace the 
identity of the user.It has happened before 
Decision I don't understand, how do we go about the connection? :boss: do we 
install Tor and use our PC to host zeus and then put what Tor URL to 
be able to access it???? 
I'd love to see this working with a botnet that is bigger than 100 bots. 
Implementation I have a feeling that this is how I will be making my next botnet for 
tests, very interesting tutorial!  Never thought about using TOR 
hidden services desite being more than familiar with it uses... 
February 2011 Knowledge [initial post] 
Persuasion ok nice service, offshore / bp, but bestiality, rape and child porn are a 
big NO on [Community C], so I'd suggest not advertising that. 
There is no real bp service. So this means your full of shit man. Isp 
will block your conection if many complaints get unanswerd 
Decision What about really problematical content? 
Is this hosting bulletproof?  If i was a fucking idiot and wanted to use 
ZeuS , could i use this hosting for my c&c ? 
Implementation Interested in shared hosting in such countries: China, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Honk Kong, Iran Packages and prices please 
Confirmation I can vouch for LoyalNet, I have a BP domain from him, and even 
after god knows how much abuse reports, it's still alive and kicking. 
 
     In the first innovation, most members who contributed to the discussion were 
skeptical, while at least one member stated that he would like to utilize the technique.  
However, none of the members admitted to using the technique, so it is unknown if the 
technique was adopted within the wider membership of Community C.  The second 
innovation was more widely accepted as the service being advertised was traditional 
bulletproof hosting and some of the members indicated that they would like to utilize it, 
even though a few members were unsure of the true bulletproof nature of the service.  
One member stated that his encounter with the service was successful and that he 
continued to use it due to its effectiveness.  One interesting observation was noted in this 
thread, and in others regarding bulletproof hosting observed in Community C.  If the 
seller of the service was noted as being Russian – either through his speech, or because 
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he also advertised his services within higher-end Russian-language communities – the 
members of Community C assigned him more credibility and the image of the member 
was enhanced.  This may be because Russian computer crime is seen within the hacker 
and security worlds as being more sophisticated and professional (Broadhurst, Grabosky, 
Alazab, Bouhours, & Chon, 2014).  Member C1 added that the current administrator of 
Community C is Russian, and Member C2 stated that most of the advanced malware 
comes from Russia.  Despite the low number of overall postings, it appears that this 
technique has been adopted by the members of Community C who choose to employ it.  
 
4.2.4.4 Community C – DDoS Attacks 
     The third innovation studied within Community C was that of DDoS attacks, an 
innovation examined in both Communities A and B previously.  It was observed that 
DDoS attacks were more accepted in general within Community C than within 
Community B, but still not as enthusiastically as was observed within Community A, and 
certain types of postings about this technique could be associated with a reduction of 
image.  The overall volume of conversations about DDoS was also higher than the 
previous two innovations, as is detailed in Figure 17: 
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Figure 17: DDoS Postings in Community C 
 
     A review of innovation-specific discussions regarding DDoS within Community C 
revealed a significant amount of activity surrounding this innovation, much more than 
had been observed for the prior two innovations within this community.  The curve 
described in Figure 17 above resembles an S shaped curve described by Rogers (2003), 
seen in some of the innovations described previously in this study.  Despite this level of 
interest, there was definitely disdain observed for the technique among members of 
Community C, as described in the below quotes from one of the earliest DDoS threads in 
March 2008: 
- Ddos is lame, botnets are lame so gtfo? 
- Only ddos attacks (gay) that are even worth attempting are distributed smurf 
(broadcasting using spoofed IPs etc / Syn/Ack method) or an at least 5,000 
zombie net with a decent UDP flood. For sites, Just hit it with proxys. Any site 
  148
with sql or php is instantly fuct. But like these guys said ddos is pretty lame 
especially when its your site being ddossed. 
- also with servers getting more powerful soonish ddos will be obsolete in the fact 
that server are/will have tonnes of bandwidth and active counter measures to 
monitor/detect/and reject ddos attacks. 
     Member C1 observed that the public disdain may not match the private use of the 
technique, and stated the following: 
In my early days DDoS attacks were sort of a grey area, when I say that, I mean 
my group of friends didn't approve of them but we were dabbling with botnets at 
the time because we were fairly new to "the sceen" and it was all the hype back 
then. I think I had about 60 bots at one point, just to try it out, obviously not 
enough to do any harm. As a user I'm really interested on how ddos attacks 
function, depending on the type of DDoS an individual bot can have some really 
interesting code. You can cause a host to timeout by never finishing a handshakes 
(connection routines), or even crash by sending malformed packets and so-fourth. 
There can be some really cool things going on behind the scenes. As a Moderator 
we currently have rules in place to prevent people from posting/selling bots, 
although we allow posting a bot's source code, and discussing methods of attack 
is okay. This is actually a good prevention measure as lots of new users can't code 
or compile source, yet want to run a botnet used for malicious purposes. 
     This comment shows that the community as a whole dislikes the technique and 
discourages unintelligent use of DDoS, such as simply posting bot binaries or selling 
bots, but does encourage learning and innovation of the technique in general.  
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Correspondingly, despite the dislike for the technique, there was some amount of 
innovation surrounding various DDoS malware programs introduced by members of 
Community C.  Table 23 describes the innovation factors observed for two such 
innovations: 
Table 23: DDoS Innovation Factors in Community C 
Date Factor Sample Quote 
December 
2007 
  
 
  
 
 
  
Relative 
Advantage 
Minidos is a botnet i unno how people feel about botnets on this forum 
just tell me a suggestion on it 
Compatibility i think botnets are interesting.. i mean, in order to be successful in 
spreading, they have to use at least a couple good undiscovered exploits. 
also the engine has to be smart, ie not infecting the same users twice, 
avoiding some hostnames (AVs, .gov etc). i'd like to make a bot. :p 
I get what your saying i can make a irc version to.The frist minidos was 
irc.But people kept crying cause there server kept going down.So that 
the reason why i went with Reverse Connection.And yes it is a vb app. 
But i always have a delphi version to.And the part about ddossing 
yourself.No i never had ddoss myself the older version i have over 500 
bots.I have the option on there for Pause to send the commands so it 
wont really lagg your or nothing. 
I trash the Yahoo Raw voice one i just start making it for someone that 
couldn't forward ports.i added more then ddossing to the new 
minidos.making it a small rat as well steal firefox passwords.explorer 
password.file transfering.desktop capture and a few other shit. 
Complexity looks like visual cpp to me, but i may be wrong.. why didn't you just go 
with a bot that loads in IRC? too mainstream? don't get me wrong, i like 
your idea, but an IRC server could definitely handle more bots. 
Trialability I would like to hear more idea,and i know there a way out there to use 
perl to have it host the bots one of my boy was using that method.But i 
might make this a public project.So if you like to be a part of Minidos 
message me.We'll go from there.oh and i forgot to say this is a Vb app.I 
never really got into delphi i guess you can say 
Observability Sad thing about this old build is that it's really old and get 
detected.Another is.It's alot more advanced sence that old build.So 
everyone have fun with the old code.As i have seen from the source 
code [redacted] was the one that suppose of done this. 
Image Jealous of what? Some lame Yah-Skiddies that have the ability to (in the 
lamest way possible/No FWB or anything) ddos websites and hit ppls 
IP's with lame voice bots labled as 'zombies' and think were really cool 
while we sit on our ass all day at mommys house. You are an idiot. 
May 2011 
  
 
  
Relative 
Advantage 
Selling the "ISR Trinity Bomb DDoS Tool" I only sell the Tool, no 
Hub/Bots or something else! Price will be 100€ Ukash / 125€ 
Paysafecard PM me, after that you get a link. 
Compatibility If this is the 80kb tool, I have it as well and I can vouch. I can post some 
screens if you guys want. 
Trialability just amazing send the bucks 4 mins ago and can play now around with 
isr, looks like a bomb im suprised. greetz 
Observability i get the tool thanks really much the tool looks really good and strong i 
just tested it fast and for that price is it epic!!!!! 
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     The above two innovations were quite successful in Community C, with a number of 
positive comments and declared intentions to adopt.  The first innovation, “minidos”, was 
eventually reinvented by being incorporated into a number of other bots that were 
released on Community C, for years after.  There were some postings made regarding the 
reduction in image of using a bot to engage in DDoS, but these were in the minority.  
Complexity was also seen as a potential issue for minidos as the implementation did not 
use a less complex, but more flexible, IRC method and the member appears to be 
concerned that the author was adding complexity for now apparent gain.  In the second 
innovation, a vendor was selling a DDoS tool and members were impressed with the ease 
of trialability and observability that allowed for rapid experimentation.  
     Both of these innovations, and the DDoS technique in general, were introduced in 
response to a particular hacking need – a desire to employ DDoS against victims, similar 
to what had been described in Community A.  Member C1 stated that the origin of many 
DDoS techniques may stem from attacks on game servers by hackers, as he had “heard it 
was pretty common to lag rival gamers out of games”.  Community C, like Community 
A, was a community where such attacks were desired and innovations in this area were 
warmly accepted.  
     Table 24, below, describes the adoption phases transited by two different DDoS 
innovations - a DDoS botnet referred to as “Silly Bot” that was developed by a member 
of Community C, and a DDoS service available for rent:   
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Table 24: DDoS Adoption Phases in Community C 
Date Phase Sample Quote 
February 2012 Knowledge [initial post] 
Persuasion Why still using IRC? Its an old Protocol and there are better 
possibilities to manage your Botnet ...  Just Be creative and stop 
copying Bad ideas of others ;-) 
Your bot has some really nice features, bin size and all, have you 
ever considered changing protocol to HTTP with the same binary 
features? that would be cool... 
Decision thanks for making this Bot, i am trying it. 
Implementation Bot connects and then ping time out..  Doesn't respond to any 
command.. Yes I have set my host to match the given host at build.. 
Win XP SP3 32bit (on vm) 
I can't (for some reason) make the bot connect to my IRC server. 
mIrc connects perfectly fine but silly bot doesn't. Which options are 
required and which are not? 
Thanks for the Update guess im first to try =). Would love to see the 
torrent seeder added but i can wait.  Great Release !!! 
Confirmation Nice job bro working fine ! 
March 2012 Knowledge [initial post] 
Persuasion ddos this it's [Community A] website 127.0.0.1 
free test 5 minutes, only for serious clients! 
i like this 
Decision I don't understand why you are trolling him, this is a legitimate 
service and the cracked DJ5 doesn't have SYN and UDP flood. 
Implementation Can confirm it, just completed a request. He is probably genuine. 
 
     The first DDoS innovation, Silly Bot, received a favorable reception on Community C 
and members were observed implementing the tool and then confirming their usage.  
While some individuals had difficulty with the technical details of the implementation, 
most members appeared to successfully use the tool.  Fewer feedback was observed for 
the second innovation, the DDoS service – initial posts were skeptical as the poster stated 
he was using a botnet known as DirtJumper which had been known to be cracked and 
was therefore non-exclusive, and another member made a joke about Community A, 
possibly suggesting that the poster belonged in that community instead.  Another member 
vouched for the poster and claimed that it had not been cracked as the public version of 
DirtJumper did not utilize a particular DDoS flooding method, and in the implementation 
phase a member did try the service and confirm that it worked.  No confirmation or other 
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feedback was observed about this service, possibly because as a service it was less well 
suited to the members of Community C, who were more interested in tools and code.   
     As described in the bulletproof hosting innovation, Russian influences were also seen 
as image enhancements for DDoS innovations, as observed in the following quotes:  
- I haven't tested any of these bots, but it's very unlikely that they'll be like stuff sold 
on [Community A], they're all from Russian origin. 
- Oh good he is russian, so I trust him 100%, not like some [Community A] kids 
using booters 
     Russian-speaking individuals were more highly regarded as skillful coders, and DDoS 
services offered by these individuals were prized over similar offerings geared towards 
script kiddies.  The above quotes also described the theme of animosity felt towards the 
members of Community A, as was observed in Community B.  Based on the innovation 
activity observed within Community C, it appears that DDoS was adopted by this 
community, despite the reduction in image sometimes associated with it.  In all of the 
above DDoS innovations, support from senior members was observed to be helpful, but 
not critical, for favorable impression and overall adoption of DDoS innovations, such as 
the senior members who defended the DDoS service described in Table 24.  
 
4.2.4.5 Community C – Crypters 
     The final innovation studied within Community C was crypters, the purpose of which, 
and the need to overcome IS security countermeasures that it fulfills, had been described 
previously in Community B.  This innovation had the most activity out of any of the 
innovations studied within this community, which are described in Figure 18: 
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Figure 18: Crypter Postings in Community C 
 
     Figure 18 strongly resembles the S shaped curve predicted by Rogers (2003).  The 
amount of interest in crypters is logical given the community’s focus upon malware – 
encrypting malware is a key component of distributing it and ultimately infecting victims.  
According to Member C1, “When Antivirus company's started implementing heuristic 
based detections lots of previously undetected Malware was tagged. Malware that gets 
quarantined by AVs is pretty useless, so you have two options, you can re-code the entire 
piece of malware, which then may still be detected by heuristics or, you can obfuscate it.” 
As such, a strong hacking need predated the introduction of the technique into 
Community C.   
     Member C1 argued that there are also legitimate uses for crypters, such as protecting 
programs from piracy, but added that many crypters have a bad stigma attached to them 
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due to their prevalent use within malware.  Again, there was an observed emphasis upon 
learning from Member C1, who added that “there are really cool innovations that can go 
into them though such as executable forking which I was around to see the evolution of. 
We try to promote posting source code so that others can learn how the stuff works”. 
     The activity regarding crypters within Community C was a mix of public code and 
vendors selling compiled crypting programs or online services.  Table 25 describes two 
such crypting innovations and the innovation factors that played a role in the decision to 
adopt:  
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Table 25: Crypting Innovation Factors in Community C 
Date Factor Sample Quote 
September 
2009 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
Relative 
Advantage 
since Octopus 1.0 received good feedbacks from customers (see thread), 
I'm here to show the new version, 1.1… The client will crypt the binded 
files with the chosen encryption key (generated and randomized 
automatically on client execution anyways, but also customizable). 
File/s code will be completely scrambled, and Fully UnDetectable. 
Compatibility This "EOF Support" that most common crypters use, what is it? Does it 
put the binded binary in the end of the file or? 
Complexity Not that it's important or anything, but could you not just simply choose 
to not encrypt the PE-Loader and instead of storing settings in the file at 
some offset, change some strings from the resource file? If you do it 
correct, the PE-Loader does not even have to be encrypted.  As an 
example take Cryptic. I used something I posted here a while ago and 
made it 100 % UD. 
Trialability I saw source, i vouch for [redacted]. Its not ripped, all is in credits which 
he used in snippets. 
Observability I bought 2 weeks ago.Very nice software and very good service, 
especially i like usb spread very much. 
I can say "encryption key" (Semi-polymorphic code) really 
woks.Yesterday i have noticed my server was detected by quick-
heal,then i crypted the server again with different encryption key then its 
0/23 again. 
Image AHHA admins.. why are you defending this guy? do you know him? 
NO so pleas don't ban  [Redacted] is ripper and i will repeat everydays ! 
FUCK HIM i know when he started and it was since 5/6 months and he 
were knowing NOTHING no knowledge. 
September 
2008 
  
 
  
Relative 
Advantage 
Here the second release of the BiohazarD Crypter: This time ihave 
added anti-Sandboxie,Anti-VirtualMachine,EOF Support(works with 
Bifrost!) Prockiller,AntiDebugger,Pack Server and XOR Encryption are 
not added completely.... I started to Sell my Crypter: 
Compatibility [Community C] isn't a online payment for crypters !!! Your crypter is 
coded in vb6 so no compatible vista and there are a lot of bugs   It dont 
work !!! 
Trialability I am go test it now! And yes he is a P R O - C O D E R | Delphi, Dev 
C++, VC+, VB and PHP 
ok the test with Poisonivy Server: Before: NoVirusThanks.org - Online 
Virus Scanner Engine version 1.2-build[090908]  After: 
NoVirusThanks.org - Online Virus Scanner Engine version 1.2-
build[090908] 
connect to msn [redacted] pls i will see if i can buy the new one and i 
want you to contniue tuts plz :d 
Observability hum yes... GUI work good, nice work    but your application GUI isnt 
autonomous Ocx Size : 1.6 mo looool => very big  And for the final 
package, it seems to work well  7.5/10 => good crypter   
this shit is FUD since a few days XD 
 
     Both innovations above were eventually adopted by Community C despite some initial 
concerns regarding compatibility and complexity.  Additionally, few mentions of image 
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were seen in most innovations, with the exception of an individual who was attempting to 
“flame” the thread for malicious purposes.  Some members expressed concerns that some 
of the crypters may have been “backdoored” with malicious software planted by the 
developer, but the observability of the results of the innovation helped assuage those 
concerns.  Overall across all of the crypter-related innovations seen in Community C, the 
most critical factors were seen as compatibility and trialability, with some concern for 
image in two key areas – calling members who tried to sell innovations rippers (related to 
trialability, so potential adopters can verify that the product works before purchasing) and 
questions that telegraphed that the member was a potential “n00b”, or newbie.  The 
reaction to questions from “n00bs” about crypters were public shaming and a reduction in 
image for that member.  However, one posting in particular was observed where a 
member who identified herself as female was asking such questions, and the (presumably 
male) members were enthusiastic in offering assistance, which may be an interesting side 
observation around the lack of women in hacker communities. 
     Many of the crypting innovations observed in Community C also transited the 
innovation-decision process as members evaluated the innovation factors, and example 
innovations are described in Table 26: 
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Table 26: Crypting Adoption Phases in Community C 
Date Phase Sample Quote 
September 2008 Knowledge [initial post] 
Persuasion Thanks for this great share, going to look at the source. 
thank u it's a very good crypter 
Decision You are the man! Will credit you FFS =D Didn't even believe this 
was so easy achievable. However, to make it more UD can I just 
mess around in the Rc4 encryption?  
Implementation Very nice tool mate. It is very good and very simple. 
I've got it UD, only NOD32 and Avira detect it as heuristic, is it 
because of the API's used? Someone can give me examples how to 
call the API's with CallApiByName ? Thanks 
yes tested with antivir  UD stub but when i crypt it's detected :\ 
Confirmation And that is certaintly annoying! Still he made it FUD? And price? 
Fuck it feels dumb to not being able to take a look yourself =/  
Well, if I get my own crypter programmed, I'm gonna credit you for 
this example! Thanks again =D 
It was detected by 12 then I messed about with the encryption and 
got it down to four, although it says that 'Is is the trojan dropper'. 
Now I obviously though that removing the antitrojandropper would 
work but that didn't what do you guys think? 
now HOW DO YOU MAKE THIS MOTHERFUCKER FUD????? 
goddamit, and how about in ENGLISH??? goddamit! tell us to 
change code around, there are 500000000 lines of code, you want 
we should change all that around??? im about to fucking quit, its 5 
am and i have accomplished NOTHING! this is BULLSHIT!!!  
fuck it, i fucking quit. 
September 2009 Knowledge [initial post] 
Persuasion nice gui good functions to bad u sell it 
Very good [redacted]. I wish you luck and i hope this tool stay FUD 
for a long time. Good sales for you. 
mmm, how about fiding you're proper name for this ripped project? 
i know that maybe you recoded it but the whole code is public so 
it's pointless to sell it.. do w/e i don't think you will find any 
customer ... guys if you want to buy any crypter/binder buy iCrypter 
it's the one that you're sure it's working and coded by the person 
who sell it. 
Decision I would be interested i9n this software. does anybody has tested it 
and can give feedback? 
I can give you feedback. [redacted] showed me it through 
TeamViewer. It's really nice. And still FUD. Lots of options, all 
working. 
why should they buy a shitty ripped crypter? buy Icrypt or brmcrypt  
the longlast fud but i suggest BRM Crypter  why?: stub in C++ and 
will last long FUD + more functions and for 45$ 
Implementation Is good  , i have it already ..................... 
Confirmation I have tryed this tool and must say it is not bad at all, at the time I 
get it, it was 100% FUD (NVT) Crypting PI 2.3.2 Spreader was 
working (only thing is it was not working only on USB but infect 
ALL drives).  Well the tool does its job pretty well... 
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     In the first example, the author – a senior member of Community C – posted a crypter 
for free for others to experiment and learn from.  Other members appeared appreciative 
and supportive in the persuasion phase, and numerous members transited the decision 
phase and adopted the innovation.  Many of these members had technical questions 
regarding implementation, and later confirmed that they planned to reinvent the 
innovation by incorporating it into their own crypters and “crediting” the original author.  
This crediting appears to be a way to show respect for the initial poster and elevate his 
status within the community.  Also in the confirmation phase, two members expressed 
difficultly obtaining “FUD” – one of the members was able to pass eight virus scanners, 
but the second member, who was relatively unskilled, was unsure of how to proceed.  
The other community members attempted to help him, but it seemed unlikely that he 
would continue to use the innovation, although the other members who weighed in on the 
thread appeared to indicate that they would continue use.  
     The second example was of a vendor, a senior member in Community C, who was 
selling a crypting service to other members.  Most of the reception to the service was 
positive, with the exception of two other senior members who made a number of 
disparaging remarks while they promoted other vendors who were selling competing 
services.  The objection of these members was that the technique behind the service had 
been “ripped” from another member.   However, other members on the forum defended 
the original author and supported the service, and a number of members indicated that 
they planned to adopt, or had adopted and were satisfied with the service.   The 
comparison of these two crypting innovations – one offered for free, and the other only 
available to paying customers – demonstrates some of the barriers to adoption that are 
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faced when financial motivations enter into the adoption process.  The fact that the 
innovation was being disparaged and other services were being promoted may indicate 
that the members were spreading unfavorable opinions because they would benefit 
financially.  
 
4.2.4.6 Community C – Summary 
      A review of activity within Community C revealed a very different community of 
hackers than had been observed in Communities A or B.  Community C was focused 
exclusively on malware, and specifically around the authoring of malware.  As a result, 
some innovations which were more popular in other communities – such as SQL 
injection, or DDoS – were less active here, while others, such as crypters, were much 
more active.  Discussions around innovations were much more technical and were 
focused upon code-level improvements.  Like the other communities, image was seen as 
quite important, but the increase of image from innovations associated with Russian 
members or vendors in particular was observed.  An innovation that was associated with 
a Russian origin was seen as much more successful and appeared more likely to be 
adopted, because of the positive image associated with Russian cybercriminals.  While 
image was seen as important, there was significantly less derision observed for “script 
kiddies” or for less-skilled techniques, such as Havij, that had been observed within 
Communities A or B.   
     Complexity was also an important factor, with more complexity associated in general 
with increased support for the innovation.  Innovations that were seen as too simplistic 
were often not adopted.  Member C2 emphasized this point by stating that high-level 
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languages such as Visual Basic or .NET were unfavorable and when they were observed 
in malware, those threads would often be moved to Community C’s “hall of shame”.  
Member C2 also stated that Russian (as well as Chinese) malware programmers favored 
lower-level languages and this was one reason for the success and popularity of Russian 
innovations within the community.  The skill level of Community C was observed to be 
high, due to the amount of innovation activity and the technical aptitude of its members, 
who were actively utilizing these techniques to engage in attacks.  
     Unlike Communities A and B, many of the innovations proposed within Community 
C were actually developed by members.  These innovations were introduced to the 
community in response to pre-existing hacking needs of members that were in line with 
the malware-oriented focus of the community.  The focus upon software development of 
malware led to actual code-level discussion of innovations and led to more members 
proposing technical innovations.  Similar to Community A, the focus of the forum 
appeared to be upon all three modes – mostly upon operations of attacks, with some 
vendors selling services or tools and with some learning regarding how attacks work. 
Also unlike the previous communities, senior members played a much smaller role as 
change agents – even though there were differing levels of seniority within Community 
C, their impact was minimal, and innovations appeared to be evaluated primarily upon 
their merits, or upon the impacts of image as described previously.  Member C1 stated 
that postings by senior members get more positive feedback than postings by newer 
members, but also that these postings are of a higher quality because the senior members 
have “a reputation to keep up”.  Senior members, in the opinion of Member C1, have also 
been around longer and are more experienced at coding, and therefore are in a better 
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position to introduce new innovations.  Both Members C1 and C2 stated that status 
matters little when a good idea is proposed – if an excellent innovation is proposed by a 
new member, it will still be supported and adopted. 
     As in the prior communities, the communications channels employed by members 
appeared to be primarily public postings and private messages, with some reliance upon 
outside chat services and websites.  Member C1 stated that private messages in particular 
were often used for the negotiation of sales between sellers of hacking tools and their 
buyers. 
 
4.2.5 Case Study Analysis – Community D 
4.2.5.1 Community D – Overview 
     The fourth and final community studied as part of this research was Community D.  
This community was founded in 2013 and was a very large forum, with over 270,000 
user accounts created.  Of these user accounts, about 43,000 were found to have made 
posts.  While the data collection for this community was underway, it was observed that 
upward of 4,000 members were signed on at any given time, and the site boasted that the 
highest number of users that were ever online at once was 35,000.  This indicates that 
Community D is a very active forum.  Once a user has registered for an account, they 
appear have access to the entire community. 
     The main focus of this community was found to be credit card fraud, or “carding”.   
Peretti (2009) describes the underground nature of the carding forums, and highlights 
many of the features that were observed in Community D, including tutorials, vendors of 
hacking tools and services, proxy lists, and the naming and shaming of rippers and 
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scammers.  Like the other communities investigated, Community D had a hierarchy of 
members, with junior members at the bottom and senior members (called “Top Carders”), 
moderators, and administrators at the top.  Like Community A, senior membership can 
either be purchased or awarded by the operators of the site.  Community D also employed 
a reputation point system to help members determine the level of trust that should be 
placed on other members, which was quite important when negotiating purchases 
between members.  It was noted that many, many vendors were active on this 
community, and a significant percentage of all postings were observed were 
advertisements for tools or services related to carding.  Because this forum resembled a 
marketplace more than any other forum reviewed, reputation points were key so members 
could avoid rippers and scammers.  While the primary language of the forum was 
English, a large number of participants in the community were from the Middle East.  
     While the focus of Community D was centered around credit card fraud, there were 
hacking innovations that were observed, even though the hacking activity was centered 
almost entirely around obtaining credit cards or other financial information such as 
credentials to online banking.  Based upon the input of the expert panel and the 
innovations encountered in the previous three communities, the following innovations 
were selected for study within Community D: 
- Havij 
- DDoS attacks 
- Malware-related items (including keyloggers, Zeus botnets, and crypters) 
- Credit card skimmers (closely related to point-of-sale attacks) 
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     Data collection and analysis for Community D was similar to the methodology 
employed in the previous three communities.  As before, interviews were sought with 
two community members.  However, despite repeated efforts, this research was unable to 
enlist blackhat members of Community D to participate in this study; the apparent 
reticence of members to speak with a researcher about the illegal activities was too great, 
a problem that was not encountered in the previous three communities.  This may be 
because the focus of Community D was explicitly criminal, versus the other 
communities’ more varied focuses upon learning, sales, or other less-illegal, but still 
blackhat, activities.  The researcher contacted approximately 20 members; three replied 
and declined to participate, while the remainder simply did not respond to requests for 
interview.  As an alternative, two members of Community D who were actually 
undercover whitehat IS security industry researchers were interviewed about their 
experiences within the community.  Members D1 and D2 are both long-time members of 
Community D and are security researchers employed by small cybersecurity firms.  
 
4.2.5.2 Community D – Havij 
     The first innovation studied within Community D was Havij, as was first studied 
within Community A specifically, and Communities B and C more generally under the 
umbrella of SQL injection attacks.  There was a significant amount of postings observed 
regarding this tool – primarily in the context of members utilizing it to exploit online e-
commerce sites that are vulnerable to SQL injection attacks, in order to dump credit card 
details stored within the SQL database of the site.  Member D1 stated that this technique 
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is popular within Community D, and in addition to Havij the tool “SQLmap” is also used.  
Member D2 added that Havij was preferred over SQLmap or other tools.  
     An interesting trend was noted where members would post links to websites that were 
“hackable” with Havij and encourage other members to attack and obtain credit cards.  
This was a surprising discovery, as one would assume that more hackers exploiting the 
site would lead to the same credit cards in the hands of multiple attackers, which in turn 
would lead to them being identified as compromised by the credit card issuing banks and 
would lead to attempted purchases being marked as fraudulent.  This may indicate that 
these postings are done to obtain reputation points or other image enhancements within 
Community D and not for the cards alone.  Figure 19 describes the appearance of Havij 
within this community:  
 
Figure 19: Havij Postings within Community D 
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     A total of 187 topics about Havij were noted, of which twelve were tutorials.  As 
observed in previous communities regarding SQL injection attacks, some participants 
chided members who were asking about Havij and suggested that they “do it manually” 
and not use shortcut tools.  However, there were much less of these types of comments as 
had been seen in the other three communities, suggesting that the members were more 
interested in the results of the hacks than the way they were obtained.  Member D2 stated 
that the members who believed that Havij was a shortcut tool were in the minority of 
members in Community D, with most favoring the tool due to their low skill level.  
Additionally, despite the fact that there was a significant amount of postings regarding 
Havij and SQL injection in general within Community D, there was significantly less 
innovation activity observed than in the other three communities.  In one thread, the 
merits of Havij were evaluated against another tool, called “SQLi Dumper”, as detailed in 
Table 27: 
Table 27: Havij Innovation Factors in Community D 
Date Factor Sample Quote 
October 2014 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
Relative 
Advantage 
SQLi Dumper Features:  -Suports 20 methods of SQL Injection; -Suports 
Multi. Online search engine (to find the trajects); -Automated search for 
data in a bulk URL list; 
Compatibility can l get cc details with this? 
I use havij  in your opinion SQLi Dumper 7.1 is better than havij? 
is this tool gud..??? I mean i used havji.. So is this better than havji.?? 
Complexity this tool it's like havij sql injection bro i recommend this tool for 
advanced user, so n00b stay away 
if me you are going to ask itsmore easy to use sql dumper coz its all in 
one.just a little bit not newbie friendly. 
Trialability I have this tool, and i have uploaded it pm me I'll give you link. My 
download link doesnt have any passwords so youcan safely scan 
thedownload link.  Pm me and give me rep I'll give download link 
How do i instal this on windows 8 
Observability havij is a baby compare to this, this tool is fuckin amazing. i love u no 
homo 
fabulous bro i used it yesterday results amazing.... 
mine doesnt come up with any results any body know why? 
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     In the thread described in Table 27, there was no mention of the image enhancement 
or reduction from using either Havij or the SQLi Dumper tool, a trend observed in most 
conversations regarding this tool and a sharp difference from what had been observed in 
other communities.  The tool was found to be compatible with the needs of the 
community – these needs, namely the necessity to obtain credit cards via SQL injection, 
predated the introduction of the tool, and aligned with the overall purpose of the 
community – and the complexity of the tool was found to be high as it was described to 
be “not newbie friendly” and that “n00b[s] stay away”.  This increased complexity 
appeared to be a positive factor, however, as Havij was seen as being too simplistic with 
less features than SQLi Dumper.  The easy observability of the results of this tool 
encouraged members to consider adoption, and in general it appeared that members in 
this thread were enthusiastic about SQLi Dumper as an alternative to Havij.  A review of 
additional threads about Havij within Community D, however, indicate that very few 
other mentions of SQLi Dumper were observed.  Table 28 describes the innovation-
decision process of one discussion regarding Havij and corresponding “dorks”, or search 
engine keywords to help hackers find sites vulnerable to possible SQL injection:  
Table 28: Havij Adoption Phases in Community D 
Date Phase Sample Quote 
February 2015 Knowledge [initial post] 
Persuasion omg thanks i always curious about this and i didnt know the ccs can 
found like this respect 
Decision clean file?? will try soon 
Implementation dorks are great but havij doesn't work and I don't see a scanner 
I only get gr3enox to work once or twice, then it stops getting results, 
probably due to google blocking it, any bypass? 
doesnt work error message when i launch havij and greenox fuck ,.. 
backdoored shit 
Confirmation woow nice share mate ... really HQ dorks thanks a lot ... always 
appreciate to see people sharing nice stuff  like all the others lol if u 
have some more let me know ... but thanks again !!! 
 
  167
     In the above thread, a member posted a file with Havij and a tool called “gr3onox” to 
help automate the searching for vulnerable sites using dorks.  There was little opposition 
to this innovation in the persuasion phase, although some members were concerned that 
the posted file may contain a virus.  Many of the members expressed frustration getting 
the tool to properly run in the implementation phase, and in the confirmation phase a 
member complimented the original poster on the high quality of the dorks but was silent 
on the other tools, suggesting that the uploaded tools may not have been adopted by these 
particular members.  In general, reviews of other threads related to Havij indicate that the 
tool was adopted by members of Community D, perhaps grudgingly, and enjoys active 
use by community members.  
 
4.2.5.3 Community D – DDoS Attacks 
     The second innovation studied within Community D was the DDoS attack.  This 
community contained a smaller number of postings, a total of 72, about this technique 
than had been observed in the prior innovation.  This is likely because DDoS attacks tend 
not to fit the stated mission of the community, which is credit card fraud.  Figure 20 
describes the observed postings regarding this technique.  
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Figure 20: DDoS Postings within Community D 
 
     The shape of this curve is similar to the one observed in Figure 19 for Havij – an 
initial posting early in the life of the community, and then nothing until late 2014, when a 
sharp rise occurs.  Most of the postings observed about the DDoS technique consisted of 
requests to attack a particular site or requests for where to obtain a DDoS service.  In one 
instance, a vendor was observed advertising DDoS services (referred to as a “stresser”), 
but another member posted a comment regarding the skill level of the members of 
Community D: “Hi [redacted] they dont know what is this stresser they think something 
else try to sell to other forums because this forum its only for free tools for noobs :P  Try 
to sell to [Community A]”.  Other requests for DDoS services were observed where 
members directed individuals to Community A, as that was perceived as being a more 
suitable place to find vendors.  As a result, the hacking need for such a technique within 
Community D is unclear, as it does not appear to align with the stated goals of the 
community.  It may be that there is overlap between the carding needs of the members 
  169
and their hacking needs, where DDoS would satisfy the latter but not the former.  Other 
hacking-related activities were observed that did not exactly align with the carding nature 
of the site, such as web defacements, so it seems that a need for general criminal 
techniques such as DDoS did exist, but at a much lower level than in the other 
communities examined.  
     There were very few examples of innovation activity related to DDoS within 
Community D.  One example involving a DDoS tool available for purchase where some 
of the innovation factors were observed is described in Table 29: 
Table 29: DDoS Innovation Factors in Community D 
Date Factor Sample Quote 
January 2015 
  
Relative 
Advantage 
I am selling a Dos tool, it's very powerful. I sell this to a limited members 
in forum. This is a Priv8 tool, and very easy to use! 
Compatibility How much GB/PS ? is it spoofed ? Any other costs fees for it ?? 
Trialability Vouch Copy please 
oh best tool, can u attack demo to site for me send u? 
Observability The powerful of attack depends from your internet speed, if internet 
speed is very strong(powerful) the doser will be amazing. 
Vouch for this guy , best DoSS tool  
Vouch for you bro. you really have amazing ddos. 
 
     In the above innovation, the original poster states that he is selling his DDoS tool to 
members of Community D only.  One member asks about the capabilities of the tool, to 
determine if it is compatible with his needs, while other members ask for a copy for 
testing or if the operator can attack a site to demonstrate the effectiveness of the tool.  
Other members post about their use of the tool and describe its effectiveness.  
Interestingly, no mention of complexity or image were observed.  Review of other DDoS 
threads did not result in any innovations which appeared to transit the innovation-
decision process, and members were not observed weighing the decision to adopt or 
reject DDoS attacks.  Member D2 stated that more recently, members were observed 
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seeking out “DDoS-for-hire” services.  Due to the number of postings observed regarding 
DDoS and the fact that members were actively seeking solutions, it appears that the 
technique was ultimately adopted by members of Community D.  
 
4.2.5.4 Community D – Malware 
     The next innovation studied within Community D was the use of malware.  There was 
insufficient activity regarding specific types of malware or malware-related tools and 
services – such as keyloggers, Trojans, and crypters – so coding was conducted of terms 
related to malware in general to determine the level of adoption.  The keywords utilized 
were obtained from the reviews of related topics in previous communities.  Figure 21 
describes the malware-related postings observed within Community D: 
 
Figure 21: Malware Postings within Community D 
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     A total of 79 postings related to malware were observed in Community D, of which 
five were tutorials.  The chart above also resembles the previous two innovations 
observed in this community.  It was initially unclear why there is early activity in 2013 
but none until late 2014; according to a review conducted of the Internet Archive and 
other tools, the website for Community D was active during this time and no error 
messages appear to have been displayed, so it is possible that the site may have suffered a 
loss of data or just fell out of vogue among hackers during this period.  Member D2 
provided background, stating that many members were active on a sister community of 
Community D, which was shut down in late 2014 and those members migrated to 
Community D.  
     While there was a somewhat high level of interest in malware and associated 
techniques, there was very little innovation activity observed.  Malware as a technique 
certainly fit a pre-existing hacking need and aligns well with the overall mission of the 
community – to obtain credit cards or other financial information.  Member D1 stated 
that malware activity within Community D tends to involve keyloggers or Remote 
Access Trojans (RATs), but added that he has not seen any “high reputed” malware in the 
community, suggesting that the skill level is low.  Member D2 added that “I wouldn’t say 
there was exactly a thought leader when it came to malware.  No one really posted more 
than anyone else did on the subject”.  Only one thread related to malware was observed 
where confirmed innovation activity took place – and this thread was a member selling a 
tutorial for spamming, as described in Table 30: 
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Table 30: Malware Innovation Factors in Community D 
Date Factor Sample Quote 
March 2015 
  
Relative 
Advantage 
Selling: Full Spamming Tutorial [A-Z] Pics Included   Q. Why should I do 
Spamming? A. If you hate to buy CC's, Bank Logs, Accounts etc. you'll 
need to start Spamming so you could get your stuff by yourself. Also if you 
need to spread your Keylogger or Malware, Spamming will help a lot. 
Compatibility Good guide, is original and not some out dated copy pasta. Weary helpfull 
if ur new to spamming. To be honest I don't want tis guide to get out too 
much cuz it's so helpfull 
I've added some improvements to the guide It's still on sale and really good 
guide if you looking to learn Spamming. 
Complexity Good tut for beginner and well explain nice guy with good sense of humor 
and good communication....i bought it and i like it....$$$ well spent 
A+++++++ 
it is good guide only for newbie in my opinion. all steps are accurate and it 
is clearly explained. does not include any advanced techniques though. 
Trialability Vouch Copy please 
Vouch Copy only for Staff member 
 
     The table above describes the member who was selling the spamming technique 
tutorial, with an emphasis upon using the spam to spread malware or attack 
organizations.  For the compatibility factor, one member describes how the tutorial fit his 
needs by being original, and the original seller states that he’s added even more content to 
help members with their spamming needs.  The complexity of the innovation was low, 
which was a helpful factor for selling to newbies.  Some members asked for free “vouch 
copies” so they could test the innovation and describe their results, but the seller stated 
that these copies would only be provided to staff members of Community D.  The seller 
did end up providing copies of the tutorial to senior members, who vouched for the 
content, and subsequently other more junior members began to purchase the tutorial and 
added their own vouches.  No mention of the observability of the seller’s techniques were 
observed, and as had been noted in the previous two innovations for Community D, no 
mention of the impact upon the image of members was noted.  
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     Within this same thread, parts of the innovation-decision process were transited by 
some members, as can be observed in Table 31: 
Table 31: Malware Adoption Phases in Community D 
Date Phase Sample Quote 
March 2015 Knowledge [initial post] 
Persuasion Ok, good method, well explained with images and important tips for 
newbies. good luck with sales. 
Decision when are going to sell at a discount again, am interested 
I'm quite interested in what you've got to say - if you could pm me your 
jabber, I'd like to purchase and have a convo with you. 
Implementation vouch for this guy ! i get the method ! 
I bought the last copy, it is simple and easy to understand, my vouch for 
him. 
 
     In the knowledge phase, the seller made Community D aware of his innovation 
through his initial posting to the site.  In the persuasion phase, a senior member who 
received a vouch copy of the tutorial weighed in and added his support to the seller.  In 
the decision phase, two members appeared committed to adoption and asked about 
purchasing the tutorial.  And in the implementation phase, two members stated that they 
had purchased and that the tutorial was a success.  No observation was made of the 
confirmation phase, where members could decide to continue or discontinue use; 
however, that makes sense given that this innovation was a tutorial, as the initial use of 
the tutorial should be sufficient to gain the knowledge conveyed in it, and further uses 
would not be necessary.  
     Based upon the total number of postings observed related to malware within 
Community D, it appears that the community has adopted the general concept of malware 
as a means to obtain credit card information. 
 
4.2.5.5 Community D – Skimmers 
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     The final innovation studied within Community D was the concept of skimmers.  
Skimmers are hardware devices designed to steal credit and debit card information by 
reading the magnetic data stored on the card, and can be placed by criminals into ATM 
machines or swiped surreptitiously during credit card purchases (Sharma & Rathore, 
2012).  Skimmers are closely related to the concept of point-of-sale malware as discussed 
by the expert panel, which surprisingly had no measurable level of activity within this 
community.  One would, however, expect there to be a significant amount of innovation 
activity regarding the development of skimmers in a forum such as Community D.  This 
was not the case, and Figure 22 describes the skimmer-related postings observed in this 
community: 
 
Figure 22: Skimmer Postings within Community D 
 
     A total of 30 postings regarding skimmers were observed within Community D.  
Almost all of these postings were either vendors selling skimmers, or members wishing 
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to buy them.  The need for this innovation is clear – skimmers are an easy way to obtain 
credit card data and this feature aligns perfectly with the overall nature of the community.  
There was only a single observed posting where skimmer innovation occurred – a 
member posted that his skimmer was failing on cards obtained in Europe and was asking 
for ways to improve it, and where his cards could be cashed out.  This was a collaborative 
thread, however, and no experimentation with the member’s innovation was observed, so 
it is not a good candidate for documented adoption activity.  It does appear that the 
members of Community D have adopted skimmers as a technique, given that a number of 
individuals sought to purchase and sell them, but almost no innovation activity was 
observed for this technique.  Member D1 stated that he has observed very little 
innovation regarding skimmers in this community, and has observed hardly any 
discussion of emerging credit card countermeasures such as “201 EMV”, or computer 
chips embedded in cards.  Member D2 stated that the limited amount of postings 
observed for skimmers related to ATM or gas station skimmers, but little else.  
 
4.2.5.6 Community D – Conclusion 
     Community D was observed to primarily be a marketplace of relatively low-skilled 
hackers who were focused exclusively upon credit card fraud.  Member D1 stated that 
few members are “actually wildly skilled” – most of the members are involved in simple 
pickups of cash orchestrated by more skilled hackers, while only a few members actually 
possess the skills to develop tools and infect victims with malware.  Some innovation did 
take place within this community, but it was quite limited with most of the focus of the 
community upon buying and selling tools, techniques, or services related to carding.  
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With the exception of DDoS, the studied innovations did meet a pre-existing hacking 
need, and DDoS appears to be tied to a weaker need for criminal techniques generally.  
The roles of senior members appeared to be similar to those observed in the previous 
forums – Member D1 related that vouches from senior members boost sales, as the 
reputation of these members “automatically generates interest” of members who observe 
the vouch.  Member D2 confirmed this, stating that postings by administrators, 
moderators, or other senior members “could really drive a lot of the conversation in the 
forum and were certainly revered by others”.  Similarly, Member D2 added that “he 
biggest difference between a n00b and a l33t member of the forum proposing something 
are more in the number of replies in thread and consideration that is given to an idea”, 
and that “older members are more likely to be thanked/repped for their contribution”, 
confirming the similar level of importance of these senior members.  
     For the innovation activity that was observed, it was found that the role of image 
played no part whatsoever, unlike the prior three communities studied.  This may be 
because the focus of each forum differed significantly, and the effect of an innovation 
upon the image of a member within the community may be unimportant in an almost 
purely marketplace environment.  What was important to members was reputation points, 
to avoid scammers and rippers; however, the innovations themselves had no impact upon 
the reputation points of an individual member.  The other innovation factor which was 
under-observed was that of trialability; the reason for this is unknown, but it is possible 
that the membership of Community D was uninterested in experimentation and trying 
innovations before deciding to adopt.  As a result of these observations, the overall skill 
level of Community D appeared to be low.  
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     Of the four innovation types examined, only one – a DDoS service – appeared to have 
actually been developed by a member of the forum, and DDoS arguably had the least to 
do with carding of all the innovations.  The communications channels employed by the 
members of the community matched others observed in the prior communities, and 
consisted of public postings, private messages, and outside chat services such as ICQ or 
Jabber favored by individual members.  External websites appeared to be less important, 
as the vendors selling wares tended to sell directly within the forum and did not direct 
buyers to outside websites where tools or services could be purchased.  Unlike all three 
previous communities, the community did not have an emphasis upon learning, but 
instead purely upon sales and upon the operations of attacks.  
 
4.2.6 Cross-Case Analysis 
     As described in Figure 3, the next phase of this research involves cross-case analysis.  
To some extent, this has been happening already, as each of the above cases was 
influenced by the findings of the previous cases, as had been described in the 
explanation-building analytic procedure outlined in the analysis of Community A; 
however, further conclusions can be drawn across cases.  Additionally, reviewing the 
results of these cases in light of DOI theory will also reveal additional insights.   
     To begin with, during the analysis of each case it was observed that each community 
had different focuses, with different activities occurring in each.  Table 32 summarizes 
what was observed for each of the four communities examined, including the overall 
focus of the community and the types of activities that were observed, in order of 
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observed priority for the community.  The observed skill level was also provided for each 
community. 
Table 32: Summary of Communities 
Community Overall Focus Skill Level Activities (by priority) 
Community A General hacking Medium Operations, sales, learning 
Community B Education Medium-High Learning 
Community C Malware High Operations, learning, sales 
Community D Carding Low Sales, operations 
  
     Interestingly, the skill level for Community A was determined to be medium, despite 
the active disdain for that community from Communities B and C.   This is because the 
skill level for Community D was found to be exceptionally low, and by comparison 
Community A was determined to be a level above.  Each of these communities evaluated 
a different subset of innovations that were recommended by the expert panel.  To assist in 
the analysis of these cases, it would be helpful to first summarize the tool and technique 
innovations that were adopted or rejected by each of the communities, as described in 
Table 33: 
Table 33: Summary of Community Innovation Adoption Decisions 
Community Innovation Decision 
Community A Havij Adopted 
Amplification Attacks Adopted 
Bulletproof Hosting Adopted 
Shodan Adopted 
Community B SQL Injection Adopted 
DDoS Attacks Rejected 
Crypters Rejected 
Bitcoin Adopted 
Community C SQL Injection Rejected 
Bulletproof Hosting Adopted 
DDoS Attacks Adopted 
Crypters Adopted 
Community D Havij Adopted 
DDoS Attacks Adopted 
Malware Adopted 
Skimmers Adopted 
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     As can be seen above, the four hacking communities reviewed adopted most of the 
studied innovations, with only three innovations clearly rejected.  When considering the 
adoption or rejection of these innovations, note that the technique innovations should be 
considered as innovation categories – one technique innovation, such as DDoS attacks, 
may have a number of tool sub-innovations, such as Community C’s “DirtJumper”, 
“minidos” and “Silly Bot”.  These tool sub-innovations can be adopted or rejected 
separately without affecting the adoption of the overall technique, in this case DDoS.  
Examining the contrary cases of why an innovation was rejected will also prove useful, 
as rejected innovations represent instances where the innovation-decision process breaks 
down.  Note that we are only counting an innovation as rejected if the entire community 
appears to reject the innovation, not individual members.  Even when an innovation is 
widely disparaged, such as Havij within Community A for image purposes, if that 
innovation experiences a significant amount of innovation activity and appears to be 
adopted by the majority of participants, for the purposes of this research the innovation 
will be considered adopted.   
     The first rejected innovation in Table 33 was that of DDoS attacks in Community B.  
This was a passive rejection per Rogers (2003), and the only passive rejection observed 
during the study.  DDoS attacks were examined in each of the four communities - in 
Community A under the specific subsection of amplification attacks, and in the other 
communities as DDoS more generally.  This technique was adopted by Communities A, 
C, and D, but rejected by Community B.  Within Community B, the primary reason for 
this rejection was due to the negative image associated with DDoS attacks; this class of 
attacks was strongly associated with “script kiddies” and members who attempted to 
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initiate discussions about DDoS were publicly shamed.  Strong social pressure was found 
within Community B to not engage in these attacks, and members risked having 
conversations moved to the “Board of Shame” for public ridicule if they promoted the 
technique, although some small amount of discussion about DDoS defenses and technical 
details were permitted.  The lack of complexity with DDoS attacks was also seen as a 
negative factor within Community B – the attacks were often considered too simplistic to 
be worth discussing.  
     The second innovation rejected by Community B was that of crypters, or crypting.  
The primary reason for this active rejection was a lack of complexity – in general, 
members believed that malware should be written in such a way that crypters are not 
necessary, with more-complex malware defeating virus detection and less-complex 
malware requiring crypters.  A secondary factor of image was also observed; some 
postings regarding crypters, if they were made by obvious script kiddies and were purely 
for malicious purposes with no interesting technical details, were also moved to the 
Board of Shame for the purpose of reduction of image of the member.   
     The last innovation that was rejected was SQL Injection within Community C, another 
active rejection.  Unlike the prior two innovations rejected within Community B, 
Community C appeared to reject SQL injections because they were not compatible with 
the needs of the community – namely, writing malware.  SQL injection is much more 
compatible with the needs of other communities, and was adopted by Communities A and 
D under the specific banner of the Havij SQL injection tool, and by Community B as a 
more general technique.  Interestingly, in many of these communities, this technique was 
associated with a severe reduction in image for adopters; while this did dissuade 
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individual members from adopting the technique, it did not stop the general community 
from adopting.  
     Based upon the above discussion, it appears that the following adoption factors are 
most important when determining if an innovation will be rejected: image, complexity, 
and compatibility.  A hacking innovation must first be compatible with the needs of the 
adopting community before it could be adopted; while the majority of proposed 
innovations were compatible with the communities where they were adopted, SQL 
injection was not compatible with Community C – a community focused upon writing 
malware, not upon executing attacks – and was rejected.  This appears to be 
straightforward, but the next two factors are less obvious.   
     Interestingly, when considering complexity, on many occasions increased complexity 
was seen as a positive factor for adoption, and reduced complexity a negative factor. 
Agarwal and Prasad (1997) noted that increased complexity was not a barrier to adoption, 
as motivated adopters can overcome complex innovations if the innovation is important 
enough.  Far from being a barrier, within the present study, complexity was often a 
requirement.  If an innovation was seen as too simplistic or easy, it was not interesting 
enough for adoption, which seems to agree with the notion by Holt et al. (2012) that 
hackers are constantly trying to demonstrate their technical skills and abilities in order to 
show their proficiency.  Crypters were rejected by Community B because they 
encouraged the development of code that was not complex enough to defeat antivirus, 
and were associated with “script kiddies”, a term used to reduce the image of a member.  
DDoS attacks were rejected by Community B in part because of the lack of complexity in 
their execution.  In other communities, complexity was also seen as important – within 
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Community C, many innovations were adopted because they were highly complex, and 
practices associated with a reduction in complexity, such as writing software in high-
level, less powerful languages such as Visual Basic or .NET, were disparaged.  The 
complexity of these innovations affected how potential adopters were viewed with 
respect to their skill level.  This suggests, therefore, that complexity within the hacker 
communities examined is actually closely related to image.  
     Above all other factors, image was observed to be the most often discussed by 
potential adopters of an innovation, but appeared to have limited effect.  Rarely was 
adoption of an innovation associated with an increase in image; however, certain 
innovations resulted in a severe reduction in image, and therefore image was observed to 
have a significant overall negative impact.  Image played a primary role in the rejection 
of DDoS attacks by Community B, and certain classes of innovations – namely SQL 
injection (including Havij), as well as DDoS attacks in other communities – suffered 
from a decrease in image post-adoption.  It is interesting to note that even though many 
innovations were influenced by image, it was not ultimately a critical adoption factor, as 
SQL injections were adopted by Communities A, B, and D, for example, even though 
many members felt strongly about the image of those who did adopt the technique.  In 
fact, the innovations associated with a reduction in image, such as Havij in Community 
A, may actually be adopted in secret by members, who publicly refute the technique 
while confirming their use, as indicated by the prevalence of quotes containing phrases 
such as “I hacked my first website with this, altho now i prefer manually”.  One 
interesting observation was made about the different types of image observed in each 
community while reviewing case study data – to each community, an increase or 
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reduction in image meant different things.  Table 34 describes the types of image 
observed in these communities. 
Table 34: Image Types in Different Communities 
Community Type of Image 
Community A Hacking Ability 
Community B Technical Mastery, Novelty of Attack 
Community C Programming Ability 
Community D Speed and Success  
 
     As described in the above table, each of the above communities valued different types 
of image, and reputation points were awarded in each for members who demonstrated 
these qualities.  In Community A, the members there were concerned with their perceived 
hacking ability; they wanted to establish “street cred” as a legitimate hacker and did not 
want to be perceived as a script kiddie.  In Community B, while script kiddies were also 
derided, members of that community sought recognition for technically-sophisticated 
attacks that were novel and interesting enough to be worthy of discussion.  Members who 
could introduce novel techniques were prized, and members who regurgitated the 
techniques of others, or who posted comments highlighting their lack of technical 
mastery, were shamed.  In Community C, programming ability was the primary image 
motivation, and programmers who had significant skills were praised – and Russian 
programmers were recognized to be among the best.  Community D, which consisted of 
the lowest-skilled hackers encountered in this study, members were concerned only with 
conducting successful attacks quickly, wanted the easiest methods to do so, and were 
generally unconcerned with their overall image in terms of ability.  
     Of the innovation factors predicted in the literature, one type was not observed – 
voluntariness.  Moore and Benbasat (1991) predicted that both image and voluntariness 
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would be important in IS innovation diffusion.  For the communities examined in this 
research, image was indeed very important, but voluntariness was for the most part not 
observed.  Within some communities, certain innovations – such as DDoS within 
Community B – were highly discouraged, to the point of strong social shaming when 
members proposed them.  In a way, this indicates that rejection of this innovation is 
involuntary by community members.  However, there were no occasions where specific 
innovations were mandated by the community, so outside of this involuntary rejection 
voluntariness was not found to be an important factor.  
     A review of the findings of the innovation-decision processes described for the above 
communities and innovations will also prove useful.  These findings are summarized in 
Figure 23 and described below.   
 
Figure 23: Innovation-Decision Process within Hacker Communities 
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     It was noted that within communities that permitted vendors to sell tools and services, 
there were distinct differences between innovation-decisions involving innovations for 
sale and innovations that were offered for free.  For innovations involving sales, vouches 
for vendors were found to be very important to the persuasion phase.  Many of these 
vouches were provided by senior members of the communities, and there was an 
emphasis upon obtaining “vouch copies” of the hacking tools or services.  These vouch 
copies permitted senior members to experiment with the innovation – where trialability 
and observability was noted to be important – and subsequently these members weighed 
in on the persuasion phase of the innovation-decision process.  Strong vouches by senior 
members were found to be extremely important for sales threads, and when vouches were 
observed members tended to enter the decision phase and ultimately adopt.  
     Within the persuasion phase for sales threads, another trend was noticed: the public 
disparaging of a vendor by a rival.  Within these threads, the rival vendor attempted to 
influence the persuasion phase with the goal of convincing members not to adopt.  This 
was noted in the Amplification/DDoS threads in Communities A and C, where numerous 
vendors were offering DDoS services (often called booters or stressers) and these vendors 
were competing with each other for business.  This was also observed with respect to 
crypters in Community C, where the sale of crypting tools was common.  Typically, 
senior members or moderators would put a stop to these public spats, or in extreme cases 
would ban one member or another.  Vouches by senior members also helped counteract 
these rivalries.  
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     For those members who were persuaded and decided to adopt in the decision phase, 
the implementation phase was found to be critical.  In this phase, adopters utilized the 
innovation and any problems were noted.  Members who had problems described the 
technical issues they were having with the tool or technique, in an attempt to get support 
from the original poster and other community members.  This phase was closely related 
with the persuasion phase – many members who were satisfied with their use of the 
innovation would vouch for the innovation in their own implementation phase, in an 
attempt to positively influence other members who might be in their own persuasion 
phase.  Similarly, members who continued to have difficulties might attempt to convince 
members to avoid the innovation.  If a user was not able to get their problem resolved 
during the implementation phase, many of them appeared to discontinue use in the 
confirmation phase.  As a result, many of the members who posted the innovations were 
observed trying to publicly assist those who were describing problems, both so the use of 
the innovation was not discontinued by the member encountering issues, and so that other 
members who were deciding whether or not to adopt would not be dissuaded from 
adoption in their own persuasion and implementation phases.  
     When a member did make it through the implementation phase and entered the 
confirmation phase, the next decision was to continue use or to discontinue use.  Many 
members posted messages indicating that they would continue to use the innovation, and 
similarly many members decided to discontinue use because the innovation ended up not 
being useful, or stopped working.  In many cases, online tools offered by vendors – such 
as DDoS services – eventually stopped working as servers were suspended by hosting 
companies, leading customers to discontinue use and complain loudly.  As in the 
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implementation phase, these postings often influenced the decision phase of other 
members by offering vouches or complaints.   
     In some cases, the clearest sign of continued adoption was the reinvention of an 
innovation by an adopter.  Examples of reinvention were observed in Communities A, B, 
and C, but not in D, where the volume of innovation activity in general was quite low.  In 
Community A, the amplification DDoS technique was enthusiastically adopted and 
vendors immediately reinvented the innovation by incorporating it into their own booters 
and stressers, for a profit.  In Community B, publicly-released crypters were adopted and 
improved upon by adding new features and then re-released by members, and SQL 
injection techniques were adopted and incorporated into standalone programs that were 
developed by members.  And in Community C, the DDoS tool known as “minidos” was 
reinvented into a great number of other tools released there, and a number of crypters 
were also adopted, modified, and re-released, with the emphasis by the releasing 
members upon “crediting” the original author.  The practice of writing tutorials was also 
a form of reinvention – the tutorial authors adopted a technique and developed new 
content to explain the technique to other members, primarily to cement their standing as a 
knowledgeable hacker within the community.  
     The importance of change agents within these communities also needs to be 
addressed.  Three types of change agents were observed in this research: the original 
poster of an innovation, be it the actual developer or simply the member who introduces 
the tool or technique to the community; the senior member, who is able to use his 
significant influence to affect adoption; and the tutorial writer, who seeks to convince 
others to adopt the innovation.  The overall influence of the original poster’s innovation 
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depended highly upon his seniority within the community, with the willingness of the 
community to experiment and ultimately adopt an innovation increasing with the poster’s 
seniority level.  While some instances were noted where very junior members received 
enthusiastic responses, these were rare.  More-junior members were able to show their 
trustworthiness or skill by enlisting other members to vouch for them or to provide them 
reputation points, more of each which helped convince potential adopters to experiment 
with the innovation.  
     This leads to the next class of change agent – the senior member.  Senior members 
functioned as change agents primarily as gatekeepers through which innovations must 
pass.  These members were able to obtain “vouch copies” of tools or services so they 
could evaluate the innovations and offer their support.  The support of a senior member, 
through vouches or other positive feedback, was found to be a key component in 
adoption in most of the communities examined – in many cases, innovations which were 
unsupported or were negatively reviewed were not adopted, and innovations which were 
vouched for by senior members were adopted.  This phenomenon was observed in all 
four communities, to varying degrees – interestingly, even though one of the interviewees 
of Community B claimed that their community was egalitarian, it was Community C 
where the effect of seniority was observed to be the least.   
     The last class of change agents consisted of the tutorial authors.  These members, as 
explained above, sought to convince other members to utilize a given technique or tool 
by providing detailed instructions on how to operate the innovation.  This appears to have 
been primarily to demonstrate their own usefulness and skill to the rest of the community, 
or to gain reputation points.  Many tutorials were quite comprehensive and within certain 
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communities emerged as the authoritative, go-to source for learning about the innovation, 
such as a SQL injection tutorial written by a Community B administrator that had been 
examined.  Despite their apparent motivation of self-promotion, it appears that these 
tutorial authors were quite effective in enlisting other members to experiment with and 
adopt innovations, judging by the feedback provided by members who followed the 
tutorial.  
     The development of the innovation was stated by Rogers (2003) to be an important 
part of the innovation process.  Recall that development, as defined by Rogers, consists 
of “the process of putting a new idea in a form that is expected to meet the needs of an 
audience of potential adopters” (Rogers, 2003, p.146).  In the context of this study, 
development was observed to include such activities as the authoring of code around a 
particular technique, introduction of hacking services, or the posting of new hacking 
tools.  These innovations may not have been “developed” by the individual member in a 
software engineering sense, but have been from a DOI perspective.  Many of the 
innovations examined were developed outside of the community and introduced by 
change agents, where other members – both junior and senior – frequently experimented 
with, adopted, reinvented, and improved the innovations.  The efforts were observed to 
be somewhat collaborative – usually the innovation would be introduced by the change 
agent in a complete form, but then others may comment or offer suggestions for 
improvement, which may or may not be incorporated by the initial developer.  There 
were, however, some innovations which were developed within these communities.  In 
Community A, this included amplification attacks – notably, Member A2 introduced the 
technique to the community, and he reportedly used that as a way to make significant 
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amounts of money from selling tools and services related to it.  In Community B, 
member-developed SQL injection scripts and crypters were noted.  And in Community C, 
DDoS programs – notably “minidos”, which was reinvented in a number of other DDoS 
tools – as well as crypters were developed by members.  In Community D, no significant 
development activity was observed, in accordance with the low skill level of the 
community.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
5.1 Introduction 
     This chapter concludes the research study by conducting a detailed discussion of the 
findings of this research in light of the original research questions and propositions.  
These findings include a review of the results from the four case study locations as well 
as those obtained from the cross-case analysis.  A discussion of the importance and 
significance of the results is conducted.  Practical implications for information security 
are also discussed, as are potential limitations of the research, an evaluation of the rigor 
of the research, and recommendations for future research.  Finally, a conclusion section 
summarizes the research.  
 
5.2 Findings 
     The original research model for this study, described in Figure 2, can be revisited with 
the insights obtained from the case studies and cross-case analysis.  Table 35 details a 
summary of findings in relation to the original research model, which will guide the 
discussion in this section.  
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Table 35: Relation of Findings to Research Model 
Innovation Stage Key Findings 
Identification of Hacking 
Need 
Need arises when existing hacking methods fail to be effective 
Development of 
Innovation 
Collaborative development within hacker community, combined with 
introduction of externally-developed innovations 
Communication within 
Community 
Primarily mass media, localite channels during knowledge phase; some 
interpersonal, localite channels during persuasion phase  
Innovation Adoption 
Factors 
Complexity: more complex hacking innovations favored and adopted; 
Image: can result in social pressures to not adopt hacking innovation, 
and different hacking communities value different types of image; 
Compatibility: innovation must be compatible with the needs of the 
hacking community 
Adoption of Innovation Most innovations adopted by hacking communities. Vouches by senior 
members important contributor to decision to adopt.   
Use of Innovation Implementation phase critical: problems with hacking innovation need 
to be resolved, or innovation is discontinued  
Continued Use Reinvention of hacking innovation a reliable signal of continued use 
 
 
     Based on the above case study and cross-case analysis, and summary of findings in 
relation to the original research model, the original research questions of the study can be 
answered.  Recall that both of the two initial research questions proposed in Chapter 1 
were broken down into two further propositions.  Rival propositions were also developed 
for each proposition to ensure that the behavior observed was explained by the 
proposition and not by the direct rival, as per Yin (2009).  This section will examine these 
propositions and the rival propositions to determine if they were supported by the results 
of the case study.  
 
5.2.1 Research Question One  
     The first research question of this study was broken down into two propositions.  
These propositions, and their rivals, are provided and discussed in light of the results 
from Chapter 4.  
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P1: Participants of hacking communities develop new techniques when existing 
hacking techniques cease to reliably breach targeted organizations.  
R1: Participants of hacking communities develop new techniques as a means of 
demonstrating skill and earning status in the communities. 
     The first proposition describes the hacking need that results in the introduction of the 
innovation to the community.  A review of the hacking needs observed for each of the 
innovations examined in the four communities under study revealed support for this 
proposition in most cases.  For example, the amplification technique was introduced 
when existing methods of DDoS ceased to be as effective.  With increasing bandwidth 
available to victim servers, and the proliferation of anti-DDoS countermeasures available 
to organizations, standard methods of DDoS – such as sending data floods from a single 
server, or employing bots to send data from multiple computers – were becoming less 
effective.  Amplification (and the sub-technique of reflection) made DDoS attacks many 
times more powerful than had been possible before, and as a result many vendors in these 
hacking communities offered powerful, and cheap, DDoS services for rent.  
     Similarly, crypters were introduced in response to a clearly defined need.  Antivirus 
companies began implementing heuristic-based detection mechanisms, and malware that 
previously did not match known signatures was being caught by these IS security 
countermeasures, resulting in malware as an overall technique becoming less effective.  
Crypters were developed and released to these communities as a way to overcome the 
antivirus countermeasure employed by organizations.  Another example can be found in 
bulletproof hosting – as web-based botnets became more popular, as a countermeasure 
targeted organizations and security companies would request (or legally compel) the 
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providers hosting the malicious content to take down the malware.  To allow these new 
malware techniques to continue to be effective, bulletproof hosting was needed so that 
malware would stay online.  
     In one case, a tool was introduced to these communities to make it easier for hackers 
to execute their attacks. SQL injection was developed as an overall technique as a new 
way to breach web-based assets of organizations – countering more traditional 
countermeasures such as firewalls, in line with P1 – but the tool Havij specifically was 
developed to allow attackers of all skill levels to engage in this technique.  This 
democratization of the SQL injection technique allowed many more victim organizations 
to be breached.  
     Shodan was the only instance of a tool or technique being introduced without a 
specific hacking need – or at least, an observable need in the community where it was 
introduced, although it may have been created in response to the needs of other, 
unreviewed communities.  When Shodan was introduced to Community A, members 
were interested and enthusiastic, but it did not appear that they were clamoring for a 
solution to find and exploit internet-connected devices, such as webcams, prior to the 
introduction of the tool.  In this one instance, it appeared that the member who posted the 
innovation did make his post to demonstrate his skill and increase his own status 
(measured in terms of reputation points) within that Community.  This was the only case 
where this was observed, so it appears that for the other innovations P1 is supported and 
R1 rejected.  This indicates that these hacking communities primarily follow a “need-
pull” model of technology innovation (Baskerville & Pries-Heke, 2001). 
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     The second proposition for the first research question, and its corresponding rival, is 
below: 
P2: The methods by which the new hacking techniques are communicated 
amongst the community affect the adoption of the innovations.  
R2: A hacking innovation, if useful enough, will be adopted by the community 
regardless of the manner in which it is communicated through the social system.   
     The communications channels employed by community members when considering 
the examined innovations remained relatively consistent across the examined 
communities.  The main communications channels employed by all four communities 
were the forum public messages themselves – which would be considered mass media, 
localite communications per Rogers (2003), with some conversations occurring over 
private messages, which would be considered interpersonal localite communications.  
Discussions over external chat services, such as ICQ, Jabber, or MSN, were also fairly 
common, and one community – Community B – operated its own official IRC server, 
where members congregated.  The external chat services would be considered 
interpersonal, cosmopolite communications methods per Rogers, while the Community B 
IRC server would be considered a interpersonal localite method.  In some cases, members 
also visited external websites, primarily to interact with vendors who may be operating 
services, such as DDoS booters or stressers, outside of the community, which would be 
mass media, but cosmopolite methods.  These communications were overwhelmingly 
informal, in line with the overall informal, slang-heavy nature of hacker communications 
described by Holt (2009).  
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     Rogers (2003) stated that cosmopolite, mass media channels are more often employed 
during the knowledge phase of the innovation-decision process, and localite, 
interpersonal methods are more often employed during the persuasion phase.  This study 
suffers a bit from observation limitations, as most of the innovations were primarily 
observed over the public forum postings and insights into private messages were not 
possible.  Similarly, most of the observed communications were localite and cosmopolite 
channels were referred to but generally not observed directly.  However, on many 
occasions during the persuasion phase members would ask to be contacted over private 
message or external chat service, lending some support to Rogers’ notion.   
     Many of the sales of tools and services also occurred over these interpersonal 
channels.  Cosmopolite channels did not appear to be utilized as much as localite 
channels; however, some vendors offered external websites which contained information 
about their services, and some members provided their external chat handles to negotiate 
sales. 
     In each of the cases above where an interpersonal channel was employed, the 
community adopted the innovation.  Generally these communications involved the 
original poster of the message – the vendor, or the change agent who is seeking adoption 
of the innovation – being contacted by a potential adopter.  It seems that this “personal 
touch” does help with the adoption, although for interpersonal communications no 
distinction was made between cosmopolite and localite methods.  This would imply 
support for P2, but does not completely refute R2, suggesting that further research 
encompassing cosmopolite channels would help to answer this question.  
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     Now that the first two propositions have been discussed, a discussion of the first 
research question can be conducted.  This question is reproduced below: 
RQ1: What characteristics affect the development and communication of 
emergent hacking techniques and tools within hacker communities?  
     We have learned that hacker tool and technique innovations are developed and 
introduced into communities in response to a pre-defined hacking need because existing 
methods of conducting attacks are inadequate, in most instances (with the exception of 
Shodan).   This is in line with Utterback’s (1971) findings of innovation introduction 
within organizations.  We have also learned that most of the communications channels 
within these communities tend to be localite mass media channels, and that interpersonal 
channels (of either the localite or cosmopolite variety) have a positive impact upon the 
eventual adoption of the innovation.  
     The development of the innovation within these hacking communities, as defined by 
Rogers (2003), includes both software-engineering style development of code, as well as 
the introduction of hacking tools and services to the communities.  Many of the 
innovations observed during this research were written outside of the individual 
communities, while some of them were in fact authored by community members for the 
use of the individual community.  This development was observed to be collaborative in 
nature, with community members commenting upon code changes and feature 
improvements.  These innovations were introduced in the knowledge phase of the 
innovation-decision process and later championed by a variety of change agents, who 
sought to influence adoption within the community.  
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5.2.2 Research Question Two  
     The second research question of this study was also broken down into two 
propositions.  The first proposition and its corresponding rival is described below: 
P3: Change agents within the hacking community are instrumental in the 
adoption of the hacking innovation.  
R3: The role of change agents within a community advocating for particular 
innovations is minimal; instead, the merit of the innovation dictates its adoption.   
     Change agents were found to be quite influential within the studied communities, as 
described in detail in the previous chapter.  Within these communities, there were three 
types of change agents observed, each of which could potentially overlap – the member 
who introduced the innovation, the senior member of the community, and the tutorial 
author.  For members who introduced various hacking tools or techniques, the seniority 
of the member was found to be quite important, with innovations introduced by more-
senior members receiving wider interest, experimentation, and eventual adoption of their 
innovations, and innovations introduced by more-junior members experiencing less 
success in adoption.  These more junior members would often need to enlist the support 
of other members through vouches or reputation points before their innovation was 
considered for adoption.  
     Senior members themselves were a class of change agent, by acting as gatekeepers 
through which hacking innovations needed to pass.  Senior members in the studied 
communities fulfilled Holt’s (2013) observation of a “relational J curve” structure in 
hacking communities, where a small number of users – the senior users – are ultimately 
responsible for a majority of the useful content.  Innovations that received the support of 
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these members – which included site administrators, moderators, or long-time members 
with high numbers of posts – were much more likely to be adopted by the community.  
Negative reviews by senior members often had a severe negative impact upon the 
adoption of hacking innovations, as did a simple lack of support.  Finally, tutorial authors 
were found to be the third type of change agent.  These members often wrote tutorials to 
demonstrate their skill with a particular innovation, and innovations which had tutorials 
written about them appeared to be adopted more quickly and enthusiastically.    
     Based upon the above discussion of change agents, it appears that P3 is supported.  R3 
likewise appears to be rejected, based upon the importance of senior members and 
influence of tutorial authors.  Despite the insistence by some interviewees that their 
communities are indeed egalitarian and are merit-based, tool innovations which did not 
receive the support of senior members, or received a negative review, were often not 
adopted.  
     The final proposition considered in this research, P4, can be found below along with 
its corresponding rival: 
P4: Continued use of a hacking innovation by community members will determine 
the ultimate adoption of an innovation. 
R4: Ultimate adoption of an innovation is unaffected by continued use of the 
hacking innovation.   
     The case study conducted on these four communities revealed that continued use of an 
innovation was indeed a predictor of overall adoption.  Many tool sub-innovations were 
experimented with but members struggled in the implementation phase, leading the 
members to eventually discontinue use in the confirmation phase and for the individual 
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tools to not be adopted, even if the overall technique was eventually adopted by the larger 
community.  This provides support for the rejection of rival R4.  On the other hand, when 
members resolved issues in the implementation phase (often with the assistance of the 
original tool author), those innovations appeared to have been adopted at a higher rate.  
Tool and technique reinvention was also found to have a strong association with 
adoption.  When members reinvented tools or techniques, such as amplification attacks in 
Community A or minidos in Community C, or authored significant amount of tutorials 
(themselves a form of reinvention) regarding tools or techniques, these innovations were 
among the most widely adopted of those reviewed.  This indicates that P4 should be 
accepted.  As described by Parthasarathy and Bhattacherjee (1998), this post-adoption 
behavior was ultimately important in understanding the success of these innovations.  
     Now that propositions P3 and P4 have been discussed, an analysis of RQ2 is 
appropriate.  Recall that RQ2 was as follows: 
RQ2: How do the participants in these communities decide to adopt these 
techniques and employ them in attacks against organizations?   
     To answer this question, the importance of change agents, from proposition P3, should 
be considered.  However, also important were innovation diffusion factors as well as the 
various phases of the innovation-decision process relevant to this aspect of adoption.   
     While all of the innovation factors discussed played some particular role – with the 
exception of voluntariness, which was not relevant for these communities – certain 
factors were determined to be more important.  Complexity was found to be important, 
but for counterintuitive reasons – it turned out that increased complexity was beneficial to 
adoption, and a lack of complexity was seen as a negative factor.  Innovations which 
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were seen as too simplistic were disparaged by members and were often associated with 
“script kiddies”, which frequently – but not always – led to non-adoption.  For example, 
in Community B DDoS attacks were seen as too simplistic to be worth discussing, and 
they were not adopted.  Similarly, usage of crypters in Community B were seen as 
indicative of low programming skills, as highly skilled developers should be able to make 
their malware undetectable without the use of a third-party crypter, leading to the 
rejection of the technique by the community.  This indicates that complexity is closely 
tied to image, as the complexity of an innovation affects the image of the adopter.  
     Image itself was found to be somewhat important – in some communities, the negative 
image associated with an innovation (such as DDoS in Community B) contributed to the 
community’s rejection of the technique.  However, in other communities certain tools or 
techniques, such as the Havij tool or SQL injection more broadly, were adopted even 
though usage of them was often associated with “script kiddies”.  One interesting finding 
regarding image was that different communities valued different types of image: in 
Community A, overall hacking ability was prized; in Community B, technical mastery 
and novelty were rewarded; in Community C, programming ability was what was 
recognized; and in Community D, the speed of attacks and the end results were 
important, with little concern how a hacker achieved them.  
     Compatibility was the last innovation factor determined to be critical for adoption.  
When an innovation was deemed to be compatible with the needs of a community, it was 
often adopted.  However, when the innovation was determined to be incompatible with 
the needs of the community – such as SQL injection in Community C, which was 
generally not compatible with the malware-writing needs of the community – it was not 
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adopted.  For the most part, the innovations examined in this study were compatible with 
the needs and goals of their communities.  
     Regarding the innovation-decision process, while all of the phases played a role in the 
eventual adoption or rejection of an innovation, a few of the phases of the process 
appeared to be especially crucial within these hacker communities.  For example, the 
persuasion phase was observed to be very active, and for innovations associated with 
vendors who were trying to make a profit from the innovation, this phase was quite 
important.  These vendors frequently sought vouches from senior members who could 
support the innovation, and often provided “vouch copies” for free to senior members in 
order to obtain support.  After vouches were provided by these senior members, many of 
the more-junior members would declare their intention to adopt.  Also observed in the 
persuasion phase for these sales threads were “anti-vouches”, or disparaging remarks 
from rival vendors, who attempted to convince potential adopters to not adopt the 
innovation, often in favor of their own.  
     The implementation phase was also observed to be critical, as detailed in the response 
to proposition P4.  In this phase, adopters described their experiences with the innovation, 
and often publicly detailed their problems in an attempt to get them resolved.  If these 
members were able to get their problems with the innovation resolved, they appeared to 
continue use of the innovation; likewise, if they were not able to resolve the problems, 
they appeared to discontinue use.  The change agents championing the innovation often 
attempted to publicly assist these adopters with their problems.  This behavior was also 
closely related to the persuasion phase, as members who were considering adoption 
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observed these exchanges and could decide to adopt or reject based on the 
implementation experiences of other members.  
     In the confirmation phase, also related to proposition P4, one of the best indicators 
that an innovation was going to be adopted by the community was when individual 
members would reinvent the innovation in their own offerings, in line with what had been 
predicted by Rogers (2003).  This reinvention could take different forms, including the 
repackaging of techniques (such as amplification attacks) by vendors into their own for-
profit offerings, or code from tools (such as minidos) that were incorporated into new 
tools, often with the author of the new tool crediting the original source.  Tutorials, 
frequently observed in these communities and whose presence often signaled that a 
community had adopted a particular tool or technique, were also a form of reinvention; 
tutorial authors wrote new content around an innovation and released that content to the 
community to aid in the adoption of the innovation.  
     The above innovation factors and important phases from the innovation-decision 
process, combined with our discussion of the importance of change agents, greatly aids in 
our understanding of the adoption process of these hacking innovations and in the second 
research question of the study.   
 
5.3 Discussion 
     This study attempted to understand how hacker communities innovate to overcome IS 
security countermeasures.  There are a number of important findings from this research, 
which significantly add to the body of knowledge of IS security literature as well as the 
technology adoption and innovation literature.  While studies of IS security adoption and 
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innovation within organizations are plentiful, this is the only known study which 
examines the innovation and adoption activities of blackhat hackers, in the underground 
communities where they spend much of their time.  These hackers are the human agents 
behind the attacks that cause organizations to spend so much money, and develop new 
countermeasure technologies, so detailed study of their own innovation processes was 
found to be lacking in the literature.  In fact, Mahmood et al. (2010) argue that more 
research focused on the activities of these blackhats is necessary, even though it may be 
harder for researchers to conduct.  Studies of criminal innovations themselves are fairly 
rare (Baker & Faulkner, 2003; Koller, 2010; Snynder, Priem, & Levitas, 2009), and to 
date, none have been observed which focus upon criminal or malicious IS innovations.  
Given the pace and breadth of hacking innovations observed in these communities, there 
are additional opportunities for study which may further enhance the IS security body of 
knowledge.  
     In the arena of innovation and adoption literature specifically, this study uncovered 
some counterintuitive findings.  While this research found that hacker communities reject 
innovations that are not compatible with the needs of the community – a seemingly-
obvious conclusion – it also found that these communities reject innovations because of a 
lack complexity or the negative image associated with adopting a particular hacking 
innovation.  Agarwal and Prasad (1997) noted that increased complexity is not always a 
barrier to adoption, as motivated adopters will overcome complex challenges; however, 
the present study has demonstrated that hackers seek out highly complex innovations and 
shun overly simplistic ones, which makes hacking communities unique in the innovation 
literature.  This study also highlighted the strong social pressures exerted through the 
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threat of negative image within some communities to not adopt certain innovations, or 
risk being labeled as a “script kiddie” or having your post displayed on the “Board of 
Shame”.  Prior innovation research has focused primarily upon the increase in image 
associated with adopting a particular innovation, not the reduction in image, suggesting a 
new arena of study for innovation researchers.  
     This study also confirmed the importance of hacking communities as a separate 
subculture where hackers learn from each other and seek to gain status, as described in 
numerous studies of hacker communities (Bratus, 2007; Holt & Copes, 2010; Jordan & 
Taylor, 1998).  Additionally, many of the activities that occurred within these 
communities – including posting new innovations, vouching for the activities of others, 
or providing feedback on new tools and techniques – were done by hacker participants 
who sought to gain “rep” and an elevation of image.  This importance of image also may 
have practical implications, as described in the next section.  
 
5.4 Practical Implications 
     There are a number of implications for policy and practice from this research.  By 
identifying the importance of change agents in the hacker tool and technique innovation 
process, parties seeking to disrupt this process – such as law enforcement, information 
security firms, or even targeted organizations – know which hackers to target to achieve 
maximum impact.  This disruption could include arresting senior members to remove 
their ability to support innovations, or coopting them to provide negative vouches to 
emerging innovations.  Tutorial authors could also be targeted in a similar fashion.  
Furthermore, by understanding which innovation factors were found to have the most 
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impact – image, complexity, and compatibility – organizations could seek to engage in 
online undercover operations within these communities to influence the innovation-
decision process.  While Holt (2013) has argued that engaging in simple slander attacks 
against hacker community members may be ineffective, this study may indicate that more 
sophisticated manipulations that focus upon these factors – such as complaints about the 
functionality of innovations, labeling innovations as too simplistic and more appropriate 
for script kiddies, or declaring certain classes of innovations, such as DDoS, not 
compatible with the objectives of a particular community – may have greater effect.  
     Another practical avenue may involve the economic disruption of the marketplaces 
observed in many of the communities in this study.  Many of the postings in these forums 
were financial in nature – members were selling tools or services for individual profit, 
and this marketplace, and the importance of reputation for these sellers, seemed to drive 
much of the innovation activity observed.  A focus upon disrupting these transactions, by 
introducing uncertainty into negotiations or by physically blocking them from occurring 
by targeting payment platforms, may make it harder for hacking tool or service sellers to 
profit from their innovations and may lead to a reduction in innovation activity overall.  
     Organizations could also seek to develop and utilize new or improved IS security 
countermeasures which incorporate the findings of this study.  For example, hackers were 
found to discourage the use of overly simplistic innovations, favoring more complex 
innovations, due in part to the reduction of image associated with the simpler 
innovations.  By focusing energies on defending against the more-complex innovations, 
organizations may sow confusion within the communities if the complex innovations 
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cease to be as effective, by pitting the desire for increased complexity against the need for 
success.  
 
5.5 Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
     This research included a number of assumptions, limitations, and delimitations.  One 
main assumption was that the participants of the hacking communities under study were 
actually engaging in the attacks that they claim to be, and as such are representative of 
hackers in general.  It is possible that some participants may not be conducting the attacks 
they claim, or may even be undercover law enforcement agents or other researchers; 
however, this research has taken the participants, their stated abilities, and their claims of 
past exploits at face value.   It was also assumed that interview participants were able to 
answer questions honestly; to help ensure this, the identities of the participants were kept 
anonymous and confidential.   
     The preset study also had several limitations.  For example, this study described 
innovation activities within a number of hacking communities, but these findings may not 
be representative for other hacking communities that may vary in size, membership, 
language, or other factors.  Another limitation of the study is that of time; this study 
occurred over a certain period of time, and as such reflected the activities, attitudes, and 
other conditions of the hacking communities during that time, which may not necessarily 
reflect what will occur at a later date.   
     To control the scope of this research endeavor, a number of delimitations were 
imposed.  For example, only those communities that primarily utilize the English 
language were examined.  Also, only those communities to which the researcher was able 
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to obtain access were investigated, such as public registration for web forums.  To further 
control the scope, only four cases were be analyzed.  
 
5.6 Evaluation of Research Rigor 
     As described in earlier chapters, this study applied a positivist philosophical approach 
to the understanding of hacker innovation.  To evaluate the rigor of this study, in addition 
to the previous discussion of threats to validity described in Chapter 3, the evaluation 
criteria proposed by Dubé and Paré (2003), which concerns positivist case studies 
specifically, will be employed. 
       Dubé and Paré (2003) lay out a number of criteria for the design of explanatory case 
studies.  First, they should have clear research questions, focusing upon well-defined and 
clearly stated “how”, “why”, or “what” questions.  The unit of analysis should also be 
specifically stated.  They should also employ a theory of interest and derive predictions 
from that theory, and should also include rival propositions to account for alternative 
explanations.  A successful and rigorous case study will also employ multiple-case design 
and replication logic within those cases.  The case context should be provided, consisting 
of a site description of the case and the time period of the case.  All of these 
recommendations for research design were followed in this study.  One design 
recommendation which was not followed was the employment of a team of researchers 
to collect data, as only a single researcher was utilized.  
     Similar evaluation criteria were provided by Dubé and Paré (2003) for the collection 
of data within explanatory case studies.  The data collection process should be 
elucidated, so readers of the research can determine which methods were employed.  
Multiple methods of collection should be utilized to achieve triangulation of the data.  In 
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the present study, the multiple methods of data collection were clearly described and 
triangulation of data was achieved.  A mix of qualitative and quantitative data should be 
collected; in the present study, most of the collected data was qualitative, but some 
quantitative data – namely, the frequency of conversations about specific innovations – 
was collected.  A case study protocol should be employed, and a case study database 
constructed to house the data – both of which were employed by the present study.  
     Finally, Dubé and Paré (2003) detail evaluation criteria for data analysis within 
explanatory, positivist case studies.  These include employing field notes and coding, as 
well as data displays such as tables, all of which were employed in the present study.  A 
logical chain of evidence should be maintained so a reader can follow the conclusions 
draw, and analytic strategies such as pattern-matching, explanation-building, and time-
series should be employed.  The present study indeed maintained a chain of evidence, 
and employed a combination of pattern-matching and explanation-building approaches.  
A time-series approach was not employed because the present study did not have an 
explicit time component, and a key feature of time-series analysis often involves the 
introduction of a particular intervention or improvement (Runeson & Höst, 2009), which 
was not a feature of this research.  Cross-case analysis should also be utilized to draw 
conclusions across cases, which occurred in this research.  Finally, using quotes from 
research subjects allows the reader to come to the same independent conclusions as the 
researcher, and were used extensively in this study.  
     It should be noted that Straub, Boudreau, and Gefan (2004) also provided criteria for 
evaluating rigor in positivist research.  However, their focus was on quantitative 
techniques, with very few mentions of qualitative methods.  Some of the criteria they 
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specify which could apply to qualitative research includes inter-rater reliability, which 
does not apply to this study as only a single researcher performed data collection, and 
content validity of the instrument through a literature review and expert panel.  In the 
present study, a literature review did guide the creation of the instrument (case study 
protocol); however, the final protocol was not reviewed by the expert panel convened 
earlier in the research.  This could be addressed in future research studies on this topic.  
 
5.7 Recommendations for Future Research 
     This study has created a number of opportunities for future research.  For example, the 
unit of analysis of this study was the hacker community itself, which resulted in a focus 
upon community-wide trends and behaviors, but with less focus upon aspects of DOI that 
pertain to individuals and their influences.  These aspects include classifying individual 
adopters into adoption categories – such as early adopters, laggards, and so forth – and 
quantifying how many of each category were present for various innovations, as well as 
what critical mass of adopters much be present for the community as a whole to adopt.  
Future research could examine the impact of individual hackers within the community 
and follow these individuals as they interact with various innovations, to determine which 
ones they support or reject, and why.  Such research could also examine individual 
hackers to determine if they might be placed into different adoption categories for 
different types of innovations.  
     Future research could also explore in greater depth communications that occur outside 
of the communities, to answer questions about the efficacy of different communication 
types and locations.  In addition, subsequent research endeavors could examine these 
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communities from a cross-cultural perspective, to determine if hackers from different 
cultures or who speak different languages adopt hacking tools and techniques in different 
fashions.  One final area of future research may address the possibility that outwardly 
unpopular innovations – such as Havij – may in fact be adopted in secret to preserve the 
image of adopters.  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
     This research conducted a comprehensive multi-part case study of four distinct 
hacking communities, applying a Diffusion of Innovations lens to understand how these 
communities adopted or rejected hacking innovations that had diffused through the 
communities.  These innovations were developed within these underground communities 
to overcome IS security countermeasures erected by organizations to defend against an 
ever-increasing barrage of cyberattacks.  The cycle of innovation, attack, and 
countermeasure is incredibly costly for defending organizations, an equation that is 
wildly out of balance, with the defenders bearing the overwhelming brunt of costs.  
Further insight into the hacker innovation diffusion process within these communities 
was needed to begin to understand how to disrupt this cycle.  
     This research highlighted a number of key findings where future deterrent and 
disruption efforts may be targeted.  First, hackers within these communities highly value 
innovations which fill a specific hacking need, often to overcome specific IS security 
countermeasures such as firewalls, antivirus, and DDoS protections.  Change agents were 
also found to be very important – these change agents included the developer of the 
hacking tool or technique innovation, senior hackers within the underground hacking 
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community, and the authors of hacking tutorials, each of whom had the ability to 
champion an innovation and influence its adoption.  To be successfully adopted and 
diffused, these innovations that are introduced to and developed within these 
communities need to be compatible with the needs of the members and need to be 
complex enough so that hackers can adopt them without being perceived as having low 
skills.  This requirement of complexity for perception’s sake is related to the overall 
image that a hacking innovation confers on a potential adopter.  Image by itself was 
found to be an important factor, but not a critical one, as many hacking innovations 
which conferred a lower image – such as SQL injection and Havij – were adopted, 
perhaps reluctantly, by these communities.  
     This research also examined the innovation-decision process that occurs when hacking 
innovations are evaluated and adopted by the hackers that make up the members of the 
communities in this study.  The persuasion phase of the process was found to be quite 
important within these communities – senior members often vouched for innovations 
they found to be worthy, and members selling innovations sought these vouches by 
providing “vouch copies” of hacking tools or services – such as bulletproof hosting 
services, or DDoS tools – to senior members.  Developers of rival hacking innovations, 
such as operators of competitor booter services, also frequently attempted to disparage 
innovations in this phase and convince members not to adopt.  The implementation phase 
was also found to be critical, as during this phase members would frequently discuss 
problems they were having with the hacking tools and techniques they were in the 
process of adopting.  If these problems were not resolved to the satisfaction of the 
adopter, the innovation was frequently rejected – and this occurred in public, so other 
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members in their own persuasion phases were influenced by the outcome of the 
implementation phase of the hacking innovation.  In contrast, innovations where the 
developer was able to resolve the issue of the adopter experienced increased adoption by 
other hackers.  Finally, the confirmation phase was an excellent indicator of whether an 
innovation was discontinued or continued to be adopted.  One of the most reliable 
indicators of continued use was the reinvention of the innovation, as other members 
would incorporate the innovation – either techniques, such as amplification attacks, or 
direct code, such as minidos – into their own tools that were released to the community.  
Tutorial writing was also found to be a form of reinvention that was popular within some 
communities, and was a reliable indicator that the community had successfully adopted 
the hacking innovation.  
     This study of the innovation diffusion and adoption process for the examined 
innovations was a starting point in the overall understanding of hacker innovations, but 
was illuminative in its own right.  By incorporating the findings of this research, 
organizations and IS security firms can develop approaches to disrupt the innovation 
diffusion process and either develop appropriate defenses, or prevent these hacking tool 
and technique innovations from reaching their IS security countermeasures in the first 
place.  
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